Gayle, &C., v. Owen County Court

• Decision Date: 07 May 1885
• Citation: 83 Ky. 61
• Parties: Gayle, &c., v. Owen County Court.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

83 Ky. 61

Gayle, &c., v. Owen County Court.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

May 7, 1885.

APPEAL FROM OWEN CIRCUIT COURT.

O. B. HALLAM FOR APPELLANTS.

W. MONTFORT ON SAME SIDE.

THOMAS R. GORDON FOR APPELLEES.

JOSEPH BLACKWELL ON SAME SIDE.

JUDGE PRYOR DELIVERED THE OPINION OF THE COURT.

By an act of the Legislature approved May 9, 1884, the voters of the county of Owen were authorized to vote at the ensuing August election on the proposition "as to whether or not spirituous, vinous or malt liquors, or any mixture thereof, may be sold in Owen county as a beverage."

The officers of the election were required to propound to each voter who might vote the question "Are you in favor of the sale of spirituous, vinous and malt liquors in Owen county as a beverage?" and when the vote is cast to record it for or against the proposition, so as to express the will of the voter on the question.

The election seems to have been conducted as required by the provisions of the act, resulting in a majority vote against the sale of liquor as a beverage.

The appellants, several in number, who were hotel-keepers in the county at the time the vote was taken, and engaged in retailing spirituous, vinous and malt liquors, made, or some of them, application to renew their tavern license with the privilege of selling ardent spirits. The county judge refused to grant the license, and from this refusal the appellants have resorted to a court of equity, alleging that the county judge refused to renew the license in anticipation of the vote about to be taken under the act, believing that a majority of those within the particular locality were in favor of the law, and opposed to the sale of liquor as a beverage, or that a majority in the county would favor prohibition: that the county judge had no other reason for denying the several applications, and by reason of such action on his part, and the additional reason that the act was unconstitutional, and, if enforced, would work irreparable injury in reducing the value of their property and destroying their business, they applied to the chancellor for an injunction, enjoining the clerk and judge of the county court from spreading on the records of the court the result of the vote which, when made of record by the provisions of the act, was to be evidence that all proceedings under it were properly and regularly had. An injunction was granted, and by an amended petition a mandamus was asked for directing the judge and clerk to refrain from exercising this ministerial duty. No objection was taken below to the manner in which the action was instituted, or the question raised as to the right of the several hotel-keepers who, if wronged, had each an independent cause of action to unite as plaintiffs, and present in the one action their several complaints, and, therefore, it is unnecessary to determine this question.

The act had been assailed upon the ground that it is in violation of the Constitution, and the decision of this question determines the right of the appellants to the relief sought. If the act is constitutional, and their application heard by a tribunal having the sole jurisdiction to pass on the facts, there can be no equity in their petition.

In such a case the influences operating on the mind of the judge in the decision of the case, either for or against the parties, is not the subject of investigation by the chancellor, nor would he interpose by injunction to restrain the action of the county judge, however erroneous his decision might have been on the merits of the application. The resort to a mandamus was the proper remedy to prevent the entry of the vote upon record if the act was unconstitutional, and whether an injunction could be resorted to as another and distinct remedy is not material to decide.

In the matter of license to keep a hotel, or to retail spirituous liquors, the judge of the county court has a large discretionary power, and while this discretion is judicial, the chancellor will not control its exercise or prohibit the inferior court from acting when the case is within its jurisdiction. The judge, from his own knowledge, may suspend or...