Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Company

Decision Date11 August 1970
Docket NumberNo. 19746.,19746.
Citation429 F.2d 324
PartiesRobert Kenneth DEWEY, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. REYNOLDS METALS COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

William A. Coughlin, Jr., Detroit, Mich., for defendant-appellant; Cross, Wrock, Miller & Vieson, Detroit, Mich., on the brief; Fred R. Edney, Asst. Gen. Counsel, Reynolds Metals Co., Richmond, Va., of counsel.

Donald F. Oosterhouse, Grand Rapids, Mich., for plaintiff-appellee; Vander Veen, Freihofer & Cook, Peter R. Tolley, Grand Rapids, Mich., on the brief.

George H. Darden, Washington, D. C., for Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, amicus curiae; Russell Specter, Acting Gen. Counsel, Equal Employment Opportunity Comm., Washington, D. C., on the brief.

Lawrence Halpern, Detroit, Mich., on brief for National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs, amicus curiae; Howard I. Rhine, of counsel.

Before WEICK and COMBS, Circuit Judges, and O'SULLIVAN, Senior Circuit Judge.

WEICK, Circuit Judge.

The action in the District Court was brought under the provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.

Plaintiff's (Dewey's) claim was that he was wrongfully discharged by his employer, the defendant, Reynolds Metals Company (Reynolds), because of his religious beliefs, and he prayed for reinstatement with back pay.

Prior to bringing the action, Dewey filed grievances with Reynolds on the identical claim set forth in his complaint, under the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement entered into by Reynolds with Local 277, United Automobile Aerospace and Agricultural Workers of America, AFL-CIO (UAW), which was the bargaining representative of Reynolds' employees. Dewey was a member of UAW. The grievances were processed and resulted in their submission to a mutually agreeable arbitrator, who made an award denying them on June 29, 1967.

Contemporaneously with the submission of the grievances, Dewey made application to the Michigan Civil Rights Commission for issuance of a complaint against Reynolds, alleging discrimination on account of his religious beliefs.

The following is a Summary of Findings and Order of Dismissal, entered by the Commission on December 13, 1966:

"The findings indicate that the claimant, despite due notice of overtime requirements by the company and the applicable Collective Bargaining Agreement provisions, continued to refuse to perform scheduled overtime work on Sundays and took the position that his right to continued employment while following his religious belief without interference was an absolute right.
"The Commission has previously ruled that where the normal work week and foreseeable overtime requirements are prescribed in a Collective Bargaining Agreement, that absent or (sic) intent on the part of respondent to discriminate on religious grounds, an employee is not entitled to demand any alteration in such requirement to accommodate his religious beliefs.
"The investigation did not reveal any intent on the part of the respondent to discriminate on religious grounds and it is, therefore, recommended that this application for the issuance of a complaint be denied for lack of probable cause.
ORDER OF DISMISSAL
"The Commission has found insufficient grounds on which to issue a Complaint and, therefore, the above Application is herewith denied. This Order of Dismissal shall automatically become effective within 15 days from the date of mailing unless the Claimant shall demand a hearing prior thereto." (App. 93a-94a)

Dewey requested the United States Office of Federal Contract Compliance to review his charges of religious discrimination, and that office found no basis for a charge of discrimination.

On January 4, 1967, Dewey filed a charge with Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), claiming religious discrimination. The Commission, on January 5, 1967, contrary to the recommendation of its Regional Director that the Commission find no probable cause, determined that there was reasonable cause to believe that Reynolds had engaged in unlawful employment practices and authorized the bringing of the present action in the District Court. Reynolds moved for dismissal of the complaint filed in the District Court on the grounds that the arbitrator's award was a final adjudication of the grievances and that they could not be relitigated. The District Judge, in a memorandum opinion, denied the motion to dismiss. 291 F.Supp. 786 (W.D.Mich.1968).

Reynolds then answered, denying it discriminated against Dewey on account of his religion and pleaded provisions of the collective bargaining agreement which required employees to perform all straight time and overtime work required of them by the company. Reynolds further alleged that Dewey refused to perform overtime work on Sundays or to arrange for another qualified employee to replace him, basing his refusal on his religious convictions. Reynolds, after giving warnings and a three-days' layoff, finally discharged Dewey under its plant rules for his continued refusal to comply with the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.

The parties stipulated the facts and the case was tried by the Court without a jury. In a memorandum opinion, the District Judge ruled in favor of Dewey. He ordered Reynolds to reinstate Dewey with back pay and enjoined Reynolds from requiring Dewey to work on Sundays. 300 F.Supp. 709 (W.D.Mich.1969). The District Court refused to stay execution on the reinstatement pending appeal, and required Reynolds to post a $15,000-bond to stay execution on the judgment of $7,286.92 for back pay. 304 F.Supp. 1116 (W.D.Mich.1969). Reynolds appealed. We reverse.

The applicable statute is 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), which provides as follows:

"(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer —
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual\'s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; * * *."

The legislative history of the statute is clear that it was aimed only at discriminating practices. Congressional Record, Vol. 110, pages 13079-13080, June 9, 1964.

In order to prove a violation of the Act it was incumbent on Dewey to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that his employer discriminated against him on account of his religion. In 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Adm. News, page 2515, it is stated:

"A substantial number of committee members, however, preferred that the ultimate determination of discrimination rest with the Federal judiciary. * * * In addition, we believe that the employer or labor union will have a fairer forum to establish innocence since a trial de novo is required in district court proceedings together with the necessity of the Commission proving discrimination by a preponderance of the evidence."

On page 2516 it is stated:

"Similarly, management prerogatives, and union freedoms are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible. Internal affairs of employers and labor organizations must not be interfered with except to the limited extent that correction is required in discrimination practices."

Reference to the collective bargaining agreement indicates rather clearly that the provisions with respect to straight time and overtime work apply to all employees equally and do not discriminate against Dewey or any other employee.

Reynolds operated a "job type" plant, producing, on order, aluminum extrusions and billets. It was necessary therefore for production to be scheduled to meet delivery dates provided for in contracts with customers.

Prior to the 1960 collective bargaining agreement, overtime was performed by employees on a voluntary basis. As a result thereof, with an increase in orders it became impossible to schedule production on Saturdays and Sundays. In order to remedy this difficulty, Reynolds negotiated with UAW the 1960 and 1965 collective bargaining agreements which provided that the company had the right to set straight time and overtime schedules and the employees were obligated to work such schedules unless they had a substantial and justifiable reason for not doing so. The 1965 agreement provided:

"All employees shall be obligated to perform all straight time and overtime work required of them by the Company except when an employee has a substantial and justifiable reason for not working; provided, however, that no employee shall be required to work more than twelve (12) continuous hours without his consent."

The agreement provided time and one-half for work on Saturdays and double time for work on Sundays.

The agreement further provided that overtime work shall be divided as equally as possible. If more employees are needed they are assigned in the inverse order of their seniority. Reynolds also issued an interpretation that any employee assigned to overtime could be relieved from the assignment simply by arranging for another qualified employee to replace him. This system was used extensively.

Dewey had been employed by Reynolds in various capacities since 1951, and at the time of his discharge, on September 12, 1966, was a die repairman. Since 1961 Dewey has been a member of Faith Reformed Church. He never volunteered for overtime work on Sunday after joining the church, although he did volunteer for other days.

Dewey was scheduled to work on Sunday, November 21, 1965. He refused to work because of his religious beliefs. He was given a warning and informed as to the necessity of a seven-day operation and was advised that a repetition would lead to disciplinary action under Plant Rule 11, which prohibits "absence from work without reasonable cause," and provides a three-offense progression of punishment with discharge for the third offense.

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