McMiller v. Bird & Son, Inc.
Decision Date | 16 May 1974 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 18881. |
Citation | 376 F. Supp. 1086 |
Parties | Noel McMILLER et al., v. BIRD & SON, INC., and Local 685 of the United Papermakers and Paperworkers, AFL-CIO. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Henry C. Walker, Shreveport, La., Elie, Sobol, Strickler & Dennis, New Orleans, La., for plaintiffs.
Herschel E. Richard, Jr., Cook, Clark, Egan, Yancey & King, Shreveport, La., for defendants Bird & Son, Inc.
James E. Youngdahl, Youngdahl, Huckabay & Larrison, Little Rock, Ark., for Local 685.
RULING ON MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
This purported class action was instituted by plaintiffs in their own behalf and that of other black employees of their employer, Bird & Son, Inc., at its Shreveport plant, seeking redress under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for alleged employment discrimination based upon race. They allege, inter alia, that defendant discharged them from its employ because of their race.
Noel McMiller's claim arises out of his discharge from employment at the Bird plant October 5, 1972, for an alleged unexcused absence. A grievance was filed for him by the local union, protesting the discharge, and an arbitration proceeding was initiated pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement in effect between the local and defendant. The arbitrator concluded that defendant had just cause to discharge McMiller, and that his testimony was unworthy of belief.
Defendant now, upon the basis of the arbitrator's ruling, has moved for partial summary judgment as to McMiller's claim, contending that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that it is entitled to a judgment, as a matter of law, dismissing the action as to him. Rule 56, F.R.Civ.P.
We reject this contention because the primary question in dispute here—racial discrimination—was not presented at the arbitration proceeding. Consequently, there exists at least that genuine issue as to material fact. But our task does not end there inasmuch as defendant has raised salient questions as to whether national policy favoring arbitration 1) precludes our consideration of a § 1981 action arising out of an occurrence that has been submitted to binding arbitration, and 2) if not, the extent to which we may reconsider issues already settled by arbitration.
The policy favoring arbitration was enunciated by the Supreme Court in the Steelworkers' Trilogy1 where it said:
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 1360, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960).
Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 429 F. 2d 324 (6th Cir., 1970), followed by Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir., 1972), held that this arbitration policy requires dismissal of an employment discrimination action under Chapter VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, where the grievance already has been adjudicated finally by arbitration. Dewey held:
This view recently was rejected by the Supreme Court, however, when it reversed the Tenth Circuit in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 94 S. Ct. 1011, 39 L.Ed.2d 147 (February 19, 1974), holding that, in an action brought under Chapter VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, national policy condemning discriminatory employment practices requires an exception to the rule of arbitral finality. After reviewing in detail all history of arbitration and employment discrimination, the Court said:
2
In light of this most recent pronouncement by the Supreme Court, we find no valid reason for applying a different rule here merely because this "employment discrimination" action was brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, instead of Chapter VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
It is settled that the specific remedies fashioned by Congress in Chapter VII were not intended to preempt or repeal the general rights granted by § 1981,3 and that § 1981 in a sense is a parallel prohibition against racial discrimination in private employment.4
National policy proscribing racial discrimination in employment is reflected just as strongly in § 1981 as in Chapter VII, which merely is an "up-date" of § 1981. Young v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3rd Cir., 1971). This was recognized in Hackett v. McGuire Brothers, Inc., 445 F.2d 442, 446 (3rd Cir., 1971), and Page v. Curtiss-Wright Corporation, 332 F.Supp. 1060, 1068 (D.N.J., 1971), which held:
"The national public policy reflected both in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and in § 1981 may not be frustrated by the development of overly technical judicial doctrines of standing or election of remedies."
This view further is buttressed by the recommendation to the District Court made by the Fifth Circuit in Caldwell v. National Brewing Co., 443 F.2d 1044, 1046 (5th Cir., 1971), cert. den. 405 U.S. 916, 92 S.Ct. 931, 30 L.Ed.2d 785, that the procedures set out in Young v. International Telephone & Telegraph Co., 438 F.2d 757 (3rd Cir., 1971), be followed ". . . so as to accord due regard to the conciliatory policy which is at the heart of Title VII while at the same time preserving the full remedy of § 1981." This allows District Courts to exercise certain Chapter VII powers, in staying any relief until the conciliatory procedures (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)) of that chapter are carried out during a pending § 1981 action and, as stated by the Court, ". . . melds the Title VII policy into the § 1981 remedy." Id.
We hold, therefore, that the rule announced by the Supreme Court in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Company equally is applicable in this § 1981 action. Hence, defendant's motion for partial summary judgment hereby is denied.
Nevertheless, following the Fifth Circuit's direction in Caldwell, we hereby sua sponte stay any further proceedings herein until all plaintiffs fully have utilized the conciliatory procedures provided in § 2000e. See also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(4).
1 United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S. Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960).
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