Martínez-Rivera v. Puerto Rico

• Decision Date: 29 January 2016
• Docket Number: No. 13–1772.,13–1772.
• Citation: 812 F.3d 69
• Parties: Edna MARTÍNEZ–RIVERA, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor child, RCM; Lydia Rivera–O'Farril; Lydia Martínez–Rivera, Plaintiffs, Appellants, v. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO; Department of Justice of Puerto Rico; Department of Labor and Human Resources of Puerto Rico; Vocational Rehabilitation Administration; Nydia Colón–Zayas, Myrna Cambrelen, Juan Ortiz–Ortiz, Enrique Del Cueto–Pérez, all in their official and personal capacities, Defendants, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

812 F.3d 69

Edna MARTÍNEZ–RIVERA, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor child, RCM; Lydia Rivera–O'Farril; Lydia Martínez–Rivera, Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO; Department of Justice of Puerto Rico; Department of Labor and Human Resources of Puerto Rico; Vocational Rehabilitation Administration; Nydia Colón–Zayas, Myrna Cambrelen, Juan Ortiz–Ortiz, Enrique Del Cueto–Pérez, all in their official and personal capacities, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 13–1772.

United States Court of Appeals, First Circuit.

Jan. 29, 2016.

Carlos Rodríguez García, with whom Rodríguez García PSC was on brief, for appellants.

Roberto Ariel Fernández, with whom González Castañer PSC was on brief, for appellees.

Before Torruella, Lipez, and Thompson, Circuit Judges.

THOMPSON, Circuit Judge.

Overview

Edna Martínez Rivera ("Martínez") is a former employee of Puerto Rico's Vocational Rehabilitation Administration ("VRA"), an agency tasked with integrating persons with disabilities into the workforce. Sometime after the VRA let her go, Martínez filed a federal-court suit against the defendants listed in our caption. Essentially believing that they had discriminated against her because of her disability, age, and politics, her complaint seemingly alleges various violations of federal and local law.¹ We say "essentially" and "seemingly" because her complaint is quite muddled in key ways, forcing us to spend a lot of time piecing together what claims she makes against whom (which isn't fair to other litigants waiting in line for our attention, by the way). Adding to the confusion, the district judge homed in on one federal claim (under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ), concluded that it ought to be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and then—without explaining why—dismissed the remaining claims too.

Martínez appeals. Unfortunately, her briefs are, like her complaint, disorganized and opaque—they float legal theories but do not always ground them in the case, for example.² Yet she still ends up with a partial victory, as we affirm in part and reverse in part. We explain our thinking below. First, a little background.

How the Case Got Here

A lawyer by training, Martínez worked for years as a Puerto Rico government employee. In the late 2000s, for example, she held key posts—director of the office of legal affairs and auxiliary administrator of the office of administration—within the VRA. A member of the Popular Democratic Party—one of Puerto Rico's two main political parties, the other being the New Progressive Party—Martínez has a visibly-apparent disability that affects her mobility. And our defendants knew about her political affiliation and her disability.

Martínez's professional life was going along swimmingly—until the New Progressive Party's Luis Fortuño Burset became Puerto Rico's governor in January 2009. Sadly for Martínez, over the next six months VRA personnel stripped her of meaningful duties, banished her to a subpar office, and made fun of her disability (to list just a few of the indignities inflicted on her). As a coup de grâce, the VRA told her in a letter dated January 14, 2010—which she acknowledged receiving the next day, January 15—that she was "being terminated" effective February 19, 2010 as part of a government downsizing required by law. That law (known as "Law 7") called for (among other things) the termination of certain commonwealth employees based on seniority, all in the hopes of putting Puerto Rico on a better financial footing. See generally Álamo–Hornedo v. Puig, 745 F.3d 578, 580 (1st Cir.2014) (discussing Law 7). She could not work after January 20, 2010, the complaint says, because the stress caused by all the "political [and] disability discrimination" perpetrated by defendants "exacerbated her physical disability."

Not willing to go away without a fight, Martínez "attempted" (her word, not ours) to file an administrative appeal with the Public Service Labor Relations Commission on February 12, 2010. Accusing the VRA of discriminating against her because of her political affiliation and disability, her "attempted" filing asked the commission to "declare void and null the layoff that was notified." As best we can tell, Martínez never says what became of her "attempted" filing. Anyway, the VRA let her go 7 days later, on February 19, 2010.

Still upset about the termination, Martínez filed a complaint with the EEOC on July 12, 2010 and an amended complaint on August 17, 2010, alleging political and disability discrimination.³ Her amended EEOC complaint specifically accused the VRA of replacing her with two nondisabled "female lawyers" who "are politically affiliated [with] the governing party." She asked the EEOC for a right-to-sue letter on February 2, 2011. But before getting one, she sued our defendants in federal court on February 17, 2011. The EEOC gave her a right-to-sue letter about a month later, on March 18.

Martínez's 103–paragraph federal complaint is hardly a picture of clarity. Giving that document a generous read, she seemingly alleges (as best we can discern) four categories of claims. The first involves a political-discrimination claim tied to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (dealing with deprivations of federally-protected rights at the hands of state actors), 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (declaring all persons "have the same right" to be free from discrimination in specific activities, like making and enforcing contracts and bringing suits), and 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (forbidding racial discrimination by federal-grant recipients). The second involves a disability-discrimination claim under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. The third involves an age-discrimination claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("AEDA"), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. And the fourth involves a grab-bag of claims under Puerto Rico law.

To Martínez's complaint, defendants responded with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1). Basically they argued that the statute of limitation had run out on any section 1983 claim: the applicable one-year limitations period, they wrote, started running no later than January 20, 2010 (the date when she could no longer work because of all the alleged discrimination she had experienced)—but she filed her complaint on February 19, 2011, they added, nearly one month after the limitations period had expired. Oddly, defendants cited no authority (as far as we can see) for the idea that a late-filed section–1983 claim is jurisdictionally barred from federal court. See generally Williams v. Henderson, No. 14–5150, 626 Fed.Appx. 761, 763, 2015 WL 5638015, at *1 n. 3 (10th Cir. Sept. 25, 2015) (unpublished) (agreeing with cases from the Seventh and Ninth circuits holding that section 1983's limitation period is not jurisdictional). Odder still, they argued—without supporting reasoning—that because she filed her section–1983 claim out of time, the judge had to dismiss all federal claims (not just the section–1983 claim). And then they suggested that the judge should decline jurisdiction over the local-law claims.

Focusing with laser-like intensity on the section–1983 claim, Martínez fired back that the one-year limitations clock did not start ticking until after February 19, 2010, when she learned that the VRA had replaced her with persons who—unlike her—were politically affiliated with the new administration (she does not specify the precise date, regrettably). Alternatively, she argued that her August 2010 EEOC filing tolled section 1983's limitations period (tolling typically operates to interrupt and so postpone the limitation period's running), making her section–1983 claim (filed less than a year later) timely.

Taking up defendants' Rule 12(b)(1) motion, the district judge (like the parties) zeroed in on section 1983. And he ruled, first, that the limitations period began running on January 15, 2010 when Martínez got the termination letter, not when the VRA hired her replacement—though he then concluded that the limitations clock reset when she filed her EEOC complaint on July 12, 2010. So far, so good, for Martínez. But noting that she had sued defendants before getting an EEOC right-to-sue letter, the judge ruled that she had not exhausted her section–1983 claim administratively (remember, the judge keyed his analysis to section 1983 ). And—here's the kicker—he then dismissed all claims (not just the section–1983 claim) with prejudice: as best we can discern, he jettisoned all federal claims on exhaustion grounds and relinquished jurisdiction over the supplemental local-law claims.

Which brings us to today, with the parties fighting over the judge's section–1983–driven decision. Essentially, Martínez argues that she did not have to exhaust her section–1983 claim for political discrimination with the EEOC.⁴ She also insists that she timely filed her federal complaint, either because she brought it within a year after learning that the VRA had replaced her with persons politically simpatico with the party in power (she did not know about the VRA's politically-discriminatory motives until the replacements appeared, the theory goes) or because her EEOC filings reset the limitations clock. And, wrapping up, she contends that her receipt of the EEOC's right-to-sue letter before the judge dismissed the case cured her failure to exhaust her disability-and age-discrimination claims. Defendants' brief disagrees with just about everything Martínez says—though they changed their tune a bit on the disability-discrimination issue at oral argument, as we'll soon see.

Time to roll up our sleeves and sort this all out.

Standard of Review

Relying on Rule 12(b)(1), the judge (to repeat ourselves) decided the statute-of-limitations and exhaustion issues as if they implicated the court's subject-matter jurisdiction. On both scores, we have our doubts. As a general matter, statutes of limitations are affirmative defenses...