United States v. McCranie, 17-1058
Citation | 889 F.3d 677 |
Decision Date | 03 May 2018 |
Docket Number | No. 17-1058,17-1058 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. Edward Dean MCCRANIE, a/k/a Edward Dean McCrainie, Defendant–Appellant. |
Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (10th Circuit) |
Submitted on the briefs:* Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public Defender, and Howard A. Pincus, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Office of the Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant–Appellant.
Robert C. Troyer, United States Attorney, and James C. Murphy, Assistant United States Attorney, Office of the United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff–Appellee.
Before HARTZ, SEYMOUR, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
We must determine whether a conviction for federal bank robbery categorically qualifies as a crime of violence under the elements clause of the career-offender sentencing guideline. We conclude that it does, so exercising jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
Edward Dean McCranie pleaded guilty to federal bank robbery. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).1 The presentence report (PSR) treated that conviction as a crime of violence under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) Manual § 4B1.2(a)(1)—as it also did for McCranie's earlier convictions for federal bank robbery, see 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), and Colorado aggravated robbery, see Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-302(1)(d) (2017). With these predicate convictions, McCranie qualified as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).2 As a career offender, McCranie's total offense level rose to 29, and his criminal history category rose to VI. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). Under the sentencing table, the advisory guideline range is 151 to 188 months' imprisonment.
At the sentencing hearing, McCranie objected to the PSR's career-offender recommendation, arguing that none of his three referenced felony convictions qualify as a crime of violence. The district court rejected this argument. First, it noted that under our circuit's precedent Colorado robbery qualifies as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). Second, it reached the same conclusion for federal bank robbery. So the district court applied the career-offender enhancement and sentenced McCranie to a mid-level, 175–month term of imprisonment.
On appeal, McCranie raises the same issues: He claims that neither Colorado robbery nor federal bank robbery qualify as a crime of violence. But he "recognize[s] that this court has held that Colorado robbery is categorically a crime of violence."3 Appellant's Opening Br. at 45 ( ); see also United States v. Crump , 674 Fed.Appx. 802, 803 (10th Cir. 2017) (unpublished) ().
So we can resolve this appeal by deciding one issue—whether federal bank robbery by taking property by force, violence, or intimidation qualifies categorically as a crime of violence. If so, then McCranie qualifies as a career offender under § 4B1.1. We review de novo whether a prior conviction qualifies as a crime of violence under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). See United States v. Maldonado–Palma , 839 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2016).
In the district court, the government relied on only the elements clause of § 4B1.2(a). Under that section, "[t]he term ‘crime of violence’ means any offense under federal or state law, punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that ... has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another ...." U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1). In deciding whether McCranie's convictions qualify as crimes of violence under this language, we must determine whether his federal bank robbery offenses categorically meet the crime-of-violence definition without reference to the underlying facts of his convictions.4 United States v. Armijo , 651 F.3d 1226, 1230 (10th Cir. 2011). To decide if they do, we focus on the elements of the statute forming the basis of his convictions. United States v. Taylor , 843 F.3d 1215, 1220 (10th Cir. 2016) (citing Descamps v. United States , 570 U.S. 254, 257, 133 S.Ct. 2276, 186 L.Ed.2d 438 (2013) ).
The relevant portion of the federal bank-robbery statute requires a taking, or attempted taking, of property "by force and violence, or by intimidation." 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a). The parties agree that "intimidation" captures the least culpable conduct supporting federal bank robbery. So for that crime to categorically be a crime of violence under § 4B1.2(a)(1), bank robbery by intimidation must require the threatened use of physical force. See Harris , 844 F.3d at 1268 n.9 ().
With all that in mind, we turn to McCranie's arguments: (1) that federal bank robbery can be committed without the use of physical force, and (2) that federal bank robbery committed by intimidation doesn't require the threatened use of physical force.
McCranie argues that a person can commit federal bank robbery without the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force. Specifically, he relies on this court's decisions in United States v. Perez–Vargas , 414 F.3d 1282, 1286 (10th Cir. 2005), and United States v. Rodriguez–Enriquez , 518 F.3d 1191, 1194 (10th Cir. 2008), arguing that Appellant's Opening Br. at 20.
But as McCranie recognizes, we recently overruled the Perez–Vargas line of cases, concluding that the Supreme Court has "specifically rejected the contention that ‘one can cause bodily injury without the use of physical force.’ " United States v. Ontiveros , 875 F.3d 533, 536–37 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Castleman , ––– U.S. ––––, 134 S.Ct. 1405, 1414, 188 L.Ed.2d 426 (2014) ). This defeats McCranie's argument that federal bank robbery by use of hazardous chemicals (or other "non-physical" means) isn't a crime of violence. McCranie now simply preserves this issue for en banc or Supreme Court review.
We turn to McCranie's other claim—that "intimidation" doesn't necessarily entail the threatened use of force.5 Here, McCranie argues that federal bank robbery can occur even when an unusually timid bank teller feels intimidated, despite the lack of any objective threat. See Appellant's Opening Br. at 31 ( ). So we must determine whether intimidation requires a threatened use of physical force.
Our cases answer that question. "We have defined intimidation in the context of § 2113(a) as an act by [the] defendant ‘reasonably calculated to put another in fear, or conduct and words calculated to create the impression that any resistance or defiance by the individual would be met by force.’ " United States v. Valdez , 158 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 1998) (quoting United States v. Lajoie , 942 F.2d 699, 701 n.5 (10th Cir. 1991) ). This definition requires the objective threatened use of physical force.
The Tenth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions are similarly demanding, stating, "To take ‘by means of intimidation’ is to say or do something in such a way that a person of ordinary sensibilities would be fearful of bodily harm." Tenth Circuit Criminal Pattern Jury Instructions No. 2.77 (2018). And then, putting to rest any concerns of the too-timid teller, the instructions clarify that Id. Because intimidation requires an objectively reasonable fear of bodily harm, McCranie's argument fails.
Faced with this more-recent law, McCranie reaches backward to language from United States v. Slater , 692 F.2d 107, 109 (10th Cir. 1982), which provides a three-factor test for evaluating intimidation: "(1) whether the situation appeared dangerous, (2) whether the defendant intended to intimidate, and (3) whether the bank personnel were reasonable in their fear of death or injury." 692 F.2d at 109. McCranie claims that under this test, one can commit federal bank robbery by merely putting an individual in fear. But the Slater test still requires an objectively reasonable fear of death or injury, frustrating McCranie's argument.
Taking stock of our cases and the pattern jury instructions, every definition of intimidation requires a purposeful act that instills objectively reasonable fear (or expectation) of force or bodily injury. Cf. Moncrieffe v. Holder , 569 U.S. 184, 191, 133 S.Ct. 1678, 185 L.Ed.2d 727 (2013) ( ). So intimidation thus qualifies as a threatened use of physical force against the person of...
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