SH Camp & Co. v. National Labor Relations Board

• Decision Date: 03 April 1947
• Docket Number: No. 9672.,9672.
• Citation: 160 F.2d 519
• Parties: S. H. CAMP & CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (JACKSON SURGICAL GARMENT WORKERS, Inc., Intervenor).
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

160 F.2d 519 (1947)

S. H. CAMP & CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (JACKSON SURGICAL GARMENT WORKERS, Inc., Intervenor).

No. 9672.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

April 3, 1947.

M. F. Badgley, of Jackson, Mich. (Bisbee, McKone, Badgley & McInally, of Jackson, Mich., on the brief), for S. H. Camp & Co.

Frank Blackman, of Jackson, Mich. (Blackman & Blackman, of Jackson, Mich., on the brief), for intervenor Jackson Surgical Garment Workers, Inc.

Robert T. McKinlay, of Washington, D. C. (Gerhard P. Van Arkel, Morris P. Glushien, A. Norman Somers, Leonard Appel and Margaret M. Farmer, all of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for N. L. R. B.

Before HICKS, SIMONS and MARTIN, Circuit Judges.

MARTIN, Circuit Judge.

On motion of the respondent, National Labor Relations Board, its petition for enforcement of its original order in this case was remanded by this court for reconsideration by the Board in the light of an opinion by the Comptroller General that the Labor-Federal Security Appropriation Act of 1944, 57 Stat. 494, precluded the use of Board funds in connection with a complaint, where the charge upon which it was grounded was filed prior to the execution of an agreement between management and labor.

Subsequently, the Board changed its position and moved us to vacate the order of remand upon the ground that the Appropriation Act of 1944 had expired and that, inasmuch as the Labor-Federal Security Appropriation Act of 1945, 58 Stat. 547, does not apply to agreements with labor organizations formed in violation of section 158, paragraph 2, Title 29 U.S.C.A., the previously existing grounds for remand existed no longer. The motion of respondent to vacate the order of remand was denied by per curiam of October 6, 1944, for the reason that the issue in respect of the violation of the 1944 Act by respondent in its proceedings against petitioner involved a question of fact concerning which we were not then fully advised, and that presentation of evidence and additional findings would, perhaps, be required. We stated that the retroactive character of the exception noted in the 1945 Act involved a question of law based upon factual considerations and legislative history upon which we were not then informed; and that we should have the fully considered and deliberate judgment of the National Labor Relations Board after a further hearing.

Following the remand, the Board issued on October 27, 1944, and served on all parties a notice requesting the filing of statements supported by briefs, if desired, setting forth their respective positions concerning the points upon which the cause had been remanded, as well as an indication of whether a further hearing before the Board or a Trial Examiner was desired; and, if so, the general nature of the evidence which would be offered at the hearing. The notice further requested the parties, in the event that they desired to adduce no additional evidence, to indicate whether oral argument before the Board was desired.

The intervenor, Jackson Surgical Garment Workers, Inc. (the independent union), in response to the notice, filed a motion to strike the Trial Examiner's intermediate report, the Board's decision and order, and all other proceedings after July 12, 1943, the effective date of the aforementioned 1944 amendment. The motion was denied, and no additional proof was offered by any of the parties. After hearing further oral argument, the Board, on April 7, 1945, rendered a supplemental decision and promulgated an amended order. It was held that the limitations in the 1944 and 1945 Appropriation Acts for the Board do not constitute substantive amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, but merely control the supply of Board funds and the purposes for which the same may be used during the fiscal periods involved. The Board reasoned that the 1945 Appropriation Act excepts from the limitation of the use of Board funds cases, such as the instant one, arising out of "agreements with labor organizations formed in violation of" section 8(2) of the National Labor Relations Act. Therefore, there was found to be no preclusion in the Act itself or in the 1944 or the 1945 Appropriation Acts upon the expenditure by the Board of money appropriated for the fiscal year of 1945 in proceeding with the instant case.

The Board confirmed its previous decision and order, entered on October 4, 1943, except with the following amendment: "In view of the Comptroller General's ruling of April 20, 1944, we shall amend our original order so that the effective period of the 1944 limitation, namely July 12, 1943 to June 30, 1944, shall be excluded in the computation of the back pay due the eight employees discriminatorily discharged by the respondent pursuant to the terms of its union-shop contract with the Surgical Workers. The net earnings of these employees during that period shall likewise be excluded in computing their back-pay award. For the same reason, we shall not order the respondent to reimburse its employees who were members of the Surgical Workers for dues and assessments which the respondent deducted from their wages on behalf of the Surgical Workers, during the time the 1944 limitation was in effect. For the reasons which we have indicated, we do not think that the Act requires us to modify our order. We do conclude, however, that this disposition of the case is the result most likely to accord with the purposes of the Congress in enacting the Appropriation limitations."

Accordingly, in the Board's amended order to make whole eight named women employees for any loss of pay suffered by them as a result of the company's discrimination against them, the period between June 12, 1943, and June 30, 1944, was expressly excluded from computation. Likewise, the directed reimbursement of all employees who were members of the independent union, for dues and assessments deducted from their wages on behalf of that union, was excluded for the same period.

(1) We do not concur in the contention of the petitioner, S. H. Camp and Company, or the intervenor, Jackson Surgical Garment Workers, Inc., that the National Labor Relations Board lost jurisdiction in this matter after the Act of July 12, 1943, became effective. The decision of the Board rests upon sound rationale and is supported by the thoroughly considered and well reasoned opinion of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in National Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, Inc., 141 F.2d 794, 797, 798, 799, wherein the legislative history of the pertinent appropriation legislation is detailed,¹ with the resultant conclusion that the rider to the Appropriation Act prohibiting the use of funds in a complaint case arising out of an agreement between management and labor which had been in existence for at least three months without complaint being filed was not intended to be a substantive amendment to the National Labor Relations Act. As Judge Stephens stated 141 F.2d at page 798, the views of opponents to the enactment of legislation may not "be relied upon as indicative of legislative intent although the statements of those in charge of a bill may be considered as evidence of its meaning." See Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440, 463, 464, 57 S.Ct. 556, 81 L. Ed. 736, 112 A.L.R. 1455, and cases there cited; McCaughn v. Hershey Chocolate Co., 283 U.S. 488, 493, 494, 51 S.Ct. 510, 75 L.Ed. 1183. Cf. United States v. United Mine Workers of America (United States v. John L. Lewis), 67 S.Ct. 677. The decision of the Board has further authoritative support. In National Labor Relations Board v. Baltimore Transit Co., 4 Cir., 140 F.2d 51, 58, a motion to stay proceedings on the ground that a proviso attached to the Board's current appropriation precluded enforcement of its order in the Court of Appeals was denied. It was thought by the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit to be manifest that a limitation upon spending by the Board may not be construed as a limitation upon the jurisdiction of the reviewing court to enforce an order of the Board. In dealing with the same appropriation law here involved, the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had previously reached a similar conclusion. That court held, moreover, that a petition for enforcement of the Labor Board's order against an employer, upon findings that the employer had dominated and supported an employees' association and had coerced its employees not to join a local union affiliated with a national labor organization, did not present a case involving a labor agreement within the meaning of the Act prohibiting the use of funds 57 Stat. 515 "in connection with a complaint case arising over an agreement between management and labor which has been in existence for three months or longer without complaint being filed." National Labor Relations Board v. Elvine Knitting Mills, 2 Cir., 138 F.2d 633, 634.

In National Labor Relations Board v. National Tool Co., 6 Cir., 139 F.2d 490, this court said: "It is not the function of this court to inquire into the propriety of expenditures by the National Labor Relations Board of funds appropriated to its use by the Congress."

(2) The argument of the petitioner that the Labor Board failed to comply with our mandate in this case is not impressive. The petitioner and all other parties were duly notified by the Board of their right to present additional evidence, if desired. Petitioner did not avail itself of the proffered opportunity. The record contains more than 525 pages of testimony and 165 pages of exhibits, which had already been received in evidence, and adequately presents the merits of the controversy. No duty rested upon the Board to adduce further evidence; and its procedure, after remand, was not unfair to either the petitioner or the intervenor. In our view, they were accorded adequate opportunity to be heard on all issues presented by the controversy.

(3) And now, passing to the merits, the amended order of the Board...