Nachtman v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation

• Decision Date: 29 May 1950
• Docket Number: Civ. A. 422-50.
• Parties: NACHTMAN v. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Columbia

90 F. Supp. 739

NACHTMAN v. JONES & LAUGHLIN STEEL CORPORATION.

Civ. A. 422-50.

United States District Court District of Columbia.

May 29, 1950.

David G. Bress (of Newmyer & Bress), Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.

Edgar J. Goodrich, and James M. Carlisle, Washington, D. C., Walter J. Blenko, Pittsburgh, Pa., for defendant.

TAMM, District Judge.

In this action for damages, accounting and injunctive relief, based on patent infringements, defendant has moved to dismiss, or, in the alternative, to transfer the action to the United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, on the grounds that the action has been instituted in the wrong district, because:

"(a) The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked solely under Section 1338 of the Judicial Code (28 U.S.C.A. § 1338) on the ground that the action is one for patent infringement;

"(b) The Complaint does not contain any allegation that the defendant resides in, or is a corporation of, the District of Columbia, or that defendant has committed acts of infringement within the District of Columbia;

"(c) Defendant is a Pennsylvania corporation, resident in Pittsburgh, in the Western District of Pennsylvania, and the alleged infringement occurred in the Western District of Pennsylvania."

Section 1400(b) of Title 28, U.S.C.A. provides that: "Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business."

There is no allegation in the complaint that the defendant has "committed acts of infringement" in the District of Columbia, hence it is only to the first part of this venue statute that the Court directs its attention. Plaintiff contends that since the word "resides" is not defined in this provision of the statute, the Court is required to refer to the definition contained in § 1391 (c) of Title 28, wherein it is provided: "A corporation may be sued in any judicial district in which it is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, and such judicial district shall be regarded as the residence of such corporation for venue purposes."

This, in effect, would result in § 1400(b) being interpreted as follows: "Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in any judicial district where the defendant is incorporated or licensed to do business or is doing business, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business," thereby completely nullifying the specific venue statute relative to patent infringement suits. The Supreme Court, in the case...