Ex Parte Medellín

• Decision Date: 15 November 2006
• Docket Number: No. AP-75207.,AP-75207.
• Parties: Ex parte José Ernesto MEDELLÍN, Applicant.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

223 S.W.3d 315

Ex parte José Ernesto MEDELLÍN, Applicant.

No. AP-75207.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

November 15, 2006.

Gary A. Taylor, Austin, and Michael B. Charlton, Alvin, for appellant.

Charles A. Rosenthal, Jr., Houston, Matthew Paul, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.

OPINION

KEASLER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I, II, III.A., III.C., and IV, in which KELLER, P.J., MEYERS, PRICE, JOHNSON, HERVEY, HOLCOMB, and COCHRAN, JJ., joined, and an opinion with respect to Part III.B., in which MEYERS, PRICE, and HERVEY, JJ., joined.

José Ernesto Medellín filed this subsequent application, alleging that the International Court of Justice Avena decision and the President's memorandum directing state courts to give effect to Avena, require this Court to reconsider his Article 36 Vienna Convention claim because they (1) constitute binding federal law that preempt Section 5, Article 11.071 and (2) were previously unavailable factual and legal bases under Section 5(a)(1). We hold that Avena and the President's memorandum do not preempt Section 5 and do not qualify as previously unavailable factual or legal bases.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF MEDELLÍN'S CASE

Medellín, a Mexican national, was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death for his participation in the gang rape and murder of two teenage girls in Houston. We affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal.¹

Medellín filed an initial application for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming for the first time, among other things, that his rights under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention had been violated because he had not been advised of his right to contact the Mexican consular official after he was arrested.² The district court found that Medellín failed to object to the violation of his Vienna Convention rights at trial and, as a result, concluded that his claim was procedurally barred from review. The court also found, in the alternative, that Medellín, as a private individual, did not have standing to bring a claim under the Vienna Convention because it is a treaty among nations and therefore does not confer enforceable rights on individuals; only signatory nations have standing to raise a claim under the treaty. Offering an additional alternative, the court determined that Medellín failed to show harm because he received effective legal representation and his constitutional rights had been safeguarded. Finally, the court concluded that Medellín did not prove that his rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments had been violated and that he failed to show that any non-notification affected the validity of his conviction and sentence. We adopted the trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law with written order and denied relief.³

Medellín then presented his Vienna Convention claim in a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court denied relief,⁴ and Medellín filed for a certificate of appealability. While his application was pending, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued its decision in Avena.⁵ In that case, Mexico claimed that the United States had violated the Vienna Convention by failing to timely advise more than fifty Mexican nationals awaiting execution in United States prisons, including Medellín, of their right to talk to a consular official after they had been detained.⁶ The ICJ ruled in favor of Mexico, holding that the Vienna Convention does confer individual rights and that the United States violated the Convention.⁷ To remedy the violation, the ICJ ordered the United States to provide review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences⁸ at issue to determine whether the violation "caused actual prejudice to the defendant in the process of administration of criminal justice."⁹ The ICJ specifically stated that review is required regardless of procedural default rules that would otherwise bar review.¹⁰

The federal district court denied Medellín's application for a certificate of appealability, and Medellín appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, which also denied his application.¹¹ The Fifth Circuit noted the ICJ decision in Avena, but determined that it was bound by the Supreme Court's decision in Breard v. Greene, which held that claims based on a violation of the Vienna Convention are subject to procedural default rules.¹² Continuing, the court found that even if Medellín's Vienna Convention claim was not procedurally defaulted, its previous holding in United States v. Jimenez-Nava — that the Vienna Convention does not create individually enforceable rights — would require it to deny Medellín's application for a certificate of appealability.¹³

Medellín petitioned for certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, which granted review.¹⁴ Before oral argument the President issued a memorandum directing state courts to give effect to the Avena decision under the principles of comity.¹⁵ Then, while his case was pending before the Supreme Court, Medellín filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus in this Court, requesting that we give full effect to the Avena decision and to the President's memorandum.¹⁶ The Supreme Court subsequently dismissed Medellín's case as improvidently granted, stating that there is a possibility that "Texas courts will provide Medellin with the review he seeks pursuant to the Avena judgment and the President's memorandum. . . ."¹⁷

Based on the Supreme Court's dismissal, we determined that Medellín's subsequent application is ripe for consideration.¹⁸ We therefore filed and set this case for submission.

Under Article 11.071, Section 5(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, we may not consider the merits of any claims raised on a subsequent application for a writ of habeas corpus or grant relief unless the applicant provides sufficient specific facts demonstrating that:

• "the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been presented previously in a timely initial application or in a previously considered application . . . because the factual or legal basis for the claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous application";¹⁹

• "by a preponderance of the evidence, but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror could have found the applicant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt";²⁰ or

• "by clear and convincing evidence, but for a violation of the United States Constitution no rational juror would have answered in the State's favor one or more of the special issues. . . ."²¹

We ordered Medellín and the State to brief the following issue: whether Medellín "meets the requirements for consideration of a subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus under the provisions of Article 11.071, section 5, of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure."²² We also invited the Attorney General of the United States to "present the views of the United States."²³ On September 14, 2005, we heard oral argument from the parties and the Solicitor General, who argued on behalf of the Attorney General of the United States. Medellín's claims raise many remarkable issues of first impression for this Court to resolve. Before we provide some necessary background information, we begin with a brief overview of the arguments advanced by the parties and the United States as amicus curiae.

Medellín argues that the Avena decision and the President's memorandum are binding federal law that preempt Section 5 under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.²⁴ Alternatively, contending that he meets the requirements of Section 5(a)(1), Medellín claims that the Avena decision and the President's memorandum are previously unavailable factual and legal bases because neither was available when he filed his first application.²⁵ Countering Medellín's arguments, the State contends that the Avena decision and the President's memorandum do not meet the requirements of Section 5 and do not override it.²⁶ Finally, the United States as amicus curiae asserts that, although Avena is not enforceable in United States courts, Medellín is entitled to review and reconsideration of the merits of his Vienna Convention claim "to the extent that his claim relies on the President's determination that `review and reconsideration' . . . by Texas courts is necessary for compliance with the United States' international obligations."²⁷ The United States also avers that "Section 5 would contravene the President's implementation of treaty obligations, and federal law would preempt its operation in the circumstances of this case."²⁸

II. CONTEXTUAL BACKGROUND

A. Treaties

Treaties are compacts between sovereign nations.²⁹ In the international arena, compliance with a treaty depends upon "the interest and the honor" of the treaty's member nations.³⁰ When a member nation violates a treaty, another member nation cannot obtain redress from the judicial body of the violating nation but may seek enforcement through "international negotiations and reclamations."³¹

Treaties, entered into by the President of the United States with the consent of a super-majority of the United States Senate,³² are incorporated into the domestic law of our country pursuant to the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, which commands: "all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."³³ Treaties are "placed on the same footing" as legislation enacted by the United States Congress, and while neither is superior to the other,³⁴ both are subject to the United States Constitution.³⁵ In describing the relationship between treaties and acts of Congress, the Supreme Court explained the difference between treaties that do not contain self-executing provisions and those...