Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. State
| Decision Date | 10 August 1979 |
| Docket Number | No. 49079,49137.,49079 |
| Citation | 289 NW 2d 396 |
| Parties | MINNESOTA MINING AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY, petitioner, Respondent-Appellant, v. STATE of Minnesota, by William L. Wilson, Department of Human Rights, Appellant-Respondent. In the Matter of an Appeal by the STATE of Minnesota BY William L. WILSON, Commissioner, Department of Human Rights, from a Decision of a Hearing Examiner. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Oppenheimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard & Donnelly, Thomas P. Kane, Robert R. Reinhart, Jr., and Keith E. Goodwin, St. Paul, for respondent-appellant.
Warren Spannaus, Atty. Gen., and Richard B. Allyn, Sol. Gen., St. Paul, Erica Jacobson, Sp. Asst. Atty. Gen., St. Paul, for appellant-respondent.
Peterson, Popovich, Knutson & Flynn and Thomas M. Sipkins, St. Paul, for Ind. Sch. Dist. No. 547 et al.
Gary Green, St. Paul, for Minn. Ed. Assn.
Heard, considered, and decided by the court en banc.
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company (3M) and the Minnesota Department of Human Rights (department) both appeal from the judgment of the district court in a sex discrimination case arising out of 3M's exclusion from its income maintenance plan (IMP) of women absent from work due to pregnancy. The issues raised on appeal are:
We hold that the exclusion of pregnancy-related absences from an otherwise comprehensive income maintenance plan is per se sex discrimination within the meaning of the Minnesota Human Rights Act, Minn.St. c. 363, both before and after the 1977 amendments to that act. We further hold that ERISA does not pre-empt the Minnesota Human Rights Act from prohibiting unfair discrimination and that the district court correctly defined the class of women represented by the department in this action. We accordingly affirm the decision of the district court, but we direct that judgment also be granted to the department on behalf of Judith Troye, the individual who originally filed the charge of discrimination. We remand the case to the hearing examiner solely to determine the members of the class and the amount of damages.
On February 6, 1974, Troye filed with the department a charge of discrimination1 against her employer, 3M. She alleged that 3M denied her and other female employees monetary compensation under its comprehensive income maintenance plan for disabilities related to pregnancy. The department investigated the allegations in the charge, and the commissioner found probable cause to believe that 3M was violating the Minnesota Human Rights Act. On March 2, 1977, after attempts at conciliation had failed, the commissioner issued a class action complaint.
The matter was assigned to a hearing examiner. The department and 3M each moved for summary judgment, and the hearing examiner issued her decision on September 16, 1977. She certified the case as a class action on behalf of all present or former female employees of 3M in Minnesota who were on pregnancy leave of absence from a salaried position at 3M at any time between August 6, 1973, and December 31, 1974. She granted judgment for the department on behalf of the class, on the basis that 3M engaged in illegal sex discrimination. She also granted judgment for 3M for the period on and after January 1, 1975, on the basis that ERISA pre-empted the Minnesota Human Rights Act from applying to 3M's employee benefit plan after that date.
The department and 3M each filed a petition in Ramsey County District Court for judicial review pursuant to Minn.St. 15.0424 and 363.072. In an order issued May 25, 1978, the district court affirmed the conclusion that 3M engaged in illegal sex discrimination, reversed the hearing examiner's ruling that ERISA pre-empted the Minnesota Human Rights Act, and modified the class to consist of all present or former employees of 3M in Minnesota who were on a pregnancy leave of absence from a salaried position at 3M at any time on or after September 2, 1976, to March 25, 1978, the date of the order. 3M and the department have each appealed to this court from the judgment entered in district court.
The 1977 version of the Minnesota Human Rights Act defines "sex" as follows:
"`Sex\' includes, but is not limited to, pregnancy, childbirth, and disabilities related to pregnancy or childbirth." Minn.St. 363.01, subd. 29.
The 1977 version delineates various unfair discriminatory practices, including:
3M's IMP obviously violates the current version of the Minnesota Human Rights Act. 3M argues, however, that its IMP did not run afoul of the pre-1977 act. Prior to June 3, 1977, the effective date of the 1977 amendments, the Minnesota Human Rights Act prohibited discrimination in employment on the basis of sex, but did not specifically mention pregnancy and childbirth. Minn.St.1976, § 363.03, subd. 1. 3M argues, therefore, that it was not discriminating on the basis of sex when it excluded pregnancy-related absences from its IMP prior to June 3, 1977. 3M contends that the 1969 Minnesota Legislature, which originally enacted the sex discrimination provision, adopted it from a similar provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(a), and intended the same interpretation of sex discrimination as that given Title VII by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). At that time, the EEOC had construed Title VII as not reaching the exclusion of pregnancy-related absences from income maintenance plans. 3M further contends the pregnancy exclusion is reasonable, exhibits no intent to harm women, and, in fact, has no adverse effect upon women.
We believe, however, as the department argues, that the 1977 amendments to the Minnesota Human Rights Act clarified rather than changed existing state law. The 1977 amendments were prefaced by the following description: "An act relating to human rights; clarifying the scope of sex discrimination * * *." L.1977, c. 408. The impetus for the 1977 amendments was the United States Supreme Court's decision in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 97 S.Ct. 401, 50 L.Ed.2d 343 (1976), which held by a 6 to 3 divided court that the exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from G.E.'s disability plan was not sex discrimination under Title VII. The sponsors of the 1977 amendments emphasized that the legislation was intended to merely clarify that the Minnesota sex discrimination provision was not to have the same interpretation as Title VII after the Gilbert decision.2 For instance, Representative Ann Wynia, immediately prior to the passage of the 1977 amendments bill, responded to a question on the House floor, as follows:
"* * * We know the interpretation that has been given to the prohibition on the discrimination of sex in the Minnesota Human Rights Act but in light of this United States Supreme Court decision, let\'s just clarify the meaning consistently with the interpretation we have had in the past."
We note two additional factors which lead us to this conclusion. First, the origin of the original sex discrimination provision enacted in 1969 (L.1969, c. 975) is unclear. Contrary to 3M's contention that Title VII was the model for our statute, at least one commentator has suggested that the Minnesota Human Rights Act owes its primary heritage to the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Anti-Discrimination Act,3 which the Minnesota Legislature "had before it" at the time it adopted the antidiscrimination laws, rather than Title VII. See, Auerbach, The 1967 Amendments to the Minnesota State Act Against Discrimination and the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Anti-Discrimination Act: A Comparative Analysis and Evaluation, 52 Minn.L. Rev. 231, 232, 245. See, also, Auerbach, The 1969 Amendments to the Minnesota State Act Against Discrimination and the Uniform Law Commissioners' Model Anti-Discrimination Act: A Comparative Analysis and Evaluation, 55 Minn.L.Rev. 259, 260.
Second, it is quite likely that the legislature which enacted the original sex discrimination provision in 1969 did not have in mind a particular application of the provision but instead contemplated that the department would interpret the provision as circumstances arose. The department appears to have consistently treated pregnancy classifications as sex based and has held prior to the 1977 amendments that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is sex discrimination.4 On March 23, 1971, a hearing examiner of the department concluded that a county welfare board violated the Minnesota Human Rights Act by terminating a female employee when she took an unauthorized leave of absence for maternity purposes. State v. Crow Wing County Welfare Board, 3 Empl.Pract. Guide (CCH) ¶ 24,399.15. This interpretation by the agency charged with enforcing the statute is, of course, entitled to great weight. See, Steere v. State, Dept. of Public Welfare, 308 Minn. 390, 243 N.W.2d 112 (1976). We hold that the...
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