Victor Mfg. & Gasket Co. v. National Labor Relations Bd.

Decision Date20 June 1949
Docket NumberNo. 9762.,9762.
Citation174 F.2d 867
PartiesVICTOR MFG. & GASKET CO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Henry E. Seyfarth, Lee C. Shaw, Owen Fairweather, Robert W. MacDonald, Chicago, Ill., for petitioner.

David P. Findling, Associate General Counsel, A. Norman Somers, Assistant General Counsel, Robert E. Ackerberg, Owsley Vose, and George H. Plaut, Attorneys, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C., for respondent.

Before KERNER, MINTON, and DUFFY, Circuit Judges.

KERNER, Circuit Judge.

This is a petition to review and set aside an order of the National Labor Relations Board, based on findings that petitioner had interfered with, restrained, and coerced its employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed them, and had discriminatorily discharged an employee because of his union activities, thereby violating § 8(1) and (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.A. § 158(1) and (3). Upon these findings the Board ordered petitioner to cease and desist from the unfair labor practices, and to reinstate Charles Pletka and make him whole for the loss of any pay he may have suffered.

Petitioner makes the point that Pletka was discharged because he had engaged in union activity on company time in violation of an established company rule, while the Board insists that the finding that Pletka was discharged for union activities is supported by substantial evidence, considered as a whole, and asks that the order be enforced.

Of course, the Act does not interfere with the normal right of an employer to select his employees or to discharge them. He may discharge them for violation of his orders or rules, or for any reason, just or unjust, except that he may not discharge them because of union activities, and where it is claimed that the employer was justified in discharging an employee, the controlling and ultimate fact which determines the issue is, what was the true reason back of his discharge. National Labor Relations Board v. Kohen-Ligon-Folz, 5 Cir., 128 F.2d 502. But in deciding that issue, the Board is not bound to accept the employer's explanation of the discharge.

Petitioner argues that there is a total absence of positive and direct testimony that it discharged Pletka because of union activities. It asserts that the Board relied on inference in the face of strong and impelling positive testimony that Pletka was discharged for a violation of a company rule. While it is true that the provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq., give reviewing courts more latitude, that Act does not provide for a hearing de novo. National Labor Relations Board v. Austin Co., 7 Cir., 165 F.2d 592, and National Labor Relations Board v. Caroline Mills, 5 Cir., 167 F.2d 212. See also ...

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