Igartúa v. United States

• Decision Date: 28 January 2015
• Docket Number: Civil No. 14–1558 JAG.
• Citation: 86 F.Supp.3d 50
• Parties: Gregorio IGARTÚA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

86 F.Supp.3d 50

Gregorio IGARTÚA, et al., Plaintiffs
v.
UNITED STATES of America, et al., Defendants.

Civil No. 14–1558 JAG.

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed Jan. 28, 2015.

86 F.Supp.3d 52

Gregorio Igartúa–De–La–Rosa, Igartúa Law Office, Aguadilla, PR, for Plaintiffs.

Daniel Riess, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

GARCIA GREGORY, District Judge.

On July 14, 2014, Gregorio Igartúa, Carlos Mendez–Martinez, Jorge Perez–Diaz, Pedro Mendez–Soto, Iris Gonzalez–Camacho, and Maria Negron–Cedeno (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint against the United States of America, the President of the United States, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Clerk of the U.S. House of Representatives, all in their official capacities (collectively “Defendants”) seeking declaratory judgment and other relief. Docket No. 1. Plaintiffs claim that the U.S. citizen-residents of Puerto Rico are entitled to vote for representatives from Puerto Rico to the U.S. House of Representatives. Id. Specifically, Plaintiffs argue that the U.S. Constitution, international treaties, and customary international law compel Defendants to take the necessary steps for the apportionment of congressional districts in Puerto Rico. Id. Furthermore, Plaintiffs ask this Court to convene a three judge panel to evaluate and decide the merits of the instant case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284. Docket Nos. 2–3. Defendants, on the other hand, have filed a Motion to Dismiss under both Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). Docket No. 11.

This is Plaintiff Igartúa's fifth case concerning the enfranchisement of the U.S. citizen-residents of Puerto Rico and their participation in the federal electoral processes. In the first three cases, including an en banc decision, the First Circuit held that Puerto Ricans do not have a legal right to vote for the President and Vice President of the United States.See Igartúa–De La Rosa v. United States (Igartúa III), 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir.2005) (en banc); Igartua De La Rosa v. United States (Igartua II), 229 F.3d 80 (1st Cir.2000) (per curiam); Igartua De La Rosa v. United States, 32 F.3d 8 (1st Cir.1994) (per curiam). In his fourth case, Plaintiff Igartúa brought suit claiming that the U.S. citizen-residents of Puerto Rico have a right to vote for Representatives from Puerto Rico in the U.S. House of Representatives. See Igartúa v. United States (Igartúa IV), No. 08–1174 (D.P.R. June 3, 2009), aff'd, 626 F.3d 592 (1st Cir.2010), cert. denied, ––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 2376, 182 L.Ed.2d 1017 (2012).¹ This Court dismissed the complaint in that case and the First Circuit, upon de novo review, affirmed the dismissal. Id.

Plaintiffs' arguments in the Complaint at bar are nearly identical to the ones raised in Igartúa IV. Since the text of the Constitution has not been amended, Puerto Rico's political status has not changed, and the relevant jurisprudence continues to be the same, it follows that a contrary result in this case is foreclosed by this Circuit's precedent. For the reasons outlined below, Plaintiffs' Motion Requesting a Three–Judge District Court is DENIED and Defendant's Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED.

86 F.Supp.3d 53

STANDARD OF REVIEW

A defendant may move to dismiss an action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). As courts of limited jurisdiction, federal courts have the duty of narrowly construing jurisdictional grants. See, e.g., Alicea–Rivera v. SIMED, 12 F.Supp.2d 243, 245 (D.P.R.1998). Since the justiciability requirement of standing is generally viewed as a component of subject matter jurisdiction, see, e.g., Dubois v. U.S. Dep't of Agric., 102 F.3d 1273, 1280–81 (1st Cir.1996), standing challenges are more appropriately brought under Fed.R.Civ.P. Rule 12(b)(1). See Valentin v. Hosp. Bella Vista, 254 F.3d 358, 362–63 (1st Cir.2001) (stating that justiciability issues should be analyzed under Rule 12(b)(1) ). Accordingly, this Court evaluates Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under the standard for motions brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1).

Motions brought under Rule 12(b)(1) are subject to the same standard of review as Rule 12(b)(6) motions. Negron–Gaztambide v. Hernandez–Torres, 35 F.3d 25, 27 (1st Cir.1994). To survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must allege “a plausible entitlement to relief.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1967, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). According to Twombly, the complaint must state enough facts to “nudge [plaintiffs'] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Id. at 1974. Therefore, to preclude dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), the complaint must rest on factual allegations sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id. at 1965.

At the motion to dismiss stage, the court accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. See Correa–Martinez v. Arrillaga–Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 51 (1st Cir.1990). Thus, the plaintiff bears the burden of stating factual allegations regarding each element necessary to sustain recovery under some actionable theory. Gooley v. Mobil Oil Corp., 851 F.2d 513, 514 (1st Cir.1988). The court need not address complaints supported only by “bald assertions, unsupportable conclusions, periphrastic circumlocutions, and the like.” Aulson v. Blanchard, 83 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir.1996).

ANALYSIS

I. Plaintiffs' Request for a Three–Judge District Court

Plaintiffs ask this Court to appoint a Three–Judge Court to resolve the merits of this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2284. Docket Nos.2–3. Section 2284 provides, in relevant part that “[a] district court of three judges shall be convened when otherwise required by Act of Congress, or when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts, or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.” Plaintiffs argue that the judicial disposition of this case requires that a three-judge court be convened as in Adams v. Clinton, 90 F.Supp.2d 35, 72 (D.D.C.2000) (per curiam), aff'd without opinion, 531 U.S. 941, 121 S.Ct. 336, 148 L.Ed.2d 270 (2000), where a three-judge district court held that the District of Columbia is not a “State” for purposes of Article I of the Constitution and, as a result, its residents may not vote in congressional elections. Docket No. 2 at 2. Defendants, on the other hand, argue that Plaintiffs' claims are meritless and that a three-judge court is not necessary when the constitutional claim raised is insubstantial. Docket No. 12 at 2 (citing Butler v. Dexter, 425 U.S. 262, 266, 96 S.Ct. 1527, 47 L.Ed.2d 774 (1976) ).

86 F.Supp.3d 54

The First Circuit already rejected this request in Igartúa IV when it held that Plaintiffs' action cannot be construed as a challenge to the constitutionality of the apportionment of congressional districts. Igartúa IV, 626 F.3d at 598 n. 6. In other words, the First Circuit already found that Plaintiffs' claims for political inclusion do not meet the requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 2284. While it is true that a three-judge court was convened to adjudicate similar claims in Adams, this Court finds that such a court is not necessary in this case since Plaintiffs' constitutional and international law claims were already rejected in previous decisions, particularly in Igartúa IV. The First Circuit stated in Igartúa IV that “[s]ince Puerto Rico is not a state, and cannot be treated as a state under the Constitution for these purposes, its citizens do not have a constitutional right to vote for members of the House of Representatives.” Id. at 594. The First Circuit also stated that “Igartúa's claim that international law requires a contrary result is foreclosed by our decision in [Igartúa III ].” Id. (citing Igartúa III, 417 F.3d 145). Moreover, in light of the controlling authority relevant to this case, Plaintiffs' request for a three-judge court is unfounded. See Vazza v. Campbell, 520 F.2d 848 (1st Cir.1975) (finding that a previous decision and its subsequent affirmance had rendered the parties' claims “wholly insubstantial” for purposes of convening a three-judge panel). Therefore, this Court rejects Plaintiffs' request.

II. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6)

Defendants argue, inter alia, that this case must be dismissed because Plaintiffs lack standing to assert the constitutional and international law claims in the Complaint. Docket No. 11 at 5–7. Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiffs lack standing to assert their constitutional claims because they neither show that the alleged harm is fairly traceable to the Defendants' actions nor that a favorable decision is likely to redress the alleged harm. Id. As to the international law claims, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs do not have standing to raise these claims because the alleged harm is not likely to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.Id. As a result, Defendants assert that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiffs' claims. Id.

Moreover, Defendants...