Louisville, N.A.&C. Ry. Co. v. Carson

• Decision Date: 08 November 1897
• Citation: 48 N.E. 402,169 Ill. 247
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court
• Parties: LOUISVILLE, N. A. & C. RY. CO. v. CARSON et al.

169 Ill. 247

48 N.E. 402

LOUISVILLE, N. A. & C. RY. CO.

v.CARSON et al.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 8, 1897.

Appeal from appellate court, First district.

Action by Jennie E. Carson, executrix, and others, against the Louisville, New Albany & Chicago Railway Company. From a judgment of the appellate court (66 Ill. App. 262) affirming a judgment for plaintiffs, defendant appeals. Affirmed.G. W. Kretzinger, for appellant.

Milton Higgins, for appellees.

This is an action upon a lease dated April 25, 1887, executed by John B. Carson and Andrew J. Cooper, leasing certain premises in Chicago to the appellant for five years, and from May 1, 1887, at a total rental of $35,000 for the five years, to be paid in monthly installments of $583.33 on the 1st day of each month, in advance. The present suit is to recover for the rent due for the 14 months from March 1, 1891, to April 30, 1892, inclusive. The declaration avers that Cooper conveyed his interest in the premises to Higgins and Furber; and that thereafter the deaths of Carson and Higgins were suggested of record, and their representatives were substituted as plaintiffs. A plea of the general issue verified was filed. Certain special pleas and additional special pleas were filed by the appellant here, the defendant below. To some of these pleas replications were filed, making issues of fact upon the averments of the pleas. In addition to these replications, an additional replication was filed, setting up a former suit by the plaintiffs upon the same lease, to recover for the installments of rent accruing from May 1, 1890, to February 28, 1891, inclusive; also setting up that in said former suit certain special pleas were filed by appellant, and replications thereto were filed by appellees; and further averring that upon the trial of the said former cause upon the issues thus made upon the pleas and replications therein judgment was rendered in favor of plaintiffs against defendant for said rent and interest accruing under said lease from May 1, 1890, to February 28, 1891; and that an appeal was prosecuted from the judgment rendered in said cause to the appellate court, where said judgment was affirmed; and that upon appeal to the supreme court said judgment of the appellate court was also affirmed. The additional replication then avers that said former judgment is conclusive of all matters of law and fact therein adjudicated; that said former action was brought upon the same lease upon which the present suit is brought; that the questions as to the execution of the lease by appellant, and its ratification, and all questions as to its being a binding lease, were involved in said former cause, and were determined therein upon issues there made; and that the defendant is estopped in this action from disputing the execution and validity of said lease, and from disputing the right of the plaintiffs to recover the rent sued for for any reason based upon the invalidity of said lease. The appellant demurred to said additional replication. The court overruled said demurrer, and the defendant below elected to stand by its said demurrer. Thereupon a jury was waived, and a trial was had before the court without a jury. The findings of the court were in favor of the plaintiffs below, and judgment was rendered against the appellant for the sum of $10,000.60. An appeal was taken from the judgment so rendered to the appellate court, which has affirmed the judgment rendered by the trial court. The present appeal is prosecuted from such judgment of affirmance.

MAGRUDER, J. (after stating the facts).

The present suit is brought to recover rent for the period from March 1, 1891, to May 1, 1892, upon the same lease which is described in Railway Co. v. Carson, 151 Ill. 444, 38 N. E. 140. The former suit, which was disposed of by the case referred to, was brought for the installments of rent upon said lease for the period from May 1, 1890, to March 1, 1891. The additional replication filed in the present case sets up the verdict and judgment in the former case as an estoppel or bar to the prosecution of the present suit, so far as the validity of the lease is concerned. The present suit is brought upon the same lease upon which the former suit was brought, but seeks to recover different installments of rent. Appellant claims that its demurrer to the additional replication should have been sustained upon the ground that the bar or estoppel therein set up was for a different cause of action from that involved in the present suit. It is contended upon the part of the appellant that, because the present suit is not brought to recover the same installments of rent which the former suit was brought to recover, it is based upon a different cause of action, and that, therefore, the appellees have no right to plead the former suit and verdict and judgment in estoppel.

Among the propositions submitted by the appellant to the trial court to be held as law was the following: ‘The doctrine of res judicata cannot be invoked against the defendant in this suit, because the issues are not the same as in the former suit. This suit is for the rent due and owing from March 1, 1891, to May 1, 1892, hence a recovery for rent prior to that time cannot be set up as a former adjudication in this action for rent subsequently due.’ This proposition was refused by the trial court, and its refusal is assigned as error by the appellant. There was no error in such refusal. Not only was the former suit brought upon the same lease upon which the present suit is brought, but the present suit is between the same parties who were parties to the former suit. In the former suit the question of the validity of the lease here sued upon was involved. In that suit it was contended that Carson, the vice president and general manager of the appellant, signed the lease without the knowledge, consent, or approval of the board of directors of appellant; that his execution of the lease was never ratified and confirmed by the appellant or its board of directors; that when Carson signed the lease for appellant he was himself the owner of two-thirds of the demised premises; that the leasing by the manager of the company of his own property to the company which he represented made the lease void, and of no effect; that the execution of the lease under those circumstances was against public policy; and that, on May 1, 1890, the appellant vacated the premises, and delivered up the possession thereof to the plaintiffs, who have since held possession. The contentions were embodied in appellant's pleas in the former suit, and were denied by the replications filed by appellees in that suit. Thus an issue was therein formed upon them; and that issue was decided against appellant. So far, therefore, as these questions are concerned, the former decision of them is res judicata as against the appellant. The fact that this suit is for different and later installments of rent on the same lease in no way affects the right of the appellees to plead the former judgment and suit in estoppel of appellant's right to question the validity of the lease. It is not always true that an adjudication in a former suit cannot be made available as an estoppel, unless it appears that the things sought to be recovered and the cause of action in both suits were the same. Where the second action is upon the same claim or demand as the first, the judgment in the former suit, if rendered upon the merits, is an absolute bar or estoppel to the subsequent action, and, as to the claim in controversy, concludes both parties and privies, not only as to every ground of recovery or defense actually presented in the action, but also as to every ground which might have been presented. But...