Manion, by, &C., v. Ohio Valley Railway Co.

• Decision Date: 18 June 1896
• Citation: 99 Ky. 504
• Parties: Manion, By, &c., v. Ohio Valley Railway Company.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

Page 504

99 Ky. 504

Manion, By, &c., v. Ohio Valley Railway Company.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

June 18, 1896.

APPEAL FROM HENDERSON CIRCUIT COURT.

S. B. & R. D. VANCE FOR APPELLANT.

JUDGE LANDES DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

The question raised in this case is whether the guardian of the infant appellant had the lawful power to bind him by compromising a claim for damages against the appellee, alleged to have been caused by reason of the negligence of the appellee.

It seems that the infant appellant was in the service of the appellee company on the 27th day of July, 1892, in the capacity of watchman and fireman on one of its engines, and that on that day, at McLean Station, on Green River Island, between Henderson and Evansville, he stumbled over a pile of rocks and fell upon the railroad track in front of the engine, and his leg was run over and broken and "so badly mutilated that it had to be amputated just below the knee."

Afterwards James F. Manion, his father, was appointed and qualified as his guardian, and compromised with the company for the sum of four hundred dollars, which was paid by the company and the receipt of the guardian taken for the amount, which reads as follows: "Received, March 31, 1893, of the Ohio Valley Railway Company, the sum of four hundred dollars, in full compromise, satisfaction and discharge of all claims or causes of action against it, or any of its lessees, and particularly of all claims or causes of action arising out of injuries received by Matthew Manion, by loss of leg, by being run over by engine No. 6, on O. V. Railway, near mile 494, on or about July 27, 1892."

Action was commenced against the company by the infant, suing by his said guardian, on the 30th day of June, 1893, seeking to recover five thousand dollars in damages for the alleged injury. Defense was made, in which the alleged negligence was denied, and the said compromise and payment of four hundred dollars, and receipt therefor, were set up as a full discharge of the company from all further liability to the infant appellant.

In the reply it was admitted in substance that the compromise was made, and the four hundred dollars were paid as alleged in the answer; but it was averred that "in consideration of the payment of said sum, and the agreement of defendant to furnish a place and employment to the plaintiff, his guardian did agree that same should be a settlement of all claims and causes of action against the defendant arising out of said injury."

It was then averred...