Diaz-Morales v. Rubio-Paredes

• Decision Date: 21 March 2016
• Docket Number: CIV. NO. 13–1360(PG)
• Citation: 170 F.Supp.3d 276
• Parties: Robert Anel Diaz–Morales, Plaintiff, v. Sergio Rubio–Paredes, et als., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

170 F.Supp.3d 276

Robert Anel Diaz–Morales, Plaintiff,

v.Sergio Rubio–Paredes, et als., Defendants.

CIV. NO. 13–1360(PG)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed March 21, 2016

Ramon Coto–Ojeda, Angel E. Rotger–Sabat, Coto & Associates, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Jaime J. Zampierollo–Vila, Puerto Rico Department of Justice, San Juan, PR, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

JUAN M. PEREZ–GIMENEZ, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Before the court is co-defendantsLimaris Cruz–Velez, Sergio Rubio–Paredes and Emilio Arill–Garcia's motion for summary judgment(DocketNo. 89).For the reasons set forth below, the courtGRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART the co-defendants' motion.

I.BACKGROUND

On May 8, 2013, plaintiffRobert Anel Diaz–Morales(hereinafter “Plaintiff” or “Diaz–Morales”) filed the instant action seeking compensatory damages against co-defendants police officer Limaris Cruz–Velez(“Cruz–Velez”), prosecutorSergio Rubio–Paredes(“Rubio–Paredes”), supervising district attorney Emilio Arill–Garcia(“Arill–Garcia”), and other unknown defendants.¹As explained in this court's Opinion and Order of September 30, 2014(DocketNo. 53), the facts of this case stem from the assault and murder of Kenia Rosario Viera(“Rosario”) during the early dawn hours of October 23rd, 2001.The Plaintiff was eventually charged and found guilty of these crimes by a jury on November 13, 2003, but, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico vacated this verdict eight and a half years later, on May 9th, 2012.²

The Plaintiff brought the present claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for what he claims were violations to his constitutional rights under the Fourth, Sixth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.These constitutional violations, he claims, stem from the investigation and prosecution of the assault of Rosario that resulted in her death.SeeDocketNo. 1.Plaintiff also invoked the court's supplemental jurisdiction over the claims arising from the alleged violations of his constitutional rights under the Commonwealth's Constitution and for damages under the Commonwealth's tort statute, to wit, Article 1802 of the Puerto Rico Civil Code,P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 5141. Id.

On September 30, 2014, the court dismissed several claims upon defendants' request and only the claims for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment, the conspiracy claims, and the related supplemental state law claims remain.SeeDocketNo. 153.

The defendants now seek summary dismissal of all pending claims (DocketNo. 89), which the Plaintiff opposes (DocketNo. 128).Also before the court is defendants' reply (DocketNo. 137).

II.STANDARD OF REVIEW

A motion for summary judgment is governed by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which entitles a party to judgment if “the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).To be successful in its attempt, the moving party must demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue as to any outcome-determinative fact in the record, seeDeNovellis v. Shalala,124 F.3d 298, 306(1st Cir.1997), through definite and competent evidence.SeeMaldonado–Denis v. Castillo–Rodriguez, 23 F.3d 576, 581(1st Cir.1994).Once the movant has averred that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case, the burden shifts to the non-movant to establish the existence of at least one fact in issue that is both genuine and material.SeeGarside v. Osco Drug, Inc.,895 F.2d 46, 48(1st Cir.1990)(citations omitted).“A dispute is genuine if the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the non-moving party.”Prescott v. Higgins,538 F.3d 32, 40(1st Cir.2008)(citingThompson v. Coca–Cola Co.,522 F.3d 168, 175(1st Cir.2008) );see alsoAnderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 248–250, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986);Calero–Cerezo v. U.S. Dep't of Justice,355 F.3d 6, 19(1st Cir.2004)(stating that an issue is genuine if it can be resolved in favor of either party).In order for a disputed fact to be considered material it must have the potential “to affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.”Sands v. Ridefilm Corp.,212 F.3d 657, 660–61(1st Cir.2000)(citingLiberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. at 247–248, 106 S.Ct. 2505 );Prescott,538 F.3d at 40(citingMaymi v. P.R. Ports Auth.,515 F.3d 20, 25(1st Cir.2008) ).

If the non-movant generates uncertainty as to the true state of any material fact, the movant's efforts should be deemed unavailing.SeeSuarez v. Pueblo Int'l,229 F.3d 49, 53(1st Cir.2000).Nonetheless, the mere existence of “some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not affect an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment.”Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202(1986).However, “summary judgment may be appropriate if the nonmoving party rests merely upon conclusory allegations, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation.”Medina–Munoz v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,896 F.2d 5, 8(1st Cir.1990).

At the summary judgment juncture, the court must examine the facts in the light most favorable to the non-movant, indulging that party with all possible inferences to be derived from the facts.SeeRochester Ford Sales, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co.,287 F.3d 32, 38(1st Cir.2002).The court must review the record “taken as a whole,” and “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence.”Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,530 U.S. 133, 135, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105(2000).This is so, because credibility determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge.Id.

III.DISCUSSION

A.Section 1983

Section 1983“provides a remedy for deprivations of rights secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States when that deprivation takes place under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory.”Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc.,457 U.S. 922, 924, 102 S.Ct. 2744, 73 L.Ed.2d 482(1982)(internal quotation marks omitted).To prevail in a Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff“must allege facts sufficient to support a determination (i) that the conduct complained of has been committed under color of state law, and (ii) that [the alleged] conduct worked a denial of rights secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”Cepero–Rivera v. Fagundo,414 F.3d 124, 129(1st Cir.2005)(quotingRomero–Barcelo v. Hernandez–Agosto, 75 F.3d 23, 32(1st Cir.1996) ).For Section 1983 liability purposes, “a state employee generally acts under color of state law when, while performing in his official capacity or exercising his official responsibilities, he abuses the position given to him by the State.”West v. Atkins,487 U.S. 42, 49, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40(1988).

Section 1983 claims require that a plaintiff establish three elements for liability to ensue: deprivation of a right, a causal connection between the actor and the deprivation, and state action.SeeSanchez v. Pereira–Castillo,590 F.3d 31(1st Cir.2009);see also42 U.S.C. § 1983.The causation element requires that the plaintiff establish (1) that the actions of the defendant deprived the plaintiff of a protected right, and (2)“that the defendant's conduct was intentional, grossly negligent, or amounted to a reckless or callous indifference to the plaintiff's constitutional rights.”Concepcion v. Municipality of Gurabo,558 F.Supp.2d 149, 162(D.P.R.2007).Moreover, a plaintiff must link each particular defendant to the alleged violation of federal rights.SeeGonzález–Piña v. Rodríguez,407 F.3d 425, 432(1st Cir.2005).A plaintiff may do so by indicating any “personal action or inaction [by the defendants] within the scope of [their] responsibilities that would make [them] personally answerable in damages under Section 1983.”Pinto v. Nettleship,737 F.2d 130, 133(1st Cir.1984).

The Plaintiff raises claims of malicious prosecution and conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights.In their motion, the defendants seek to dismiss all of Plaintiff's remaining Section 1983 claims pursuant to several grounds that will be discussed herein.

1.Malicious Prosecution

a. Probable Cause

In order to bring a Section 1983 malicious prosecution claim under the Fourth Amendment, a plaintiff shall establish that “the defendant(1) caused (2) a seizure of the plaintiff pursuant to legal process unsupported by probable cause, and (3) criminal proceedings terminated in plaintiff's favor.”Hernandez–Cuevas v. Taylor,723 F.3d 91, 101(1st Cir.2013)(citation and quotation marks omitted).In Hernandez–Cuevas, the First Circuit held that “it is ‘self-evident’ that ‘those charged with upholding the law are prohibited from deliberately fabricating evidence and framing individuals for crimes they did not commit.’ ”Id. at 100(citingLimone v. Condon,372 F.3d 39, 44–45(1st Cir.2004)(concluding that “the right not to be framed by law enforcement agents was clearly established in 1967”)).

The defendants seek the dismissal of the Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims against them because they acted upon probable cause.In fact, the defendants assert that “the instant action hinges over the existence of probable cause,”Docket No. 89at page 8, that is, the second element of the malicious prosecution claim.In support of this contention, the defendants list the series of events that led to the crime, which stemmed from their investigation.Seeid. at 10–15.The defendants offer these findings as statements of uncontested fact, most of which are based on the testimony of Jose Luis Delgado(“Delgado”), a co-author of the crime and an admitted heroin user.Id.The defendants also argue that the Commonwealth...