Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, PC

• Decision Date: 15 February 2000
• Docket Number: (SC 16050)
• Citation: 745 A.2d 178,252 Conn. 153
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: CAROLE BURNHAM v. KARL AND GELB, P.C., ET AL.

252 Conn. 153

745 A.2d 178

CAROLE BURNHAM v. KARL AND GELB, P.C., ET AL.

(SC 16050)

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued October 27, 1999.

Officially released February 15, 2000.

McDonald, C. J., and Norcott, Sullivan, Callahan and Mihalakos, Js. James S. Brewer, with whom, on the brief, was William O'Shea, for the appellant (plaintiff).

Richard P. Weinstein, with whom was Nathan A. Schatz, for the appellees (defendants).

Jonathan L. Gould filed a brief for the Connecticut Employment Lawyers Association as amicus curiae.

Opinion

SULLIVAN, J.

In this certified appeal, the plaintiff, Carole Burnham, appeals from the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment rendered following the granting of the defendants' motion for summary judgment. This appeal requires us to consider whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that the plaintiff was precluded from bringing a cause of action for wrongful discharge against her former employer. We affirm the Appellate Court's judgment. The opinion of the Appellate Court sets forth the following relevant facts and procedural history. "The named defendant, Karl and Gelb, P.C., is a dental practice located in West Hartford that employs two periodontists, the defendants Edward Karl and David Gelb. On July 6, 1993, the plaintiff ... was hired by the defendants as an office manager. On November 5, 1993, the plaintiff filed an anonymous complaint with the Connecticut State Dental Association (dental association) alleging that the defendants engaged in unsanitary and unhealthy practices in violation of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act [of 1970] ... 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. On November 22, 1993, the plaintiff was terminated by the defendants and thereafter filed a complaint with the Hartford office of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration alleging that she was terminated by the defendants in retaliation for her complaint to the dental association. The plaintiffs complaint was administratively closed in February, 1994, due to the plaintiffs `lack of response' to correspondence from the Hartford office of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration.

"On January 24, 1995, the plaintiff filed a three count amended complaint alleging breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation and wrongful termination. On September 23, 1996, the defendants moved for summary judgment. On March 7, 1997, the trial court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment as to each count of the plaintiff's amended complaint." Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., 50 Conn. App. 385, 386-87, 717 A.2d 811 (1998). Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

The plaintiff subsequently appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court. In her appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiff claimed that the "trial court improperly granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants as to her claims (1) of breach of contract, (2) of negligent misrepresentation and (3) of wrongful discharge." Id., 386. The Appellate Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court with respect to each claim. See generally id., 386-97.

We granted the plaintiff's petition for certification limited to the following issues relating to the plaintiffs wrongful discharge claim: First, "[w]hether the Appellate Court erred in concluding that the plaintiffs attempted use of violations of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Act (act) to support a claim for wrongful termination failed as a matter of law because the existence of a statutory remedy under the act precluded the plaintiffs claim of wrongful discharge based on a violation of public policy?" Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., 247 Conn. 944, 723 A.2d 320 (1998). Second, "[w]hether the Appellate Court erred in concluding that an administrative remedy existed under the act?" Id. Third, "[w]hether the Appellate Court erred in concluding that no material fact in dispute existed as to whether the plaintiff exhausted her supposed administrative remedy with the Occupational Safety and Health Administration?" Id. And fourth, "[w]hether the Appellate Court erred in concluding that the plaintiff did not have a cause of action for wrongful discharge against her employer for refusing to work under conditions that pose a substantial risk of death, disease or physical harm and that are not contemplated within the scope of the plaintiff's duties?" Id., 944-45. We answer each of the certified questions in the negative and, accordingly, affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court.

The standard of review applicable to all four certified issues is well settled. "In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment when the material facts are undisputed, we must decide whether the trial court erred in concluding that the moving party was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.... [O]ur review of the ruling of the trial court is plenary, and we must determine whether the trial court's conclusions are legally and logically correct and find support in the facts appearing in the record." (Citations omitted.) Covelli v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 235 Conn. 539, 544, 668 A.2d 699 (1995), vacated on other grounds, 518 U.S. 1031, 116 S. Ct. 2577, 135 L. Ed. 2d 1092 (1996).

I

The plaintiff's first claim is that the Appellate Court improperly concluded that she was precluded as a matter of law from bringing a common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge based on a violation of public policy embodied in General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 31-51m.¹ The Appellate Court concluded that the plaintiff's claim that she was terminated by the defendants for reporting violations of the act could not support a common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge based on the existence of a statutory remedy available to her under 29 U.S.C. § 660 (c).²Burnham v. Karl & Gelb, P.C., supra, 50 Conn. App. 395-96.

We conclude that the plaintiff was precluded from bringing a cause of action for wrongful discharge for three reasons. First, we agree with the trial court that the plaintiff failed to present evidence that created a material issue of fact as to whether her termination violated the public policy embodied in § 31-51m. Second, even if we were to conclude that the plaintiffs termination violated the public policy embodied in § 31-51m, the plaintiffs common-law wrongful discharge claim would be precluded by § 31-51m (c), which provides a statutory remedy for employer conduct prohibited under § 31-51m (b). Third, we agree with the Appellate Court that the plaintiffs common-law cause of action for wrongful discharge is precluded because she had a remedy for her employer's conduct under 29 U.S.C. § 660 (c).

In Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Food, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980), we recognized that it is a "general proposition that contracts of permanent employment, or for an indefinite term, are terminable at will." Id., 474; see, e.g., Somers v. Cooley Chevrolet Co., 146 Conn. 627, 629, 153 A.2d 426 (1959); Fisher v. Jackson, 142 Conn. 734, 736, 118 A.2d 316 (1955). In Sheets, however, this court "recognized a common law cause of action in tort for the discharge of an at will employee if the former employee can prove a demonstrably improper reason for dismissal, a reason whose impropriety is derived from some important violation of public policy." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Carbone v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 204 Conn. 460, 466-67, 528 A.2d 1137 (1987), quoting Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Food, Inc., supra, 475.

In interpreting this exception, "we note our adherence to the principle that the public policy exception to the general rule allowing unfettered termination of an at-will employment relationship is a narrow one.... We are mindful that courts should not lightly intervene to impair the exercise of managerial discretion or to foment unwarranted litigation." (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Parsons v. United Technologies Corp., 243 Conn. 66, 79, 700 A.2d 655 (1997).

In Atkins v. Bridgeport Hydraulic Co., 5 Conn. App. 643, 501 A.2d 1223 (1985), the Appellate Court recognized a limitation on the public policy exception to the at-will doctrine. The court in Atkins concluded: "A finding that certain conduct contravenes public policy is not enough by itself to warrant the creation of a contract remedy for wrongful dismissal by an employer. The cases which have established a tort or contract remedy for employees discharged for reasons violative of public policy have relied upon the fact that in the context of their case the employee was otherwise without remedy and that permitting the discharge to go unredressed would leave a valuable social policy to go unvindicated." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Id., 648.

In this case, the plaintiff alleged that she was terminated for reporting the defendants' unsafe dental practices that violated the act. The plaintiff relied upon, inter alia, the public policy against retaliatory discharges embodied in § 31-51m, to support her claim of wrongful termination.³ Section 31-51m (b) prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who report "a violation or a suspected violation of any state or federal law ... to a public body ...." (Emphasis added.) General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 31-51m (b). Section 31-51m defines "public body" in relevant part as "any public agency, as defined in subsection (a) of [General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) §] 1-18a...." General Statutes (Rev. to 1993) § 31-51m (a) (4). Section 1-18a, in turn, defines public agency as "any executive, administrative or legislative office of the state or any political subdivision of the state and any state or town agency, any department, institution, bureau, board, commission, authority or official of the state or of any city, town, borough, municipal corporation, school district, regional district or other district or other political ...