GERSCHICK & ASSOCIATES, PC v. Pounds, A03A2023.
Decision Date | 17 March 2004 |
Docket Number | No. A03A2023.,A03A2023. |
Citation | 266 Ga. App. 852,598 S.E.2d 522 |
Court | Georgia Court of Appeals |
Parties | GERSCHICK & ASSOCIATES, P.C. v. POUNDS et al. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Dennis J. Gerschick, Kennesaw, pro se.
Cromwell & Hibbert, William G. Cromwell, Henry A. Hibbert, Atlanta, for appellees.
Gerschick & Associates, P.C., a law office whose principal is Dennis Gerschick, sued former clients Robert Van Pounds (Van Pounds) and his father Robert Donald Pounds (Don Pounds), as well as unnamed John Does, alleging that the Poundses had fraudulently concealed and misrepresented assets to avoid paying Gerschick a $17,412.53 judgment against Van Pounds. The trial court found that the action was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and dismissed the complaint. Gerschick appeals, contending that the trial court erred in concluding that the complaint was barred by res judicata and contending that the trial court erred in issuing a protective order barring all discovery in the case. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the grant of summary judgment to the defendants.
(Punctuation omitted.) Id. at 557(2), and n. 11, 586 S.E.2d 22
Gerschick first sued Van Pounds in the Superior Court of Coweta County in February 1999 for failing to pay attorney fees pursuant to a contract signed in October 1996. Pounds failed to answer and Gerschick obtained a default judgment in April 1999 for $12,000 plus interest. Gerschick attempted to engage in post-judgment discovery, but Pounds provided no substantive responses and instead moved to set aside the default judgment. The parties subsequently agreed on January 4, 2002, to stipulate Pounds' liability and present the issue of damages to a jury, which awarded Gerschick $17,412.53 on March 4, 2002.
Gerschick again engaged in post-judgment discovery. Both parties agree that Gerschick served three separate sets of discovery requests, and that Van Pounds answered the first two sets, although they disagree as to the completeness of those responses. After the third set of requests, Pounds moved for a protective order, which the trial court granted on July 30, 2002. Shortly before the court granted that order, on June 17, 2002, Gerschick filed the suit that is the subject of this appeal.
In that complaint, also filed in the Superior Court of Coweta County, Gerschick alleged that Van and Don Pounds, assisted by unnamed others, fraudulently concealed Van Pounds' assets so that Gerschick was unable to collect his $17,412 judgment. Gerschick alleges that the Poundses took these actions beginning in 1995, to make Van Pounds "judgment proof." Gerschick claimed he suffered damages of $17,412.53 and asked for "exemplary and punitive damages in an amount to be determined but not less than $250,000 to deter Defendants from such wrongful and fraudulent conduct in the future." Gerschick served interrogatories, requests for admissions, and requests for production of documents on both defendants. The Poundses answered and moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim and because the suit was barred by collateral estoppel and estoppel by judgment. The defendants also moved for a protective order until their motion was ruled on, which the trial court granted on August 19, 2002.
After Gerschick responded to the motion to dismiss, the Poundses moved to convert it into a motion for summary judgment, which Gerschick opposed. The trial court granted the Poundses' motion, finding that the cause of action was identical to the previous action, the liability asserted against the new defendant was derivative of the liability asserted against the defendant who appeared in both cases, the issue was adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction and the plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues in the first suit.
1. (a) Gerschick first contends that the trial court erred in granting the Poundses' motion for summary judgment because they failed to raise the affirmative defense of res judicata in their answer, citing Owens v. Williams, 87 Ga.App. 238, 73 S.E.2d 512 (1952), for the proposition that such a defense cannot be raised by a motion to dismiss. OCGA § 9-11-8(c) provides that, in pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth affirmatively the defense of res judicata. In this...
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