Olympic Auto. & Accessories v. Puerto Rico Elec. Power Auth.

• Decision Date: 23 December 2014
• Docket Number: Civil No. 14–1026 GAG.
• Citation: 68 F.Supp.3d 300
• Parties: OLYMPIC AUTOMOTIVE & ACCESSORIES, et al., Plaintiffs, v. PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY (PREPA), et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

68 F.Supp.3d 300

OLYMPIC AUTOMOTIVE & ACCESSORIES, et al., Plaintiffs
v.
PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY (PREPA), et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 14–1026 GAG.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed Dec. 23, 2014.

68 F.Supp.3d 302

Julio Cesar Alejandro–Serrano, for Plaintiff or Petitioner.

Luis M. Rodriguez–Lopez, for Defendant or Respondent.

OPINION AND ORDER

GUSTAVO A. GELPÍ, District Judge.

Olympic Automotive & Accessories (“Olympic”), The Wellness Inc. and José Joaquín Robles (collectively “Plaintiffs”) bring this action against the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (“PREPA”) and several of its officers (collectively “Defendants”), arguing that Defendants violated their due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution and their statutory rights under Law 33 of June 27, 1985, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 27 §§ 262 et seq. (“Law 33”). (Docket No. 51 at 2–3.) Plaintiffs support their claims positing that Defendants willfully discouraged and prevented them access to PREPA's administrative procedures to object and challenge the cost of their power service. (Docket No. 1.) Plaintiffs thus seek equitable relief, asking the court to enjoin Defendants from disconnecting their power and order its reconnection. Id. at 2. They also seek monetary relief. Id.

Pending before the court is Defendants' motion to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) (Docket No. 51), which Plaintiffs opposed. (Docket No. 54.) After reviewing the parties' submissions and the pertinent law, the court GRANTS Defendants' motion to dismiss.

I. Standard of Review

1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)

As courts of limited jurisdiction, the federal courts must construe their jurisdictional grants narrowly. Destek Grp. v. State of N.H. Pub. Utils. Comm'n., 318 F.3d 32, 38 (1st Cir.2003). Consequently, the party asserting jurisdiction carries the burden of showing the existence of federal jurisdiction. Viqueira v. First Bank, 140 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir.1998). When deciding whether to dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the court “may consider whatever evidence has been submitted, such as ... depositions and exhibits.” Aversa v. United States, 99 F.3d 1200, 1210 (1st Cir.1996) ; Torres v. Bella Vista Hosp., Inc., 523 F.Supp.2d 123, 132 (D.P.R.2007). Motions brought under Rule 12(b)(1) are subject to the same standard of review as Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Negrón–Gaztambide v. Hernández–Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1994) ; Torres, 523 F.Supp.2d at 132.

2. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, see Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the court analyzes the complaint in a two-step process under the current context-based “plausibility” standard established by the Supreme Court. See Schatz v. Republican State Leadership Comm., 669 F.3d 50, 55 (1st Cir.2012) (citing Ocasio–Hernández v. Fortuño–Burset, 640 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.2011) which discusses Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) and Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). First, the court must “isolate and ignore statements in the complaint that simply offer legal labels and conclusions or merely

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rehash cause-of-action elements.” Id. A complaint does not need detailed factual allegations, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Second, the court must then “take the complaint's well-pled (i.e., non-conclusory, non-speculative) facts as true, drawing all reasonable inferences in the pleader's favor, and see if they plausibly narrate a claim for relief.” Schatz, 669 F.3d at 55. Plausible, means something more than merely possible, and gauging a pleaded situation's plausibility is a context-specific job that compels the court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense. Id. (citing Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ). This “simply calls for enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of” the necessary element. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

“[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2) ). If, however, the “factual content, so taken, ‘allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,’ the claim has facial plausibility.” Ocasio–Hernández, 640 F.3d at 12 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 ).

In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court must accept as true all the factual allegations in the complaint and construe all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiffs. Beddall v. State St. Bank & Trust Co., 137 F.3d 12, 16 (1st Cir.1998). Ordinarily, a court may not consider any documents that are outside of the complaint, or not expressly incorporated therein, unless the motion is converted into one for summary judgment. Watterson v. Page, 987 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1993) ; Alternative Energy, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 267 F.3d 30, 33 (1st Cir.2001). There is, however, a narrow exception “for documents the authenticity of which are not disputed by the parties; for official public records; for documents central to plaintiffs' claim; or for documents sufficiently referred to in the complaint.” Id. See Alternative Energy, Inc., 267 F.3d at 33–34. When a [pleading] rel[ies] upon a document, whose authenticity is not challenged, such a document “merges into the pleadings” and the court may properly consider it under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. Alternative Energy, Inc., 267 F.3d at 34 ; Beddall, 137 F.3d at 17 ; accord Clorox Co. P.R. v. Proctor & Gamble Commercial Co., 228 F.3d 24, 32 (1st Cir.2000) (considering advertising material outside of the complaint in a motion to dismiss false advertising claim because material was “integral” to assessing the complaint's allegations).

II. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background

1. On September 20, 2012, Plaintiffs sent PREPA a letter objecting to the September 2012 power bill, arguing that eighty percent (80%) of the total amount billed consisted of “hidden charges,” requesting the source of these charges and indicating that it paid what it believed was the correct amount. (Docket No. 16–1 at 1.)

2. PREPA initiated an internal investigation to address Plaintiffs' complaints. (Docket No. 29–1 at 2.) As a result, PREPA recalculated the account. (Docket No. 51 at 4.)

3. On October 25, 2012, Plaintiffs sent PREPA a letter objecting to the October 2012 bill. PREPA received the letter on November 9, 2012. (Docket No. 29–1 at

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9.) PREPA then recalculated and adjusted the account. (Docket No. 51 at 4.)

4. On November 15, 2012, PREPA notified Plaintiffs of the results of the investigation performed as to the September 2012 bill. The letter explained Plaintiffs' rights under Law 33 and that to continue with the administrative process and take the objection further, it had to request a revision with the Region Administrator. (Docket No. 16–1 at 14.)

5. On November 21, 2012, unsatisfied by the investigation's outcome, Plaintiffs sent PREPA a letter objecting the evaluation performed and requesting further review of the September 2012 bill. Id.

6. On November 28, 2012, PREPA notified Plaintiffs of the results of the investigation performed as to the October 2012 bill and attached the formulas used to calculate the fuel and energy costs. (Docket No. 29–1 at 11.) PREPA again explained Plaintiffs' rights under Law 33 and the proper course of action to take its objections further. PREPA indicated that if Plaintiffs failed to follow the process, the amount owed and objected to would reflect in the following month's bill as delayed pay, which constitutes cause for suspension of service.Id.

7. On December 5, 2012, Plaintiffs sent a letter to PREPA acknowledging receipt of PREPA's November 28 letter and stated that it was unsatisfied with the investigation's outcome and was thus going to challenge the decision. (Docket No. 16–1 at 17.)

8. On December 28, 2012, in reply, PREPA sent Plaintiffs two letters, which addressed the September and October 2012 bill objections, respectively. (Docket No. 16–1 at 18; 29–1 at 13.) In both letters, PREPA indicated that it reviewed the prior administrative decision as to both bills and that it was sustaining the decision of PREPA's District Manager. The letters explained the course of action to follow if Plaintiffs decided to take their objections further. PREPA made clear that if no further review was requested nor payment was made within ten (10) days, the amount objected to would reflect in the next bill, which constitutes cause for suspension of service. Id.

9. On March 21, 2013, PREPA contacted Plaintiffs' representative, Limaris Cotto,...