L & W SUPPLY CORP. v. Chartrand Family Trust

• Citation: 40 P.3d 96,136 Idaho 738
• Decision Date: 17 January 2002
• Docket Number: No. 26541.,26541.
• Parties: L & W SUPPLY CORPORATION d.b.a Gem State Acoustical & Drywall Supply, a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent, v. The CHARTRAND FAMILY TRUST; Total American, Inc.; and Does I Through Z, Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Idaho

40 P.3d 96

136 Idaho 738

L & W SUPPLY CORPORATION d.b.a Gem State Acoustical & Drywall Supply, a Delaware corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant-Cross Respondent, v. The CHARTRAND FAMILY TRUST; Total American, Inc.; and Does I Through Z, Defendants-Respondents-Cross Appellants.

No. 26541.

Supreme Court of Idaho, Idaho Falls, September 2001 Term.

January 17, 2002.

Hawley, Troxell, Ennis & Hawley, Boise, for appellant-cross respondent. Lynnette M. Davis argued.

Anderson, Nelson, Hall, Smith, P.A., Idaho Falls, for respondents-cross appellants. Joel E. Tingey argued.

KIDWELL, Justice.

L & W Supply Corporation d.b.a. Gem State Acoustical and Drywall Supply (Gem State) brought an action to foreclose a materialman's lien against a home owned by the Chartrand Family Trust (Chartrand). The district court granted summary judgment for Chartrand and dismissed Gem State's claim, finding that Gem State's lien was invalid, because Gem State was too remote from Chartrand in order to enjoy the benefits of Idaho's materialman's lien statute, I.C. § 45-501. Gem State has appealed the grant of summary judgment. Chartrand has cross-appealed the district judge's denial of its motion for attorney fees and costs. We agree that Gem State's claim of lien was invalid and that Chartrand was entitled to an award of costs at trial.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts were adapted from the district court's first "Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary Judgment Motions." Chartrand hired a general contractor to build a steel-frame house near Salmon, Idaho. The general contractor engaged Total American, Inc. (Total American) to supply the steel framing materials for the home. Total American, in turn, engaged the appellant, Gem State, to supply the requisite materials. Gem State now seeks to enforce a lien against the property, under I.C. § 45-501.

In its early dealings with Total American, the general contractor requested a bid for a "complete steel package" to be used in the construction of the house. Total American's bid indicated that the company could provide a "complete framing package" to include "[e]ngineered, detailed drawings for the required design criteria," "[s]tructural CAD drawings depicting each components (sic) length and gauge in all load bearing walls as per the architectural plans provided," "[c]ross sections throughout the structure showing connection locations and attachment procedures," and "[t]echnical assistance available by telephone/fax." The bid further included all of the necessary steel components, including steel studs, clips and fasteners, and pre-cut materials for header and truss assemblies to be fabricated at the building site. Bill Ladd, Total American's officer, negotiated with the general contractor, reviewed house plans provided by the general contractor, and developed a list of materials. Total American agreed to provide those materials to the general contractor.

In determining the necessary materials, Ladd used standard load tables provided by steel manufacturers. He created his own Computer Aided Drafting (CAD) drawings to identify load-bearing walls, floor systems, and components for the framing system. The general contractor participated in finalizing the drawings and made significant changes to the design. Ladd also created detailed instructions about assembly and conveyed those instructions to the general contractor. Neither Ladd nor Total American participated in any on-site construction. Total American charged the general contractor a flat, agreed-upon rate for its work in identifying components, assembling the materials, and preparing the instructions.

In August of 1998, Total American submitted its materials list to Gem State. Gem State was to supply the components and deliver them directly to the building site. Gem State did not have the materials in stock, but rather ordered the materials from its supplier, Knorr Steel Framing Systems (Knorr). Knorr caused the materials to be delivered to the job site on August 28, 1998, and the components were eventually incorporated into the structure of the house.

Shortly after the materials were delivered, Knorr billed Gem State, and Gem State billed Total American. Although Total American was paid by the general contractor, it failed to pay Gem State. Gem State filed a notice of a lien, under I.C. § 45-501(hereafter "materialman's lien"), against the Chartrand property. On February 16, 1999, Gem State brought this action to foreclose the lien. In May of 1999, Gem State sent another invoice to Total American in the amount of $19,421.34. The invoice identified some late charges, but it did not notify Total American that a lien had been filed or that Gem State would require payment of its attorney fees. On June 9, 1999, Total American submitted a check for the full amount of the invoice. On the check, Total American included a condition that acceptance of the check would constitute a full release by Gem State. On June 10, Gem State's attorney contacted Total American and notified the company that the check did not satisfy the full amount of the lien. Gem State refused to grant a release or negotiate the check unless Total American agreed to pay Gem State's attorney fees. Total American refused.

On October 14, 1999, the district judge denied Gem State's and Chartrand's cross-motions for summary judgment. After further discovery, the parties again filed cross-motions for summary judgment. On April 4, 2000, the district judge denied Gem State's motion and granted Chartrand's motion for summary judgment, dismissing Gem State's claim and declaring the lien void. On May 31, 2000, the district judge denied Chartrand's motion for attorney fees and costs. Gem State has appealed the grant of Chartrand's motion for summary judgment. Chartrand has cross-appealed, challenging the district judge's denial of its motion for costs and attorney fees.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court employs the same standard to be used by the district court originally ruling on the motion. Daugharty v. Post Falls Highway Dist., 134 Idaho 731, 733, 9 P.3d 534, 536 (2000). Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). When both parties file motions for summary judgment relying on the same facts, issues, and theories, essentially the parties stipulate that there is no genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the court from entering summary judgment. Daugharty, 134 Idaho at 733,9 P.3d at 536. When the parties have so stipulated and when the trier of fact is to be the court, rather than a jury, the trial court is free to arrive at the most probable inferences based upon the evidence before it and grant summary judgment, despite the possibility of conflicting inferences. See Killinger v. Twin Falls Highway Dist., 135 Idaho 322, 324, 17 P.3d 266, 268 (2000); Brown v. Perkins, 129 Idaho 189, 191, 923 P.2d 434, 436 (1996); Riverside Dev. Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 519, 650 P.2d 657, 661 (1982).

The parties both moved for summary judgment centering on whether Total American was an agent or a subcontractor, based on their respective interpretations of the facts and law relating to I.C. § 45-501, and the case was to be tried without a jury. Therefore, the district judge was free to resolve any conflicting inferences arising from the facts presented. Review of the trial court's resolution of those conflicting inferences is limited to whether the record is sufficient to support the trial court's findings. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 900, 950 P.2d 1237, 1239 (1997); Riverside, 103 Idaho at 520, 650 P.2d at 662. Determining the meaning of a statute and its application are matters of law over which this Court exercises free review. Polk v. Larrabee, 135 Idaho 303, 308, 17 P.3d 247, 252 (2000).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The District Judge Did Not Err In Holding That Gem State Could Not Utilize The Lien Provisions Of I.C. § 45-501.

1. Gem State was too remote from Chartrand or the general contractor to utilize the materialman's lien statute.

Idaho's materialman's lien statute provides, in relevant part:

Every person ... performing labor upon, or furnishing materials to be used in the construction, alteration or repair of any ... structure ... has a lien upon the same for the work or labor done or professional services or materials furnished, whether done or furnished at the instance of that owner of the building or other improvement or his agent; and every contractor, subcontractor, architect, builder or any person having charge of ... the construction, alteration or repair, either in whole or in part, of any building or other improvement, as aforesaid, shall be held to be the agent of the owner for the purpose of this chapter ....

I.C. § 45-501 (1997) (amended 1998, 2001) (emphasis added).

Gem State argues that the district judge erred in holding that it was too remote from the owner to assert a materialman's lien under I.C. § 45-501. Gem State poses several arguments intended to show that Total American was an agent of Chartrand and that Gem State therefore furnished materials at the instance of an agent of the owner, as contemplated by the statute. Specifically, Gem State argues that that Total American was a subcontractor because it was hired by the general contractor to create engineered drawings, to specify the type and gauge of steel to be used, and to provide all the necessary steel components. Alternatively, Gem State argues that if Total American was not a subcontractor, it was more generally an agent of the owner by virtue of having charge of performing those activities.

Chartrand argues that Total American was merely a material supplier who was filling an order...