Myers v. Louisiana & A. Ry. Co.
Citation | 7 F. Supp. 97 |
Decision Date | 28 February 1934 |
Docket Number | No. 519.,519. |
Parties | MYERS et al. v. LOUISIANA & A. RY. CO. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Barnette & Roberts, of Shreveport, La., for complainants.
A. L. Burford and R. F. White, both of Shreveport, La., for respondent.
The pleadings and issues in this case are set forth in an opinion handed down on February 6, 1933 (D. C.) 7 F. Supp. 92, on the application for preliminary injunction and will not be repeated. In that opinion reference was made to an amended petition filed January 5, 1933, as well as affidavits offered in support of its allegations, whereupon the defendant moved to reopen the case for the reason that the amendment had not been put at issue by answer and was pending upon a motion to dismiss. The matter was reopened, and an answer to the amendment filed. Thereafter, plaintiff's counsel filed a waiver of the right to a preliminary injunction, and the case was tried on its merits.
Finding of Facts.
The plaintiff is a former conductor of the defendant company who holds his seniority as such if conditions should warrant his returning to work. He has been duly elected chairman of the Order of Railway Conductors, employed on defendant's lines, and has occupied that position since the fall of 1919; about 85 per cent. of the conductors on this line belonged to the union at the time this controversy arose; and plaintiff was recognized by defendant as the representative of the conductors and handled their claims and disputes with it until the present misunderstanding when it requested that the General Committee be convened. The officers of the defendant company, after requesting that the General Committee be convened to meet them, refused to deal further with Myers. The purpose of having the meeting with the committee was to permit the railway officials to bring to its attention their objections to the plaintiff as general chairman, particularly what they considered his arbitrary and offensive attitude toward them. These officers frankly stated their purpose not to deal with Myers further, and suggested that some other member of the order should be selected as general chairman, preferably a conductor in the service. It was their further view that a full time paid general chairman was unnecessary and unwarranted in view of the size of the property and the number of men employed. Defendant also took the position that, although it had been dealing with the plaintiff as general chairman of the conductors, and similar representatives of the other unions, it had the right under its contract with the men to require that it be met by the committee instead of the general chairman alone.
I also find from the evidence that Myers was exacting in his dealings with the officials of the company and his attitude and conduct towards them was not such as to inspire mutual respect and consideration each for the other. He undoubtedly had the right to present and urge the claims of the men whom he represented vigorously, but this did not require that he be insulting in doing so. The order was entitled to select its own representative, and the company was prohibited by the Railway Labor Law (45 USCA § 151 et seq.) from endeavoring to influence or coerce it in this matter. I think the evidence reasonably warrants the conclusion that the purpose of the defendant's officers in this instance was to have Myers removed as general chairman and some one else selected, and that the meeting with the committee was not to discuss any specific claim of the men. To that extent they were attempting to say, at least, who should not represent the order. In justification of this position, they relied upon what they conceived to have been the unreasonable and offensive attitude of Myers.
The object in having a representative of the men to deal with the company, whether it be a general chairman or committee, is to afford an opportunity, in line with modern thought, for collective bargaining, in which the positions of the parties are adverse in the sense that they deal at arm's length until an agreement has been reached. Elaborate machinery has been set up for handling their differences, both by agreement and by law, the principal purpose of which is to bring about amicable adjustments without resort to strikes or shut-outs. If either side permitted the other to dictate or influence the selection of its representatives, then there would be absent that fair means of dealing which is essential to satisfactory relationships. This is the reason the Railway Labor law has prohibited attempts on the part of the management of the carriers to interfere in such matters affecting its employees. At the same time, when appealing to a court of equity for the enforcement of his rights against others, the plaintiff should not himself be responsible for the condition of which he complains. Even though there was a clear legal right in the petitioner to compel the defendant to deal with him instead of the committee, I do not think the court would be justified in so ordering, except upon the condition that the plaintiff conduct himself in a gentlemanly manner, so as not to be offensive to the self-respect of those required to meet him. He does not have the right, as some of the evidence tends to show, that he claims, to hire the conductors he represents to the railroad company, nor is the interest of the latter in their services confined to the question of paying their salaries.
Coming now to the question of who the company is entitled to insist shall deal with it in matters of this kind: I have looked in vain through the "Constitution, Statutes and Rules of Order" of the Order of Railway Conductors, for any specific provisions giving to this plaintiff the authority initially to handle alone disputes and claims of the men whom he represents. In his testimony, he refers to and relies upon "Art. 46, beginning with line 63, and Art. 50, on page 95," of the booklet just referred to. The provision first mentioned (beginning with line 63 of article 46) is as follows: "The Chairmen of said General Committees to constitute the General Committee of Adjustment for the system, to deal with matters beyond the jurisdiction of the General Superintendent, or on appeal from the General Superintendent, under the provisions of the law relating to General Committees of Adjustment."
With respect to the pertinent provision of section 50 relied on, I quote, beginning on page 94, as follows:
It will be noted that the language above quoted from section 50, beginning on page 94 (line 24), refers to a complaint of a local nature, "placed in his (the General Chairman) hands, in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 45 of the Statutes," and on turning to section 45, begining on page 75 (line 57), we find the following:
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