Avilés v. Figueroa

• Citation: 195 F.Supp.3d 435
• Decision Date: 15 July 2016
• Docket Number: Civil No.: 12-1200 (DRD)
• Parties: Mario Teneval AVILÉS, Plaintiff, v. Liza Estrada FIGUEROA, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

195 F.Supp.3d 435

Mario Teneval AVILÉS, Plaintiff,

v.Liza Estrada FIGUEROA, et al., Defendants.

Civil No.: 12-1200 (DRD)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed July 15, 2016

Juan A. Velez-Mendez, Miradero De Humacao, Humacao, PR, for Plaintiff.

Javier Burgos-Ruiz, Department of Justice of Puerto Rico, Juan M. Frontera-Suau, Ufret & Frontera Law Firm, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

DANIEL R. DOMÍNGUEZ, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Mario Teneval Avilés ("Plaintiff") filed a complaint on February 4, 2016, alleging political discrimination against Defendants Liza Estrada Figueroa ("Estrada Figueroa") in her official and personal capacities and against Mariel Martínez-Ortiz ("Martínez-Ortiz") in her official and personal capacities, as well via supervisory liability (collectively, "Defendants"). Dkt. No. 1. Plaintiff brings this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as supplemental claims under Article II, Sections 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, and 7 of the Constitution of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, and Articles 1802 and 1803 of the Civil Code of Puerto Rico. Id. Defendants now move to dismiss all Section 1983 claims.

II. Relevant Factual and Procedural Background

Plaintiff is an Official Executive of the Corporación del Fondo del Seguro del Estado ("CFSE") at the Bayamón Regional Office. Dkt. No. 1 , p. 2, ¶ 1. Plaintiff has been affiliated with the New Progressive Party of Puerto Rico ("NPP") since 1996, the same year he began working at CFSE. He also ran as an official candidate in the 2008 primaries for the Bayamón District. Dkt. No. 1 , p. 3, ¶¶ 1-6. At the time of filing the complaint, Plaintiff was a primary candidate for House of Representative for the Bayamón District. Plaintiff claims that his work colleagues are aware of his political affiliation. Dkt. No. 1 , p. 4, ¶ 8.

Co-Defendant Martínez-Ortiz is the CFSE Regional Director for the Bayamón Region. Dkt. No. 1 , p. 4, ¶ 12. Co-Defendant Martínez-Ortiz is an active member of the Popular Democratic Party ("PDP"), which is the main political rival of the NPP. Dkt. No. 1, p. 4, ¶ 9. Prior to starting her role as CFSE Regional Director in 2014, she served as Sub-Commissioner for the PDP State Elections Commission from 2010 to 2013. Id. at ¶ 10.

Plaintiff claims that Co-Defendant Martínez-Ortiz has at one time falsely accused him of skipping work to participate in political activities, has excluded him from staff meetings without explanation, and has denied his request for five months leave in what Plaintiff believes was an effort to thwart his primary campaign. Dkt. No. 1 , p. 4-5, ¶¶ 13-19.

Co-Defendant Estrada Figueroa is the Administrator of the CFSE and Co-Defendant Martínez-Ortiz's superior. The complaint states that José E. Ortiz Torres, a non-party in this suit and President of the Asociación Empleados Gerenciales for CFSE (AEG-CFSE), appealed via email to Estrada Figueroa to ask her to grant Plaintiff's vacation request. While the pleadings are fuzzy as to what, if any, response Estrada Figueroa gave to this entreaty, Plaintiff contends that she did not respond and that her inaction was motivated by her political affiliation with the PDP.

Defendants filed a motion to dismiss asserting that there is no absolute right to vacation leave, and therefore, no qualifying adverse action occurred to qualify the described events as political discrimination. Furthermore, regardless of any political motivations, Defendants argue that they are shielded from these causes of action by qualified immunity.

III. Standard of Review

Once confronted with an allegation regarding the sufficiency of a complaint, the Court must first turn to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a), which enumerates the minimum requirements of a valid complaint:

(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional supports;

(2) a short plain statement of the claim showing that the pleaders is entitled to relief; and

(3) a demand for the relief sought which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief

A motion under Rule 12(b)(6) must be granted when the pleader fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). A 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss will succeed when the complaint's allegations do not comply with Rule 8(a)(2). However, compliance with Rule 8(a)(2) has been the subject of much debate for decades in the legal community.

The Supreme Court sparked this discussion in 1957, when called upon to evaluate the sufficiency of a complaint:

In appraising the sufficiency of the complaint [in this case] we follow, of course, the accepted rule that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. (emphasis added).

Conley v. Gibson , 355 U.S. 41, 45–46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957) (overruled by Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). This passage, embraced by our highest court, has been interpreted by many judges and commentators to mean that "a wholly conclusory statement of claim would survive a motion to dismiss whenever the pleadings left open the possibility that a plaintiff might later establish some ‘set of [undisclosed] facts' to support recovery." (alteration in original). Twombly , 550 U.S. at 561, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (describing the evil created by the controversial Conley passage). However, such an interpretation harshly affects a defendant's desire to defend himself in a civil suit. "[T]he threat of discovery expense [would] push costs-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases." Id. at 559, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Hence, many other judges and commentators, wary of these negative implications, declined to construe the Supreme Court's words in such a literal manner. The debate between these two schools of thought raged for decades. Finally, this controversy was put to rest by the Supreme Court in 2007: "after puzzling the profession for 50 years, this famous observation has earned its retirement." Id. at 563, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (followed by Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ).

The Supreme Court cleared the smoke and established that, in order to comply with Rule 8(a)(2), a complaint must state a "plausible" claim for relief, as opposed to merely stating a "possible" claim for relief. "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged —but it has not ‘show[n]’ —that ‘the pleader is entitled to relief.’ " (emphasis provided). Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (using the language of Rule 8(a)(2) to explain plausibility). In order to " ‘nudge [a claim] across the line from conceivable to plausible,’ the complaint must contain enough facts to support a claim for relief." (emphasis provided). Twombly , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955.

"This plausibility standard has become the ‘new normal’ in federal civil practice." Garcia – Catalan v. United States , 734 F.3d 100, 101 (1st Cir.2013) (citing A.G. v. Elsevier, Inc. , 732 F.3d 77, 78–79 (1st Cir.2013) ). In other words, while Conley (arguably) states that a complaint with no more than conclusory allegations need not contain any supporting facts to comply with Rule 8(a)(2), both Iqbal and Twombly take the opposite point of view. " Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions." Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678–79, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

The doors of discovery only open when a complaint has "factual allegations [that] are sufficient to support ‘the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.’ " Garcia – Catalan , 734 F.3d at 103 (citing Haley v. City o f Boston , 657 F.3d 39, 46 (1st Cir.2011) (quoting Iqbal , 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937 )); see also Garcia – Catalan , 734 F.3d at 103 ("The circumstances in the complaint create a reasonable expectation that discovery may yield evidence of the government's allegedly tortious conduct"; citing Ocasio – Hern á ndez v. Fortuño – Burset , 640 F.3d 1, 17 (1st Cir.2011) ). The First Circuit explains the relationship between a complaint's plausibility and discovery in more detail:

... the plausibility inquiry properly takes into account whether discovery can reasonably be expected to fill any holes in the pleaders case. See Twombly , 550 U.S. at 556, 127 S.Ct. 1955 (requiring, as a hallmark of plausibility, that a complaint contain "enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence").

Garcia – Catalan , 734 F.3d at 104–05. Notwithstanding, the First Circuit has been cautious when applying the plausibility analysis to certain types of cases. Id. at 104 (citing Menard v. CSX Trans p. Inc. , 698 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir.2012) ). "Generally speaking, these are cases in which a material part of the information needed [by the plaintiff] is likely to be within defendant's control." Id. This caution is not in contravention with the Supreme Court's detailed plausibility standard:

Because precise knowledge of the chain of events leading to the [claim] may often be unavailable to a plaintiff at this early stage of litigation, we take to heart the Supreme Court's call to "draw on our ‘judicial experience and common sense’ as we make a contextual judgment about the sufficiency of the pleadings." See Sanchez v. Pereira – Castillo , 590 F.3d 31, 48 (1st Cir.2009) (quoting Iqbal , 129 S.Ct. at 1950 ).

Ocasio – Hern á ndez , 640 F.3d at 16.

Moreover, both the Supreme Court and the First Circuit have cautioned against equating a...