Boston & MRR v. United States
Decision Date | 04 February 1941 |
Docket Number | No. 3588.,3588. |
Parties | BOSTON & M. R. R. v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Richard W. Hall, of Boston, Mass., for appellant.
Alfred G. Malagodi, Asst. U. S. Atty., of Boston, Mass. (Edmund J. Brandon, U. S. Atty., of Boston, Mass., on the brief), for appellee.
Before MAGRUDER and MAHONEY, Circuit Judges, and FORD, District Judge.
Boston & Maine Railroad appeals from a judgment of the District Court, 30 F. Supp. 721, assessing a statutory penalty against it for violation of the Cruelty to Animals Act, 34 Stat. 607, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 71-74. This Act forbids carriers to confine animals in cars for a continuous period in excess of 36 hours without unloading the same into properly equipped pens for rest, water and feeding, "unless prevented by storm or by other accidental or unavoidable causes which can not be anticipated or avoided by the exercise of due diligence and foresight." Any railroad which "knowingly and willfully fails to comply" with this requirement is subject to a penalty of not less than $100 nor more than $500. Material parts of the statute are copied in the footnote.1
Trial by jury was waived. The facts as agreed upon between the parties and as found by the court are as follows:
2
All the defendant's requests for specific rulings of law were granted by the court. The error charged is that the court below denied defendant's motion for judgment, and ruled, upon the contrary, that the carrier had "knowingly and willfully" failed to comply with the statute, thereby entitling the United States to judgment for the penalty.
It may be conceded that the delay for the time necessarily consumed in repairing the brakebeam was, in the language of the statute, one of those "accidental or unavoidable causes which can not be anticipated or avoided by the exercise of due diligence and foresight". Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. United States, 8 Cir., 194 F. 342; United States v. Boston & Maine R. R., 1 Cir., 99 F.2d 635. However, this would be no excuse for failure to unload the cattle within the 36-hour period unless such delay prevented the train from reaching Boston in time to comply with the statute. But despite the loss of 35 minutes repairing the brakebeam, it appears that the train could still have arrived in Boston in time enough, had not the subsequent additional delay of 40 minutes occurred due to the return trip to Ayer to pick up the conductor. As it was, the car was placed for unloading in the yards at Boston 40 minutes beyond the statutory period, which was exactly the amount of delay that had been occasioned by going back for the conductor. Since (as provided in Section 1) the time consumed in the actual operation of unloading is not counted in computing the 36-hour period, United States v. Northern Pac. Terminal Co., C.C., 186 F. 947, 949, it thus appears that the railroad would have just got in under the wire, despite the delay in repairing the brakebeam, had the additional delay not occurred.
The trial judge was clearly warranted in his finding that "The delay occasioned by the necessity of picking up the conductor does not come within the class of unavoidable causes which could not be anticipated or avoided by the exercise of due diligence and foresight." Appellant argues that there is no basis in the facts for an inference that either the conductor or the engineer was negligent in allowing the train to pull out of Ayer without the conductor on board. This seems to us a plain case of res ipsa loquitur. The given facts may be too meager to permit an assignment of the fault precisely, but it is certainly reasonable to infer that this episode would not have occurred without negligence on the part of some servant of the railroad.
But it is contended further that as a matter of law the carrier here was not guilty of "knowingly and willfully" failing to comply with the statute. Both sides rely upon United States v. Illinois Central Railroad Co., 303 U.S. 239, 58 S.Ct. 533, 82 L.Ed. 773, which is the only case in which the Supreme Court has had occasion to consider the meaning of "knowingly and willfully" in this particular statute. It must be acknowledged that each side can find passages in this opinion favorable to its contentions. The railroad points to the statement (303 U.S. at page 242, 58 S.Ct. at page 534, 82 L.Ed. 773) that "The penalty is not imposed for unwitting failure to comply with the statute"; also, to the fact that the Supreme Court quoted with apparent approval (303 U.S. at page 243, 58 S.Ct. 533, 82 L.Ed. 773) an earlier opinion in St. Louis & S. F. R. Co. v. United States, 8 Cir., 169 F. 69, 71, in which Circuit Judge Van Devanter construed "willfully" as implying something more than "knowingly"; as meaning "purposely or obstinately" and describing "the attitude of a carrier, who, having a free will or choice, either intentionally disregards the statute or is plainly indifferent to its requirements." On the other hand, the Government points to the statement in the Supreme Court's opinion (303 U.S. at page 242, 58 S.Ct. at page 534, 82 L.Ed. 733) that "The Act is to be construed to give effect to its humanitarian provisions"; and again (303 U.S. at page 244, 58 S.Ct. at page 535, 82 L.Ed. 733) that "To hold carriers not liable for penalties where the violations of sections 1 and 2, 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 71, 72, are due to mere indifference, inadvertence, or negligence of employees would defeat the purpose of section 3."
However, when one looks at the actual decision in the Illinois Central case in the light of the agreed subsidiary facts, the case gives more comfort to the Government than to the carrier. It appeared that the yardmaster at New Orleans, having received advance information of the approximate time of arrival of the cattle car and of the time when the 36-hour period would expire, "in order promptly to handle the shipment, procured an extra engine and crew immediately upon arrival of the car to take it to the stockyards and, before the expiration of...
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