Ragland v. Anderson, &C.
Citation | 125 Ky. 141 |
Parties | Ragland v. Anderson, &c. Tinsley, Clerk, v. Keown |
Decision Date | 20 March 1907 |
Court | Court of Appeals of Kentucky |
Appeals from Butler Circuit Court and Ohio Circuit Court.
From the judgment in favor of plaintiffs in each case defendants appeal. Affirmed.
LEWIS McQUOWN, BARNETT & SMITH and M. L. HEAVRIN, attorneys for appellants.
JAMES S. MORRIS, attorney for appellants.
W. A. HALBERT and WORTHINGTON & COCHRAN for appellees.
W. H. HOLT and GEORGE DuRELLE for appellees.
These cases involve the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly of the commonwealth of Kentucky, entitled "An act dividing the State of Kentucky into 100 representative districts," approved March 23, 1906 (Acts 1906, p. 472, c. 139). They were heard together, and, as they involve the same question, will be treated as one case in this opinion.
In the first case, S. A. Anderson filed a petition in equity in the Butler circuit court, alleging that he was a citizen, taxpayer, and voter of that county; that he possessed all of the qualifications to be a representative in the Legislature of Kentucky, and was an announced candidate for the Republican nomination for the office of representative from the district composed of Butler and Edmonson counties; that by an act of the General Assembly of May 3, 1893, Butler and Edmonson counties constituted the Twenty-Fifth legislative district, which was entitled to have one representative in the Legislature; that by the act of March 23, 1906, Ohio county was joined with Butler and Edmonson counties, and designated as the Twenty-Sixth district; that the defendants (appellants) were the Republican chairmen of the three counties, and under their party law constituted the committee of the district thus created, and that this committee have ordered a primary election to be held in the three counties to name a Republican candidate for the office of representative; that the plaintiff (appellee) is a resident of Butler county, and entitled to be elected by the voters of Butler and Edmonson counties; that the defendants are proposing to and will hold a primary election for representative for the district composed of Ohio, Butler, and Edmonson counties; and that the plaintiff will be compelled to submit his claims to the voters of the three counties, instead of to the voters of Butler and Edmonson counties, unless the defendants are enjoined from so doing. In the second case, the appellee Keown filed a petition in the Ohio circuit court, averring that he was a citizen, taxpayer, and voter of that county, and possessed all of the qualifications of a representative of the Legislature of Kentucky, and he seeks an injunction against the clerk of Ohio county restraining him from refusing to place his name upon the official ballots of that county, and also to restrain him from placing the names of candidates from either of the other counties — Butler or Edmonson — on the official ballots of Ohio county.
In both petitions it is alleged that the act of March 23, 1906, is unconstitutional and void, because it violates section 33 of the Constitution of Kentucky, in that the representative districts constituted by it are grossly unequal both in population and area. In speaking of the inequality of the act under discussion it is alleged as follows:
Without analyzing the allegations of the petitions with overnice particularity, it is deemed sufficient to say that, in our opinion, they contain such a statement of facts with reference to the inequality of the representative districts of the state that the demurrers, which confess these allegations, raise sufficiently for adjudication the validity of the act which is assailed. The allegations upon which is predicated the infirmity of the act are substantially the same in both petitions. General demurrers were filed to each of them, and overruled by the trial courts. The defendants declined to answer, and thereupon judgments were entered holding the act of the General Assembly under discussion invalid, and perpetuating the temporary injunctions which had been granted at the commencement of the actions. From these judgments the defendants have appealed.
Section 33 of the Constitution is as follows:
The first proposition with which we are confronted is raised by the insistence of appellants, that the question involved here is political, and not judicial, and that the courts have not jurisdiction to review the acts of the General Assembly in the matter. To this we cannot agree. It is for the courts to measure the acts of the General Assembly by the standard of the Constitution,...
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