Olson v. EG&G IDAHO, INC.

• Citation: 9 P.3d 1244,134 Idaho 778
• Decision Date: 07 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. 23611.,23611.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: Sondra OLSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EG&G IDAHO, INC., and Constance C. Blackwood, Defendants-Respondents.

9 P.3d 1244

134 Idaho 778

Sondra OLSON, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. EG&G IDAHO, INC., and Constance C. Blackwood, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 23611.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Rexburg, May 2000 Term.

September 7, 2000.

Stephen A. Meikle, Idaho Falls, for appellant.

Pike & Shurtliff, Idaho Falls, for respondents. Edward W. Pike argued.

KIDWELL, Justice.

In this employment discrimination case, the appellant was terminated for "poor performance" and "no indication of willing[ness] to improve." The appellant claimed that the allegations were false and that the employer was discriminating against her. Prior to trial, the district court granted summary judgment to the employer on many of the appellant's claims. Following a jury trial on the remaining claims, the district court granted judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) on the claims in which the jury found for the appellant. The decision of the district court is affirmed.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In June of 1975, Sondra Olson began working for Aero Jet Company at the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory (INEL) (now INEEL). In 1976, when Aero Jet was replaced by EG&G Idaho, Olsen was employed as a project control representative. Thirteen years later, Olson was promoted to EG&G's Academic Programs Office (APO). In this position, Olson was responsible for the fellowship research program of the Associated Western Universities (AWU). The AWU, a consortium of 50 universities, was under contract with the U.S. Department of Energy. The AWU was responsible for recruiting university students, usually at the under-graduate level, for summer jobs. When applications were received, Olson would pair the students with appropriate mentor engineers who requested assistance for research projects. Olson also coordinated student security clearances and assisted students with finding accommodations during the summer. Between 1989 and 1993, the APO grew significantly, as did Olson's responsibilities for the AWU program. During this time of growth, Olson was rated good to excellent on the performance of her responsibilities.

In March of 1993, the Department of Energy gave EG & G Idaho a negative performance evaluation during a semi-annual review. Also in March of 1993, respondent Constance C. Blackwood was appointed manager of the APO as well as Olson's supervisor. Soon after becoming Olson's supervisor, Blackwood began to require Olson to perform specific tasks in limited amounts of time. On March 22, 1993, Blackwood directed Olson to input 700-800 AWU applications and to develop an acknowledgement letter all in the same day. Olson testified that Blackwood gave her similar directives that were not possible to accomplish in the time allotted.

Blackwood testified that after being appointed manager of the APO, she began receiving phone calls about Olson's performance. Blackwood noted that Olson had not submitted several weekly reports to the Department of Energy. She further stated that although she had met with Olson on several occasions to remedy Olson's poor performance, Olson had not been responsive to her suggestions.

On May 7, 1993, Blackwood met with the Women's Program Manager, Arantza Zabala, to discuss Olson's performance. Sherree Schell of EG&G Idaho's Human Resource Office was also at the meeting. During the meeting, it was determined that a corrective action plan would be implemented to educate Olson on her deficiencies and to determine whether Olson was capable of adequately performing the job. Blackwood showed the plan to Olson on July 9, 1993. Thereafter Olson and Blackwood met every Friday to discuss Olson's performance under the plan. Blackwood testified that during these meetings Olson was unresponsive to Blackwood's suggestions. Olson described the meetings as extremely unpleasant and uncomfortable.

On August 12, 1993, Blackwood terminated Olson as an EG&G Idaho employee because Olson had failed to comply with the corrective action plan in a satisfactory manner. After being informed of the termination, Olson returned to her work station where she was met by armed security guards. The security guards escorted Olson to her car with her belongings, consisting of a refrigerator and several boxes of personal items.

Olson testified that following her termination she suffered from anxiety attacks and depression. Olson stated that she constantly worried about what her fellow employees at EG&G Idaho were thinking about her being escorted by armed security guards. Olson's psychiatrist testified that Olson required medication to control depression and that without medication Olson had a 90% chance of relapsing into depression.

On December 28, 1993, Olson filed a complaint against EG&G Idaho, Blackwood, and John Does I-X, alleging wrongful discharge, defamation, self-defamation and emotional distress. Olson made her first motion to amend her complaint on June 21, 1994, seeking to add claims for violation of privacy and violation of civil rights. Following the EEOC's notice of right to sue, Olson filed a second amended complaint on December 15, 1994, adding age and disability discrimination claims as well as a claim under the False Claims Act (31 U.S.C. § 3729).

On January 20, 1995, EG&G Idaho and Blackwood (respondents) moved to dismiss portions of Olson's second amended complaint. On August 10, 1995, the district court dismissed John Does I-X and Olson's False Claims Act claim. Olson filed her third amended complaint on August 30, 1995. On February 13, 1996, she moved to amend her complaint a fourth time, this time adding another False Claims Act claim as well as breach of contract and equal protection claims. Also on February 13, 1996, respondents filed for summary judgment on all claims.

In an order dated April 9, 1996, the district court granted respondents summary judgment on Olson's claims for wrongful termination, self-defamation, negligent infliction of emotional distress, violation of privacy, violation of due process/civil rights (42 U.S.C. § 1983), and age and disability discrimination under the Idaho Human Rights Act. The court denied the motion as to defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court also denied the motion to dismiss Blackwood as a party defendant. On April 18, 1996, Olson moved for reconsideration, however the district court denied her motion.

Olson moved to amend her complaint for a sixth time on August 8, 1996. The district court denied Olson's sixth amended complaint but allowed her to file a seventh amended complaint to provide more specific and definite allegations than those contained in the sixth. On August 28, 1996, Olson filed a motion to amend her seventh amended complaint to add a claim under the False Claims Act and to add EG&G, Inc., the parent corporation of EG&G Idaho, as a party.

On September 19, 1996, respondents moved to dismiss EG&G, Inc. as a party and to dismiss Olson's False Claims Act claim. The district court granted respondents' motions, denied Olson leave to amend her seventh amended complaint to add EG & G, Inc. and dismissed Olson's False Claims Act claim.

A jury trial began on December 3, 1996. At the close of Olson's case, respondents moved for a directed verdict on all claims. The district court granted the motion as to the claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Blackwood, but denied the motion as to the remainder of Olson's claims. On December 18, 1996, the jury began deliberations. During deliberations the jury sent out a note concerning jury instruction number 15, intentional infliction of emotional distress. Over Olson's objection, the district court modified the instruction to include examples from cases where courts had found intentional infliction of extreme emotional distress.

The jury entered special verdicts on December 19, 1996. The jury found that Olson had established a case of defamation against Blackwood, but not against EG&G Idaho. The jury also found that Olson had not proven her case of intentional infliction of emotional distress against EG&G Idaho. Following the jury's special verdicts, the parties made opposing motions for j.n.o.v. The district court granted Blackwood's motion and denied Olson's. On February 3, 1996, Olson filed a timely notice of appeal.

II. ANALYSIS

A. The District Court Did Not Err In Granting Blackwood's Motion For J.N.O.V. On Olson's Defamation Claim.

The district court granted Blackwood's motion because it found there was not enough evidence that Blackwood acted with malice. On appeal, Olson claims that the district court erred because it ruled contrary to its ruling on Blackwood's motion for a directed verdict following the close of Olson's case. Alternatively, Olson argues that the jury was presented with substantial evidence of Blackwood's malice.

In reviewing a decision to grant or deny a motion for j.n.o.v., or a directed verdict, this Court applies the same standard as that applied by the trial court when originally ruling on the motion. Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759, 764, 727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986). When a court reviews a motion for j.n.o.v. under I.R.C.P. 50(b), the motion is treated as a delayed motion for a directed verdict and the same standard is applied for both. Quick, 111 Idaho at 763, 727 P.2d at 1191. When ruling on a motion for j.n.o.v., the trial court must determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the jury's verdict. Lanham v. Idaho Power Co., 130 Idaho 486, 495, 943 P.2d 912, 921 (1997). "Upon a motion for JNOV, the moving party . . . admits the truth of all the adverse evidence and all inferences that can be drawn legitimately from it." Id. at 496, 943 P.2d at 922. It is not a question of no evidence on the side of the non-moving party, but rather, whether there is substantial evidence upon which a jury could find for the non-moving party. Quick, 111 Idaho at 763,727 P.2d at 1191. This Court will not make a finding of substantial evidence in favor...