K&D Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Masten, 98894
| Decision Date | 03 July 2013 |
| Docket Number | No. 98894,98894 |
| Citation | 2013 Ohio 2905 |
| Parties | K&D MANAGEMENT, L.L.C. PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE v. DEIRDRE MASTEN DEFENDANT-APPELLANT |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
The Fair Housing Law Clinic
The Housing Advocates, Inc.
Ami J. Patel
Zashin & Rich Co., L.P.A.
Thomas P. Owen
Laurence Powers
Powers, Friedman, Linn, P.L.L.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Deirdre Masten appeals from the trial court's order granting summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee K&D Management, L.L.C. ("Landlord"). For the following reasons, we reverse.
{¶2} Masten became a resident in October 2010 of the Harbor Crest Apartments located in Euclid, Ohio. Landlord manages the property. The parties signed a one-year lease agreement for the term of October 5, 2010 through September 30, 2011. The nonrenewal provision in the lease agreement required a 60-day notice of nonrenewal if either party desired to terminate the lease at the end of the stated term.
{¶3} After Masten allegedly learned that Landlord intended to evict another resident because of the resident's disabilities, Masten helped the resident with drafting and filing a charge with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission ("OCRC"). The allegations against Landlord were for violations of the Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3617, ("FHA") and Ohio's Fair Housing Act, R.C. 4112.02(H) (collectively, "Acts").
{¶4} Masten subsequently filed her own charge with the OCRC in November 2010 based on Landlord's alleged discrimination against her. Landlord approached Masten in February 2011 and requested that she drop the charge. Masten agreed with the stipulation that, in exchange for dropping the charge, Landlord would cease the discriminatory practices.
{¶5} On or around July 11, 2011, Masten learned that she was unsuccessful in her attempt to drop the OCRC charge against Landlord. Landlord issued on July 12, 2011, an 81-day notice of nonrenewal of Masten's lease. According to the notice, Masten was required to vacate the property by September 30, 2011. Masten became a holdover tenant when she did not vacate the property by that date.
{¶6} On October 10, 2011, Landlord served Masten with a three-day notice to vacate the property. Landlord filed four days later a forcible entry and detainer action in Euclid Municipal Court for eviction of Masten. Masten answered the complaint, and filed a counterclaim under the Acts for discriminatory practices, retaliatory behaviors, and retaliatory eviction that followed the OCRC filings by Masten and, with Masten's assistance, the other resident. Masten also requested a change in venue. The municipal court granted the change in venue request, and transferred the case on November 9, 2011, to the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas.
{¶7} Landlord filed a motion for summary judgment on February 27, 2012, relating to Count 1 of its complaint for forcible entry and detainer. In an affidavit included with her brief in opposition to the motion, Masten acknowledged receipt of both the three-day notice to vacate and notice of nonrenewal of the lease.
{¶8} On August 3, 2012, the trial court granted Landlord's motion for summary judgment on Count 1 for forcible entry and detainer, but denied the motion as to Masten's counterclaims. In its ruling, the court stated in part:
{¶9} Masten timely appealed and raises four assignments of error for this court's review. She argues (1) the trial court erred in applying Indian Hills to a holdover tenant who alleges a landlord violates the FHA by not renewing a lease; (2) the trial court's decision violates the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution; (3) the trial court erred in applying Indian Hills to a holdover tenant who alleges a landlord violates the Ohio Fair Housing Act by not renewing a lease; and (4) this court should "reverse"Indian Hills because we wrongly decided the case. For the following reasons, we sustain Masten's first and third assignments of error.
{¶10} Appellate review of a trial court's decision on a motion for summary judgment is de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105, 671 N.E.2d 241 (1996); Zemcik v. LaPine Truck Sales & Equip., 124 Ohio App.3d 581, 585, 706 N.E.2d 860 (8th Dist.1998). The court applies the following test:
Pursuant to Civ.R. 56, summary judgment is appropriate when (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the nonmoving party, said party being entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor.
Zivich v. Mentor Soccer Club, 82 Ohio St.3d 367, 369-370, 696 N.E.2d 201 (1998).
{¶11} The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of showing there is no genuine issue of material fact and it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292-293, 662 N.E.2d 264 (1996). If the moving party satisfies that burden, the nonmoving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Civ.R. 56(E).
{¶12} Prior to reviewing the trial court's ruling on Landlord's motion for summary judgment, we must identify the different purposes of R.C. Chapters 1923, 4112, and5321. The underlying action commenced as one to reclaim property where an owner terminates the leaseholder's right to rent the property. The owner is provided a summary action under R.C. Chapter 1923, forcible entry and detainer, to quickly reclaim the property. R.C. 1923.02 specifically allows an owner to bring a forcible entry and detainer action against a tenant who holds over a term. R.C. 1923.061(A) allows that tenant to assert at trial "[a]ny defense in an action under this chapter."
{¶13} There is, however, a general inability derived from Civ.R. 1(C) for a tenant to assert a defense in a forcible entry and detainer action. The rule refers to the scope and applicability of the civil rules, and states, "to the extent that they would by their nature be clearly inapplicable, [they] shall not apply to procedure * * * in forcible entry and detainer." Civ.R. 1(C). Forcible entry and detainer is, therefore, designed to be a summary action allowing speedy relief. Any delay caused through added processes, including the assertion of defenses, is contrary to the speedy relief intended by R.C. Chapter 1923.
{¶14} Under the Ohio Landlord-Tenant Act, R.C. Chapter 5321, however, a tenant may raise the issue of retaliation as a defense to the landlord's action for possession if the landlord brings or threatens to bring an action against the tenant for possession in retaliation against the tenant's forming a union, complaining to a governmental agency about a violation of a building, housing, health, or safety code, or complaining to the landlord about a breach of the landlord's statutory obligations. R.C. 5321.02(A). R.C. 5321.03(A)(4) states that notwithstanding R.C. 5321.02, a landlord may initiate a forcibleentry and detainer action under R.C. 1923.02 against a tenant holding over his or her term. A holdover tenant may not, therefore, use a landlord's retaliatory action as a defense under these circumstances. Siegler, 63 Ohio App.2d 76, 408 N.E.2d 1383; Indian Hills, 8th Dist. No. 78780, 2001 Ohio App. LEXIS 3717.
{¶15} Ohio's Fair Housing Act prohibits, on the other hand, certain unlawful discrimination as defined in R.C. 4112.02(H)(1) and (12). R.C. 4112.02(H)(1) provides that it is an unlawful discriminatory practice to refuse to rent, lease, or otherwise deny or make unavailable housing accommodations because of "race, color, religion, sex, military status, familial status, ancestry, disability, or national...
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