89 Hawai'i 1, Shin v. McLaughlin

• Decision Date: 17 November 1998
• Docket Number: No. 21017,21017
• Citation: 967 P.2d 1059
• Parties: 89 Hawai'i 1 John T.S. SHIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lisa McLAUGHLIN, Defendant-Appellee, and John and Jane Does 1-10, and Doe Corporations and Other Entities 1-10, Defendants.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 1059

967 P.2d 1059

89 Hawai'i 1

John T.S. SHIN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lisa McLAUGHLIN, Defendant-Appellee, and John and Jane Does 1-10, and Doe Corporations and Other Entities 1-10, Defendants.

No. 21017

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

Nov. 17, 1998.

William H. Elkner, on the briefs, Honolulu, for plaintiff-appellant.

Carlos D. Perez-Mesa, Jr., on the briefs, Honolulu, for defendant-appellee.

Before MOON, C.J., and KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA, and RAMIL, JJ.

KLEIN, Justice.

This appeal arises out of a motor vehicle tort claim by plaintiff-appellant John Y.S. Shin against defendant-appellee Lisa McLaughlin. Shin appeals from the circuit court's April 21, 1997 order granting McLaughlin's motion for summary judgment and denying his motion for summary judgment on the basis that he untimely filed his cause of action against McLaughlin, in violation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) § 294-36(b)(1) (1985). ¹

On appeal, Shin contends that the circuit court erred in granting McLaughlin's motion for summary judgment because the general tolling provision in HRS § 657-18 (1985) ² suspended the no-fault statute of limitations for the period of time that McLaughlin was absent from the state. Because the circuit court properly concluded that Shin's complaint against McLaughlin was untimely, albeit for the wrong reason, we affirm the circuit court's order.

I. BACKGROUND

On December 17, 1989, Shin and McLaughlin were involved in an automobile collision. On October 6, 1992, Shin filed a personal injury suit against McLaughlin to recover damages for injuries he sustained in the accident. Thereafter, Shin had difficulty serving process on McLaughlin because she no longer resided in Hawai'i. On September 21, 1993, the circuit court issued a final order of dismissal, pursuant to the Rules of the Circuit Courts of the State of Hawai'i (RCCH) Rule 28. ³

On August 23, 1995, Shin, by and through new counsel, submitted an ex parte motion for reconsideration and to set aside the court's dismissal. Shin claimed that McLaughlin left Hawai'i in May 1990, that his prior counsel lost track of McLaughlin's whereabouts, that McLaughlin was now residing in Europe, that McLaughlin's insurance company had been put on notice of the claims as early as January 10, 1990, and that negotiations with the insurance company were at a standstill. Finally, given the fact that McLaughlin resided outside the United States, Shin requested a six-month extension to effect service against McLaughlin. The court set aside the dismissal, giving Shin until February 23, 1996 to serve process on McLaughlin.

McLaughlin was served on October 6, 1995. She filed her answer to Shin's complaint on February 5, 1996. McLaughlin then moved to amend her answer to plead the statute of limitations defense. The court granted McLaughlin's motion to amend, and she amended her answer accordingly.

On February 5, 1997, McLaughlin moved for summary judgment and argued that Shin's complaint should be dismissed for failure to file his claim within the two-year statute of limitations set forth in HRS § 294-36(b)(1). Shin opposed the motion and filed a counter motion for summary judgment, asserting that his cause of action was not time barred because HRS § 657-18 tolled the no-fault statute of limitations for the period of time that McLaughlin resided outside of the state following the accident. He also claimed that this court's decision in Gorospe v. Matsui, 72 Haw. 377, 819 P.2d 80 (1991), extended the general tolling provisions of HRS Chapter 657 to suits arising out of automobile accidents. A hearing on both motions was held on March 19, 1997.

At the hearing on the motion, the circuit court orally ruled:

[I]n this case[,] the defendant is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law, based on [Shin's] failure to comply with the applicable statute of limitation which is set out in [HRS] Section [294-36(b)(1) ]. The date of the accident was December 17, 1989. The complaint herein was filed on October 6, 1992.

The Court does not believe that [HRS] Section 657-18 is applicable to allow for a tolling of the statute in this case.

The Court does not find that the Gorospe case is as broad and applicable as the plaintiff asserts in this case. It is a narrowly crafted opinion specifically limited to Section 657-13 and those protected classes of persons being infants and insane.

On that basis this motion of the defendant for summary judgment is granted.

Plaintiff's counter-motion for summary judgment is denied.

The court filed its final order on September 3, 1997. Thereafter, Shin filed this timely notice of appeal.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We apply the following standard of review to summary judgment orders:

We review a circuit court's award of summary judgment de novo under the same standard applied by the circuit court. Amfac Inc. v. Waikiki Beachcomber Inv. Co., 74 Haw. 85, 104, 839 P.2d 10, 22, reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 843 P.2d 144 (1992) (citation omitted). As we have often articulated:

[s]ummary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.

Id. (citations and internal quotations omitted); see Hawai'i Rules of Civil Procedure (HRCP) Rule 56(c) (1990). "A fact is material if proof of that fact would have the effect of establishing or refuting one of the essential elements of a cause of action or defense asserted by the parties." Hulsman v. Hemmeter Dev. Corp., 65 Haw. 58, 61, 647 P.2d 713, 716, (1982) (citations omitted).

Estate of Doe v. Paul Revere Ins. Group, 86 Hawai'i 262, 269-70, 948 P.2d 1103, 1110-11 (1997) (quoting Morinoue v. Roy, 86 Hawai'i 76, 80, 947 P.2d 944, 948 (1997)) (brackets omitted). We have also held that when making a summary judgment determination, "we must view all of the evidence and the inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Morinoue, 86 Hawai'i at 80, 947 P.2d at 948 (quoting Maguire v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 79 Hawai'i 110, 112, 899 P.2d 393, 395 (1995)) (brackets omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

The sole issue presented is whether the two-year no-fault statute of limitations is tolled by operation of HRS § 657-18.

Shin argues in the affirmative inasmuch as the no-fault law is silent on the issue of tolling for absentee defendants. He cites as support for his contention our decisions in Zator v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co., 69 Haw. 594, 752 P.2d 1073 (1988), and Gorospe v. Matsui, 72 Haw. 377, 819 P.2d 80 (1991). McLaughlin, on the other hand, claims that "[t]here is no Hawai'i case law or statutory authority which applies the tolling provisions in HRS § 657-18 to motor vehicle torts." Hence, McLaughlin contends that no genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Shin filed his complaint within the limitations period.

Assuming, without deciding, that HRS § 657-18 applies to all claims arising out of motor vehicle accidents, we hold that HRS § 657-18 does not apply to toll the no-fault statute of limitations where a nonresident motorist defendant is subject to the jurisdiction of our courts and amenable to service of process under our long-arm statutes as set forth in HRS §§ 634-33 (1985) ⁴ and 634-36 (1985). ⁵

A. The Purposes and Intent Of HRS § 657-18.

HRS § 657-18 reads as follows:

If at any time when a cause of action specified in this part or section 663-3 accrues against any person, the person is out of the State, the action may be commenced within the terms respectively limited, after the return of the person into the State, and if, after the cause of action has accrued, the person departs from and resides out of the State, the time of the person's absence shall not be deemed or taken as any part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.

In interpreting a statute such as HRS § 657-18, "our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself." Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple of Hawai'i v. Sullivan, 87 Hawai'i 217, 229-30, 953 P.2d 1315, 1327-28 (1998) (quoting Gray v. Administrative Dir. of the Court, 84 Hawai'i 138, 148, 931 P.2d 580, 590 (1997)).

"It is a cardinal rule of statutory interpretation that, where the terms of a statute are plain, unambiguous, and explicit, we are not at liberty to look beyond that language for a different meaning. Instead, our sole duty is to give effect to the statute's plain and obvious meaning." Ross v. Stouffer Hotel Co. (Hawai'i) Ltd., 76 Hawai'i 454, 461, 879 P.2d 1037, 1044-45 (1994) (citations omitted). Moreover "[i]n interpreting a statute, we give the operative words their common meaning, unless there is something in the statute requiring a different interpretation." Id.

State v. Scott, 87 Hawai'i 80, 84, 951 P.2d 1243, 1247 (1998) (brackets in original).

In this case, the plain language of HRS § 657-18 indicates that where a defendant departs from the state after a cause of action accrues, the time period during which he or she was "out of the State" would not be considered as part of the limitation period. Shin's opening brief implies that because McLaughlin left Hawai'i shortly after the accident, she was physically "out of the state" within the meaning of HRS § 657-18. Shin's contention is consistent with the common meaning of the terms "out of the state" or "absent," the latter meaning "removed or away from one's domicile, or usual place of residence. Not present at a particular time." Black's Law Dictionary 8 (6th ed.1990) (defining the word "absence").

However, as a principal tenet of statutory construction, "[w]e read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose." Mendes v....