CT Hellmuth & Associates, Inc. v. WASHINGTON METRO. AREA TRANS. AUTHORITY

• Decision Date: 21 May 1976
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. W-74-1222.
• Citation: 414 F. Supp. 408
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
• Parties: C. T. HELLMUTH & ASSOCIATES, INC. v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY.

414 F. Supp. 408

C. T. HELLMUTH & ASSOCIATES, INC. v. WASHINGTON METROPOLITAN AREA TRANSIT AUTHORITY.

Civ. A. No. W-74-1222.

United States District Court, D. Maryland.

May 21, 1976.

Branko Stupar, Potomac, Md., for plaintiff.

Jordan S. Himelfarb, Bethesda, Md., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

WATKINS, District Judge.

After unsuccessfully seeking access to certain records of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (hereinafter WMATA), Plaintiff instituted the instant action to compel disclosure. Jurisdiction is predicated upon § 81 of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority Compact, Public Law 89-774, 80 Stat. 1324, 1350 (1966), Art. 41 § 317-81 Md.Ann.Code (1971 Repl. Vol.), which grants this Court jurisdiction over all actions brought by or against WMATA.¹ The case is presently before the Court on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.

The facts are essentially undisputed. Plaintiff C. T. Hellmuth & Associates, Inc., is a Maryland insurance concern; Defendant WMATA is an interstate agency, the result of an interstate compact between the State of Maryland, the Commonwealth of Virginia and the District of Columbia, entered into with the approval of Congress. The instant controversy apparently arose when WMATA awarded an insurance contract to the Prudential Life Insurance Company of America. Plaintiff, one of the unsuccessful bidders for that contract, seeks by this action to obtain copies of (1) the Prudential proposal, (2) the report prepared by a member of the Metro Insurance Administrators, WMATA's insurance consultant, recommending the Prudential proposal, and (3) any and all opinions, reports, and decisions relating to the selection of the Metro Insurance Administrators.

Plaintiff bases its right of access to these records upon the Maryland Public Information Act, Art. 76A Md.Ann.Code (1975 Repl. Vol.). Section 2(a) of that Act provides that all "public records" shall be available for inspection except as they are exempted from disclosure by the Act or as otherwise protected by law. The Act defines "public records" as including those records made or received by any state agency in connection with the transaction of public business except as they are privileged or confidential by law. Art. 76A § 1(a). Defendant WMATA maintains that by virtue of its status as an interstate agency, it is exempt from the Public Information Act; Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that WMATA, as an agency of the state,² is subject to and must comply with the provisions of Art. 76A. Thus, the only issue raised here, is whether WMATA falls within the purview of the Maryland Act.³

Upon entering into an interstate compact, a state effectively surrenders a portion of its sovereignty; the compact governs the relations of the parties with respect to the subject matter of the agreement and is superior to both prior and subsequent law. Further, when enacted, a compact constitutes not only law, but a contract which may not be amended, modified, or otherwise altered without the consent of all parties. It, therefore, appears settled that one party may not enact legislation which would impose burdens upon the compact absent the concurrence of the other signatories. See Delaware River & B. Auth. v. New Jersey Pub. E. R. C., 112 N.J.Super. 160, 270 A.2d 704 (1970), aff'd, 58 N.J. 388, 277 A.2d 880 (1971); Del River & Bay Authority v. Carrello, Del.Ch., 222 A.2d 794 (1966); Rao v. Port of New York Authority, 122 F.Supp. 595 (S.D.N.Y.1954), aff'd, 222 F.2d 362 (2 Cir.1955); State v. Hoffman, 9 Md. 28 (1856).

While apparently conceding the validity of this principle where one party to a compact attempts to enact legislation which clearly would affect the other parties' interests, Plaintiff, nonetheless, argues that the rule is inapplicable where it is claimed the parties have equivalent legislation. This Court cannot agree. Clearly, the mere fact that Virginia and the District have adopted freedom of information laws can hardly be taken as a tacit agreement on their part that WMATA should be governed by the Maryland law, particularly in view of the fact that Art. 76A was enacted subsequent to the Virginia and District of Columbia laws. Moreover, the Court is not persuaded by the alternative premise implicit in Plaintiff's argument, that the existence of comparable legislation eliminates the possibility that one party may impinge upon the others' interests.⁴ Whatever force that contention may have in the situation in which the various laws involved are identical, it is plainly unmeritorious here, where the laws involved differ in not insignificant respects.⁵ Presumably these laws reflect considered policy decisions on the part of the respective jurisdictions as to the types of information which should be accessible to the public and the...