89 Hawai'i 436, Bocalbos v. Kapiolani Medical Center for Women and Children, 20719

• Decision Date: 17 March 1999
• Docket Number: No. 20719,20719
• Citation: 974 P.2d 1026,89 Hawaii 436
• Parties: 89 Hawai'i 436 Mila BOCALBOS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. KAPIOLANI MEDICAL CENTER FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN and John Mullen and Company, Respondents-Appellees.
• Court: Hawaii Supreme Court

Page 1026

974 P.2d 1026

89 Hawai'i 436

Mila BOCALBOS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. KAPIOLANI MEDICAL CENTER FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN and John Mullen and Company, Respondents-Appellees.

No. 20719.

Supreme Court of Hawai'i.

March 17, 1999.

Reconsideration Denied

April 1, 1999.

As Amended April 1, 1999.

Mila Bocalbos, petitioner-appellant pro se.

Beverly S.K. Tom (Robert C. Kessner with her on the brief), Honolulu, HI, for respondents-appellees.

MOON, C.J., KLEIN, LEVINSON, NAKAYAMA and RAMIL, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

We granted petitioner-appellant Mila Bocalbos's (claimant) application for a writ of certiorari to review the opinion of the Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) in Bocalbos v. Kapiolani Medical Center for Women and Children, No. 20719, mem. op., --- Hawai'i ----, --- P.2d ---- (Haw.App. Aug. 7, 1998) [hereinafter the "ICA's decision"]. In Bocalbos, claimant appealed a workers' compensation decision of the Labor and Industrial Relations Appeals Board (LIRAB0) that awarded claimant temporary total disability benefits for one year only, ordered claimant's employer to pay for some, but not all, of claimant's medical services, and awarded claimant travel reimbursement at less than the maaximum allowable rate. The ICA dismissed claimant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that claimant failed to appeal from a final appealable order because the question of permanent disability or disfigurement, if any, had been retained for further action by the labor director.

For the reasons set forth below, we hold that the decision and order of the LIRAB is a final appealable order under HRS § 91-14(a). Accordingly, we vacate the ICA's opinion and remand claimant's appeal to the ICA for a decision on the merits.

I. BACKGROUND

On July 25, 1986, claimant was injured when she was struck on the head and shoulders by a falling section of soggy ceiling material while working at her part-time job as a medical technologist at the Kapiolani Medical Center for Women and Children (employer). Following the incident, she experienced headaches and neck and shoulder pain and was certified as suffering from a cervical strain disability. On August 11, 1986, employer filed an industrial injury report with the Department of Labor and Industrial Relations Disability Compensation Division and paid claimant temporary total disability (TTD) benefits for the next twelve months. Claimant began osteopathic treatment in 1987 and was diagnosed as suffering from temporomandibular joint (TMJ) dysfunction in 1988.

On February 22, 1989, the director of labor issued a decision finding that claimant sustained compensable head, neck, and shoulder injuries, TMJ dysfunction, and an aggravation of a preexisting psychological condition as a result of the July 25, 1986 incident. The director ordered employer: (1) to pay for all medical care, services, and supplies as the nature of claimant's injuries might require, including treatment for TMJ dysfunction and psychological conditions; and (2) to pay claimant TTD benefits of $15,120 for the 50-week period from August 10, 1986 through August 27, 1987. The director's decision further stated that "[t]he matters of permanent disability and disfigurement, if any, shall be determined at a later date."

Over the next four years, claimant continued receiving osteopathic treatments and had dental work performed to treat her TMJ symptoms. On September 21, 1992, the labor director issued a supplemental decision ordering that: (1) employer was liable for some, but not all, of the osteopathic and dental treatments claimant received since 1987; (2) claimant was entitled to travel reimbursement for her physician visits calculated at the personal vehicle rate for some visits, but at the public transportation rate for other visits; and (3) claimant was not entitled to further TTD benefits after August 1987. The director's decision further stated that "the issues of permanent disability and disfigurement, if any, are premature since claimant is still undergoing treatment for her TMJ condition" and, therefore, that "the matters of permanent disability and/or disfigurement, if any, shall be determined at a later date."

On December 21, 1993, the director issued a second supplemental decision ordering employer to pay for certain additional osteopathic and TMJ treatments.

Claimant and employer both appealed the director's September 21, 1992 and December 21, 1993 supplemental decisions to the LIRAB. On March 14, 1997 the LIRAB affirmed in part and reversed in part the denial of osteopathic and TMJ treatments, affirmed the award of additional osteopathic and TMJ treatments, affirmed the denial of TTD benefits after August 1987, and modified the award of travel reimbursement.

Claimant appealed the March 14, 1997 decision and order, and the matter was subsequently assigned to the ICA. The ICA issued an opinion on August 7, 1998 dismissing claimant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

II. THE ICA'S DECISION

The ICA dismissed claimant's appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction on finality grounds because the director of labor had retained jurisdiction over claimant's case to determine the question of permanent disability or disfigurement. The ICA relied on a decision of the Colorado Court of Appeals in Gonzales v. Industrial Com'n of State of Colorado, 689 P.2d 675 (Colo.App.1984), holding that a decision in a workers' compensation case awarding temporary disability benefits was not appealable because the matter of permanent disability had not been determined. According to Gonzales,

[i]f liability is not in issue, and the amount or duration of temporary benefits is the only matter questioned, and jurisdiction is retained to consider permanent disability, review must await the determination of the latter issue.

Id. at 676. The ICA adopted the holding of Gonzales.

We find the reasoning of Gonzales persuasive. In the immediate case, liability is not in issue. Instead Claimant only contests the amount or scope of her TTD benefits award; the question as to temporary total disability benefits has been answered, but the question of permanent disability or disfigurement has been specifically retained for further action by the Director. Thus, the requisite degree of finality is lacking in the immediate case.

ICA's decision at 5-6 (original emphasis). In the ICA's view, Gonzales was consistent with our decision in Mitchell v. State of Hawai'i, 77 Hawai'i 305, 884 P.2d 368 (1994), where we held that an order of the LIRAB is not an appealable "final order" under HRS § 91-14(a) (1993) "if the rights of a party involved remain undetermined or if the matter is retained for further action." Id. at 5.

The ICA also concluded that the March 14, 1997 decision and order was not appealable under HRS § 91-14(a)'s provision allowing an appeal of a "preliminary ruling of the nature that deferral of review pending entry of a subsequent final decision would deprive appellant of adequate relief."

Claimant applied for a writ of certiorari seeking review of the ICA's opinion. We granted the application.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Judicial Review of Workers' Compensation Decisions

Claims for compensation under Hawaii's workers' compensation law are decided by the director of labor and industrial relations. HRS § 386-86 (1993). The decision of the director is final unless it is appealed to the LIRAB, which may affirm, reverse, or modify the director's decision or remand the case to the director for further proceedings and action. HRS § 386-87 (1993). The decision or order of the LIRAB is directly appealable to this court. HRS § 386-88 (1993).

The appeal of a decision or order of the LIRAB is governed by HRS § 91-14(a), the statute authorizing appeals in administrative agency cases. HRS § 91-14(a) authorizes judicial review of "a final decision and order in a contested case" or "a preliminary ruling of the nature that deferral of review pending entry of a subsequent final decision would deprive appellant of adequate relief." For purposes of HRS § 91-14(a), we have defined "final order" to mean "an order ending the proceedings, leaving nothing further to be accomplished." Gealon v. Keala, 60 Haw. 513, 520, 591 P.2d 621, 626 (1979). "Consequently, an order is not final if the rights of a party involved remain undetermined or if the matter is retained for further action." Id.

Applying the Gealon definition of "final order" to a workers' compensation appeal, we held that a decision of the LIRAB denying compensation for one of two injuries was not an appealable final order because the amount of compensation for the other compensable injury had not yet been determined. Mitchell v. State of Hawai'i, supra. The ICA has likewise applied the Gealon definition of final order to hold that a decision of the LIRAB finding a workers' compensation claim to be compensable was not an appealable final order because the amount of compensation had yet to be determined. Williams v. Kleenco, 2 Haw.App. 219, 629 P.2d 125 (1981).

Other jurisdictions have statutes similar to HRSs 91-14(a) that require an appeal in a workers' compensation case be taken from a "final order." Some of these jurisdictions apply a Gealon definition and determine appealability by whether an order finally ends the workers' compensation case. For example, in Tennessee, an appealable order is one that "final[ly] [adjudicates] all of the issues which can be decided under the [workers' compensation] complaint[.]" Aetna Casualty and Surety Co. v. Miller, 491 S.W.2d 85, 86 (Tenn.1973). In Idaho, an appealable order is one that "finally dispose[s] of all of the claimant's claims[.]" Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 118 Idaho 147, 795 P.2d 309, 311 (1990).

In New Jersey, an appeal in a worker's compensation case must be taken from a "final judgment." N.J. Stat. Ann. § 34:15-66; Barry v. Wallace J. Wilck, Inc., 65 N.J.Super. 130, 167 A.2d 181, 185 (1961). Rather than applying a Gealon definition to determine...