Chrison v. H & H INTERIORS, INC.
| Decision Date | 20 March 1998 |
| Docket Number | No. A97A2435., No. A97A2434 |
| Citation | 500 S.E.2d 41,232 Ga. App. 45 |
| Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
| Parties | CHRISON v. H & H INTERIORS, INC. et al. HOLT v. CHRISON. |
500 S.E.2d 41
232 Ga. App. 45
v.
H & H INTERIORS, INC. et al.
HOLT
v.
CHRISON
Nos. A97A2434, A97A2435.
Court of Appeals of Georgia.
March 20, 1998.
Reconsideration Denied April 3, 1998.
Certiorari Denied September 11, 1998.
Decker & Hallman, David C. Moss, Atlanta, Anne L. Hunt, for Holt and H & H Interiors, Inc. et al.
SMITH, Judge.
On July 25, 1996, Chris Chrison filed this action in the State Court of DeKalb County against H & H Interiors, Inc. ("H & H"), Scott Sherrill, and Mark Holt, seeking to recover damages for defendants' alleged breach of a contract for the sale of Chrison's carpet business. The complaint later was amended to add a claim for fraud.
Holt and Sherrill are Georgia residents, and H & H is a Georgia corporation. But prior to filing this action, Chrison previously filed suit against defendants on March 8, 1995, in the Chancery Court of Davidson County, Tennessee, seeking damages for the breach of the same contract of sale (the "Tennessee action").
H & H was never served in the Tennessee action and therefore did not file an answer.1 When Sherrill and Holt could not be located, the sheriff gave the complaint and summons to the regional manager of H & H at the corporation's place of business in Tennessee. Sherrill and Holt did not answer the Tennessee complaint but moved to dismiss, alleging insufficiency of service of process because neither defendant was personally served.
The Tennessee court ruled on Holt's motion to dismiss but not on Sherrill's, and Holt was dismissed from the Tennessee action without [232 Ga. App. 46] prejudice on June 5, 1995.2 The entire Tennessee action subsequently was
After Chrison filed this action in DeKalb State Court, all three defendants filed answers and discovery responses making no mention of the affirmative defense of res judicata. But a year after the Tennessee action's dismissal, apparently when under Tennessee law the dismissal could no longer be set aside, all three defendants moved for summary judgment in the DeKalb action on the ground that the DeKalb action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The trial court denied Holt's motion because he was dismissed without prejudice from the Tennessee action prior to judgment. The trial court granted the motions of Sherrill and H & H because in Tennessee, unlike the law in Georgia, a dismissal for failure of prosecution operates as an adjudication on the merits unless the order expressly provides otherwise. See, e.g., Madyun v. Ballard, 783 S.W.2d 946, 948 (Tenn.App.1989). In Case No. A97A2434, Chrison appeals the trial court's ruling granting summary judgment to H & H and Sherrill. In Case No. A97A2435, Holt cross-appeals the trial court's ruling denying his motion for summary judgment.
Case No. A97A2434
1. Chrison's first four enumerations will be considered together because they address overlapping issues. Broadly stated, Chrison argues the Tennessee judgment does not act as a bar to the present action because the Tennessee court did not have jurisdiction over defendants due to insufficiency of service of process; the Tennessee judgment is not entitled to full faith and credit because it is void on its face; and the Tennessee judgment does not serve as a judgment on the merits for purposes of res judicata.
Georgia's principle of res judicata, codified as OCGA § 9-12-40, provides that "[a] judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction shall be conclusive between the same parties and their privies as to all matters put in issue or which under the rules of law might have been put in issue in the cause wherein the judgment was rendered until the judgment is reversed or set aside." See also Fowler v. Vineyard, 261 Ga. 454, 455, 405 S.E.2d 678 (1991).
The doctrine of full faith and credit renders the judgments and [232 Ga. App. 47] adjudications of courts of sister states of competent jurisdiction res judicata in this state unless the court lacked personal or subject matter jurisdiction or unless the judgment was procured by fraud. Tandy Computer Leasing v. Bennett's Svc. Co., 188 Ga.App. 594, 373 S.E.2d 647 (1988). The doctrine of res judicata makes conclusive a prior foreign judgment between the parties and their privies as to all matters placed in issue or that might have been placed in issue, including jurisdictional issues. Id. See also Gordon v. Gordon, 237 Ga. 171(1), 227 S.E.2d 53 (1976).
Several prerequisites must be established in order for the res judicata doctrine to apply: (1) identity of cause of action; (2) identity of parties; (3) prior adjudication by a court of competent jurisdiction; and (4) a full and fair opportunity for the party against whom the doctrine of res judicata is raised to have litigated the issues in the first action. Fowler, supra at 455-456, 405 S.E.2d 678. See also Sorrells Constr. Co. v. Chandler Armentrout, etc., P.C., 214 Ga.App. 193, 194, 447 S.E.2d 101 (1994); Bradley v. Ga. Institute of Technology, 228 Ga.App. 216, 217, 491 S.E.2d 453 (1997). Additionally, OCGA § 9-12-42 provides that the merits of the case must have been adjudicated for the judgment to be a bar to subsequent action. State Bar of Ga. v. Beazley, 256 Ga. 561, 562(1), 350 S.E.2d 422 (1986); Fowler, supra at 456(2), 405 S.E.2d 678.
(a) Sherrill. Applying these principles to the facts of this case, we find the trial court correctly determined that res judicata bars the present action against Sherrill.
First, identity of claims exists in both the DeKalb and Tennessee actions. Both complaints seek damages against Sherrill for his alleged breach of the contract of sale of Chrison's carpet business. By pleading the same breach of contract claim in both actions, Chrison seeks to reassert exactly the same claim previously asserted and dismissed in the Tennessee court.
Under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution, a judgment of a foreign court will be enforced by courts of this state. That judgment may be collaterally attacked when the foreign court lacked jurisdiction of the person or subject matter. Gordon, supra at 171(1), 227 S.E.2d 53. But when a party appears and defends in the foreign court, the judgment of that court, regular upon its face, may not be attacked in the courts of this state. And when the issue of jurisdiction is raised in the foreign court and decided against a party...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Ga. Power Co. v. Brandreth Farms, LLC.
... ... See Chrison v. H & H Interiors , 232 Ga. App. 45, 50 (2), 500 S.E.2d 41 (1998) ("Res judicata is an ... Wylie , 229 Ga. App. 282, 283 (2), 494 S.E.2d 60 (1997), quoting Glen Oak, Inc. v. Henderson , 258 Ga. 455, 458, n.4, 369 S.E.2d 736 (1988). 17 Mayer , 229 Ga. App. at ... ...
-
The Ga. Power Co. v. Brandreth Farms, LLC
...res judicata defense in its answer, it raised it by motion, and therefore, it did not waive the defense. See Chrison v. H & H Interiors, 232 Ga.App. 45, 50 (2) (500 S.E.2d 41) (1998) ("Res judicata is an affirmative defense and must be pleaded affirmatively. OCGA § 9-11-8 (c). The purpose o......
-
Smith v. AIRTOUCH CELLULAR OF GEORGIA
...534 S.E.2d 832244 Ga. App. 71SMITH ... AIRTOUCH CELLULAR OF GEORGIA, INC ... AirTouch Cellular of Georgia, Inc ... AirTouch Cellular of Georgia, Inc ... Nos. A00A0710, ... Williamson, 247 Ga. 260, 261-262, 275 S.E.2d 42 (1981); Chrison v. H & H Interiors, 232 Ga.App. 45, 49, 500 S.E.2d 41 (1998). "Choice of law provisions that may ... ...
-
Widner v. Brookins, Inc.
... ... See Chrison v. H & H Interiors, 232 Ga.App. 45, 50(2), 500 S.E.2d 41 (1998); Siegrist v. Iwuagwa, 229 Ga.App. 508, 511(1), 494 S.E.2d 180 (1997) ... ...