Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Hunter, 5685.

• Decision Date: 11 February 1948
• Docket Number: No. 5685.,5685.
• Citation: 165 F.2d 931
• Parties: PROVIDENT LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. v. HUNTER.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

165 F.2d 931 (1948)

PROVIDENT LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. v. HUNTER.

No. 5685.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

February 11, 1948.

C. F. Haynsworth, Jr., of Greenville, S. C. (Haynsworth & Haynsworth, of Greenville, S. C., on the brief), for appellant.

E. M. Blythe, Jr., of Greenville, S. C. (Love, Thornton & Blythe, of Greenville, S. C., on the brief), for appellee.

Before PARKER, SOPER, and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.

PARKER, Circuit Judge.

This is an appeal by defendant from a judgment for plaintiff on a policy of life insurance. There is no dispute as to the facts and the case was heard by the judge without a jury. The sole question in the case is one of interpretation, viz., whether the term "anniversary date" as used in the policy is to be construed as the anniversary of the date which the policy bears upon its face or the anniversary of the date upon which it was delivered and the first premium paid.

The policy was for $5,000 and was dated January 24, 1936. It contained a double protection clause providing that if the death of the insured should occur while the policy was in force and before its "tenth anniversary date", an additional sum equal to the face amount of the policy would be paid. The insured died at three o'clock in the morning of January 24, 1946. The company contends that this was not before the tenth anniversary date of the policy and, having paid the face of the policy, denies liability under the double protection clause. The contention of plaintiff that death occurred before the tenth anniversary date is based upon the fact that the policy was delivered to the insured and the first premium paid on January 25, 1936, and upon the clause of the application, attached to the policy, providing that no liability should exist thereunder until the policy should be delivered to the insured and the first premium paid. The learned District Judge accepted plaintiff's contention on the theory that the insured was entitled to ten full years insurance under the double protection clause and that the term "anniversary date" should be construed as having reference to the date of delivery.

The question involved is not one of deciding the length of term insurance to which the holder of the policy may have been entitled, but of what was the anniversary date within the meaning of the language used in the policy; and, as to this, we think the position of the company is unquestionably correct. As we said in Sellars v. Continental Life Ins. Co. 4 Cir., 30 F.2d 42, 44, "It is the custom of life insurance companies, and we think a universal custom, to issue from their home offices policies which are complete in all of their details, and to set forth in such policies the dates upon which they are issued. This date is of importance to both the company and the insured as fixing definitely the date upon which premiums are to be paid and with respect to which rights under the policy are to be calculated; and it is of the greatest importance to both that this date be not left open to any doubt or conjecture." We think it perfectly clear that it is this date which the policy bears on its face, and not the date of delivery, that the parties must be deemed to have had in mind when referring in the policy to its anniversary date; and the fact that, under this interpretation, the coverage of the double protection clause may have been less than a ten year period is beside the point. The condition of the policy is not that such coverage shall extend for ten years, but that the insured shall die before the "tenth anniversary date" of the policy.

The case is, of course, governed by the law of South Carolina as declared by its Supreme Court; and we construe the decisions of that court as according with what we have just stated. Directly in point, we think, is the recent case of Brown v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New York 186 S.C. 245, 195 S.E. 552, where the question involved was whether...