Díaz-Colón v. Fuentes-Agostini
| Decision Date | 18 May 2015 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–2340.,13–2340. |
| Citation | 786 F.3d 144 |
| Parties | José Luis DÍAZ–COLÓN, on his own behalf and on behalf of his minor son J.L.D.R.; Linda Delgado, on behalf of her minor daughter D.M.D.D.; Zoraida Colón–Cartagena; Pedro Díaz; Pedro Luis Díaz–Colón; Yahaira Enid Díaz–Colón; Lourdes De Jesús–Velázquez, on her own and on behalf of her minor children J.L.S.D.; J.L.L.S.D., on their own and as legal heirs of Leopoldo Sanabria–Díaz; L.S.D., on their own and as legal heirs of Leopoldo Sanabria–Díaz; Albaela Díaz–Caraballo; Leonardo Sanabria–Díaz; Jennifer Piris–Jusino, on her own and on behalf of her minor daughter G.R.P.; Lucy Guzmán–Borrero; Carmelo Velázquez–Colón; Carmelo Colón–Rivera; Orlando Colón–Velázquez; Orlando Ramos–Félix; Josefa Félix; José Antonio Félix; Eliseo Ramos–Félix; Juan Marcos Merced–Gómez; Héctor Merced–Rodríguez; María E. Gómez–Velázquez; Leopoldo Sanabria–Morales; Maribel Ortiz–Vázquez, on behalf of minor, J.M.S.O; Ana Luisa Díaz–Rivera; Yolanda Ortiz–Díaz; Evelyn Ortiz–Díaz; Luis Daniel Ortiz–Díaz; Digno Ortiz–Díaz; Francis I. López–Díaz; Chelsea Luz Merced; Héctor Julio Merced–Gómez, Plaintiffs, Appellees, v. José A. FUENTES–AGOSTINI; Gabriel Redondo; Juan José Toledo–Bayouth; José Capó; José Toledo–Bayouth; Fernando Toledo–Bayouth; Pedro J. Toledo–Bayouth; Aníbal Solivan–Solivan; Héctor Tirado; Daniel Colón; Francisco Báez–Quiñones; Jesús Figueroa–Cruz, Defendants, Appellants, Pedro Toledo–Dávila; FNU Candelaria; Estate of Ulpiano–Crespo, comprised of unknown individuals K through S; José Figueroa; Ulpiano Crespo; Zoé Díaz–Colón; Conjugal Partnership Báez–Doe; Conjugal Partnership Capó–Doe; Conjugal Partnership Colón–Doe; Conjugal Partnership Díaz–Doe; Conjugal Partnership Figueroa–Doe; Conjugal Partnership Fuentes–Doe; Conjugal Partnership Redondo–Doe; Conjugal Partnership Solivan–Doe; Conjugal Partnership Tirado–Doe; Conjugal Partnership Toledo–Doe, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Ivonne Cruz–Serrano, with whom Miguel A. Rangel Rosas and Maymí, Rivera, LLC, were on brief, for appellants.
Pedro R. Vázquez, III, with whom José F. Quetglas Jordán, Quetglas Law, Osvaldo Pérez Marrero, and Osvaldo Pérez Marrero Law Office, were on brief, for appellees.
Before TORRUELLA, HOWARD, and KAYATTA, Circuit Judges.
This lawsuit arises out of two sets of wrongful murder convictions in Puerto Rico's courts. In each murder trial, jurors convicted a group of individuals based in large part on the testimony of a single witness, Zoé Díaz–Colón (“Díaz”). After one of the convicted individuals killed himself in prison, Díaz came forward to recant her testimony, claiming that law enforcement personnel had coerced and bribed her into giving fabricated testimony. After the Commonwealth courts subsequently vacated the convictions, and all charges against them were dropped, the wrongfully convicted individuals (and/or their heirs and family members) filed these consolidated civil damages actions in federal court against police officers and prosecutors involved in their misbegotten prosecutions. Nine of those law enforcement defendants (or their heirs) now appeal from the denial of their respective motions for summary judgment based on absolute or qualified immunities. We reverse in part the denial of summary judgment for assistant district attorney Gabriel Redondo–Miranda (“ADA Redondo”), but otherwise affirm the district court's rulings.
Because this appeal arises from the denial of the defendants' motions for summary judgment, we present the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, accepting as true all of the inferences the district court drew in the plaintiffs' favor. Cady v. Walsh, 753 F.3d 348, 350 (1st Cir.2014). And because our review in this case is interlocutory, we train our focus on rulings of law, rather than assessments of fact. Id. at 358–59.
Puerto Rico police hired Díaz as a paid informant on August 2, 1995. The following day, Rafael Colomba was murdered in Salinas, Puerto Rico. More than two years later Antonio Peña was murdered in Salinas on November 5, 1997. Defendant police agent Jesús Figueroa–Cruz (“Agent Figueroa”)1 investigated the Colomba murder, and defendant police agent Francisco Báez–Quiñones (“Agent Báez”) led the investigation into Peña's murder. The investigations stalled until June of 1998, when Díaz gave two sworn statements at the Guayama police station claiming both that: (1) she heard Orlando Ramos–Félix, Carmelo Vélazquez Colón, and Leopoldo Sanabria–Díaz (“Sanabria”) plan and later admit to the Colomba murder; and (2) she also heard José Díaz–Colón, Héctor Merced Gómez, and Manuel Ortiz (“Ortiz”) plan and later admit to the Peña murder. Agent Figueroa and defendant assistant district attorney José Capó (“ADA Capó”) were present for the taking of Díaz's statement on the Colomba murder. ADA Redondo did not participate in the investigation of either murder.
Díaz was the key prosecution witness at both murder trials.2 No one told defense counsel during either trial that Díaz had been a paid confidential informant for the police. Based on Díaz's testimony in the respective trials, both sets of plaintiffs were convicted and sentenced to prison. Ortiz committed suicide soon after his conviction for the Peña murder in May of 1999. After learning in 2001 of Ortiz's suicide, Díaz recanted, claiming in a sworn declaration that her trial testimony against the plaintiffs was fabricated.3
Díaz's recantation led to motions from the four living convicts for new criminal trials. At the hearings on those motions, Díaz testified that Agent Báez knew that she was a paid informant, and that he coerced, bribed, and coached her into giving the statements implicating plaintiffs in the Colomba or Peña murders.4 Díaz testified that Agent Báez told her what to say, familiarized her with the murder scenes and photographs of the plaintiffs, and repeatedly met with her to rehearse her statements, which she memorized. She claimed, too, that Agent Figueroa attended some of these rehearsals. Díaz further testified that Agent Báez and a prosecutor5 offered her housing and custody of her children in exchange for testimony consistent with her sworn statements. In addition, she testified that ADA Redondo offered her a therapy machine for her asthma
while she was staying in a witness protection shelter during one of the trials in which she testified falsely for the prosecution.
In 2008, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico vacated plaintiff Velázquez's conviction and granted a new trial on the ground that the prosecutors had not timely disclosed exculpatory evidence, including Díaz's contract as a paid informant. Pueblo v. Velázquez–Colón, 174 D.P.R. 304 (2008).6 Shortly thereafter, the government requested and the trial court ordered the dismissal of the criminal charges against all of the plaintiffs.
The plaintiffs associated with each group of wrongfully convicted individuals commenced separate actions in federal court against the same set of defendants.7 The district court consolidated the two cases. The plaintiffs asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, and various constitutional and tort claims under Puerto Rico law. After the district court granted in part defendants' motion to dismiss some of the claims, only Agent Báez, Agent Figueroa, and ADA Redondo remained as targets of the federal section 1983 claims (for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment and conspiracy to deprive plaintiffs of their rights under federal law). Diaz–Colon v. Toledo–Davila, 922 F.Supp.2d 189, 209–10 (D.P.R.2013). State tort and vicarious liability claims under Puerto Rico law remained against all of the defendants who are parties to this appeal.8 Id.
During discovery, plaintiffs scheduled Díaz's deposition in Puerto Rico. But Díaz fled Puerto Rico shortly before her deposition because she allegedly received threats at her hotel. Subsequent attempts to schedule her deposition by video failed.
After the close of discovery, defendants moved for summary judgment on a variety of grounds, including that they were entitled to qualified or absolute immunity and that there was insufficient evidence to support plaintiffs' claims. To oppose defendants' motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs relied heavily on the transcripts of Díaz's 2001 testimony during the hearings on the motions for new criminal trials. Plaintiffs also filed a motion in limine seeking a ruling on the admissibility of the transcripts of Díaz's 2001 testimony under the hearsay exceptions applicable to former testimony, to statements against interest, and to otherwise reliable out-of-court communications. See Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1), (3); 807. That testimony described outright fraud by some of the defendants—but not ADA Redondo—in fabricating evidence that was then used to secure an indictment and subsequent prosecution. It also supported a finding that ADA Redondo offered Díaz an asthma
machine while she was staying in the witness protection shelter during a trial.9 In their reply to plaintiffs' opposition to summary judgment and in their opposition to plaintiffs' motion in limine, defendants contested the admissibility of the transcripts.
Rather than addressing the merits of defendants' qualified immunity defense, the district court rejected the defense on procedural grounds as insufficiently argued and briefed. In so ruling, the district court observed that defendants “d[id] not specify ... which individuals are purportedly protected by qualified immunity or for what conduct,” and instead “merely cite [d] federal case law regarding qualified immunity, without applying it to the facts of their case.” As for ADA Redondo's absolute immunity defense, the district court rejected it on the merits, concluding somewhat cryptically that the evidence would support a finding that ADA Redondo offered Díaz an asthma
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