Ingrassia v. Health & Hosp. Corp.

• Decision Date: 08 September 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. 14 CV 1900(PKC).
• Citation: 130 F.Supp.3d 709
• Parties: Jeanette INGRASSIA, Plaintiff, v. HEALTH & HOSPITAL CORP., City of New York, and Elmhurst Hospital, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

130 F.Supp.3d 709

Jeanette INGRASSIA, Plaintiff,

v.HEALTH & HOSPITAL CORP., City of New York, and Elmhurst Hospital, Defendants.

Case No. 14 CV 1900(PKC).

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed Sept. 8, 2015.

Judith G. Amorski, Judith G. Amorski, LLC, Freehold, NJ, for Plaintiff.

Alexis Downs, Mark Andrew Osmond, Don Hanh Nguyen, New York City Law Department, Benjamin E. Stockman, Corporation Counsel of the City of New York, New York, NY, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM & OPINION

PAMELA K. CHEN

, District Judge:

Plaintiff Jeanette Ingrassia brings this employment discrimination action against Defendants Health & Hospital Corporation ("HHC"), the City of New York, and Elmhurst Hospital. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants discriminated against her on the basis of age and gender in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.,

and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 28 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. Defendants now move to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("FRCP") 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6). The Court grants Defendants' motion in part and denies it in part. Defendants Elmhurst Hospital and the City of New York are dismissed from this action. Count One of the Complaint is dismissed for failure to state a claim, but the remainder of Plaintiff's claims shall proceed.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations¹

Plaintiff worked for HHC for a total of 23 years.² (Complaint ("Compl."), Dkt. 1, at ECF 8).³ She alleges that she was forced to retire on or about January 2012, (Compl. at ECF 1), due to the discrimination and sexual harassment she suffered from her supervisors at HHC. (Id. at ECF 6) (stating that, as a result of the treatment from her supervisors, Plaintiff was "upset [ ] to the point that she had to quit").

One of Plaintiff's supervisors, Eric Morales, made comments that "he did not like women and that they were only good for sex," and that he would "donat[e] the older women [employees] to a different department because he had no use for them." (Compl. at ECF 5). Her subsequent supervisor, Kevin Schwendemann, "continued and increased the same type of insulting behavior." (Id. ). He would comment that "she could not keep up with the girls" and that she was "the oldest woman." (Id. ). He would question when Plaintiff planned to retire, would stand over her and ask whether he was making her nervous, and make other insulting, derogatory comments. (Id. ). Though Plaintiff told him repeatedly that she was uncomfortable with these comments and that the comments constituted age discrimination, Schwendemann allegedly continued and even increased his comments. (Id. ).

Schwendemann also engaged in sexually harassing conduct by frequently coming within a foot of Plaintiff and grabbing himself in the groin so that Plaintiff could see. (Id. at ECF 6). In addition, Schwendemann invaded Plaintiff's privacy and harassed her by reading her medical records. (Id. at ECF 7). Plaintiff continued to receive raises and favorable performance reviews while enduring her supervisors' harassment. (Id. at ECF 5).

Plaintiff complained to Schwendemann about his conduct and also wrote to her union representative to complain about Schwendemann. When Schwendemann found out about her complaint to the union, he retaliated against her by yelling at her in front of other employees and by docking her pay when she was only a few minutes late getting to work. Schwendemann also tapped Plaintiff's phone to listen to her conversations, and would yell at her for no apparent reason. (Id. ). Schwendemann did not do this to younger similarly situated employees—only older ones. (Id. at 7). On several occasions, Plaintiff returned to work from vacation to find her desk and belongings moved so that she was facing the wall, as if she was being punished. (Id. at ECF 8).

Plaintiff has suffered, and continues to suffer, emotional and financial distress as a result of her supervisors' harassment.

B. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed a charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC")⁴ , and received a right-to-sue letter on January 25, 2013. She timely filed suit on March 15, 2013 in the U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. (Compl.). On August 23, 2013, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint pursuant to FRCP Rule 12(b)(3)

, 12(b)(5) and 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, to transfer the action for improper venue to the EDNY. (Dkt. 6). U.S. District Court Judge Michael A. Shipp held a telephone conference on March 19, 2014, reading into the record an opinion and order denying Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, but granting the motion to transfer venue. (Dkt. 10). An order consistent with that opinion was issued (Dkt. 11), and the case was transferred to this Court on March 25, 2014.

On September 25, 2014, Defendants moved to dismiss the Complaint under FRCP 12(b)(5)

(insufficient service of process) and FRCP 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted). (Dkt. 24).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

To withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(6)

, a complaint must plead facts sufficient "to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). The liberal notice pleading standard of FRCP 8(a) only requires that a complaint set forth "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Under FRCP 8(a)(2), the complaint need not set forth "detailed factual allegations," but the plaintiff must present "more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Id. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]" Id. A complaint must contain enough factual material to " ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,’ " Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ), and should be dismissed where a plaintiff has not "nudged [her] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible [.]" Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. That "it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely[,] ... is not the test." Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 515, 122 S.Ct. 992, 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002) (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974) ).

Generally, on a motion to dismiss, the Court is constrained to the "four corners" of the complaint. Gorfinkel v. Vayntrub, No. 11–CV–5802, 2014 WL 4175914, at *3 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 20, 2014)

(citing Pani v. Empire Blue Cross Blue Shield, 152 F.3d 67, 71 (2d Cir.1998) ). The Court may consider documents outside of the complaint, however, if the plaintiff relied on them to frame her pleading. Martin v. County of Nassau, 692 F.Supp.2d 282, 289 (E.D.N.Y.2010). Here, Plaintiff has attached to her Opposition a transcript of her 50–h hearing⁵ before the City. (See Dkt. 22–5, In the Matter of the Claim of Jeanette Ingrassia against the City of New York, 50–h Hearing Transcript (Jun. 19, 2012)). It is not readily apparent to the Court that Plaintiff relied on the transcript of her 50–h hearing in framing the Complaint. Indeed, the Complaint does not even reference a notice of claim filed before the City or the fact that Plaintiff participated in a 50–h hearing. Thus, the Court declines to consider the 50–h hearing transcript. See HB v. Monroe Woodbury Cent. Sch. Dist., No. 11 CV 5881, 2012 WL 4477552, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2012)

(declining to consider the 50–h transcripts attached by plaintiffs in opposition papers where "it [did] not appear that [p]laintiffs relied on the transcripts ... in drafting the [complaint]."). The Court therefore does not consider the statement of facts included in Plaintiff's opposition memorandum, which relies entirely on the 50–h hearing transcript and does not cite to the Complaint. (See Pl. Opp. at ECF 4–6).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Dismissal of Defendants Elmhurst Hospital and City of New York and Amendment of the Caption

Though the Complaint simply states that Plaintiff was employed by HHC (Compl. at ECF 8), Plaintiff also named Elmhurst Hospital and the City of New York as defendants in this action, (see id. at ECF 1). Defendants seek the dismissal of Elmhurst Hospital and the City of New York as improper defendants.

Plaintiff concedes that the City of New York is not a proper defendant. (Pl. Opp. at ECF 10). The Court thus dismisses the City of New York based on Plaintiff's concession.

As explained by Defendants, HHC is a public benefit corporation. N.Y. Unconsol. Laws §§ 7384(1)

, 7385(1), 7401. Elmhurst is an operating division of HHC and not a separate corporate entity subject to suit. See Igartua v. Elmhurst Hosp. D–11 Psychiatric Ward, No. 09 CV 3287, 2011 WL 1337494, at *1 n. 1 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 17, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, No. 09 CV 3287, 2011 WL 1337158 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 7, 2011) (stating Elmhurst "is not a suable entity). Because Elmhurst is not subject to suit and HHC is properly named in this action, the Court dismisses Elmhurst Hospital from this action."

Plaintiff seeks the amendment of the caption to replace "Health and Hospital Corp." with "The New York City Health and Hospital Corporation." (Pl. Opp. at ECF 10). Defendants do not oppose the request. (Def. Reply at ECF 4). The Court, therefore, directs the Clerk of the Court to amend the caption by removing the City of New York and Elmhurst Hospital as defendants, and by replacing "Health and Hospital Corp." with "The New York City Health and Hospital Corporation."⁶

B. Service of the Complaint

Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(5)

because Plaintiff did not serve HHC with a summons and complaint within 120 days of filing the complaint with the...