Fonte v. Collins

• Decision Date: 10 January 1990
• Docket Number: No. 89-1796,89-1796
• Citation: 898 F.2d 284
• Parties: Ronald FONTE, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. John COLLINS, et al., Defendants, Appellants. . Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 284

898 F.2d 284

Ronald FONTE, Plaintiff, Appellee, v. John COLLINS, et al., Defendants, Appellants.

No. 89-1796.

United States Court of Appeals First Circuit.

Heard Jan. 10, 1990.

Decided March 15, 1990.

William J. Kayatta, Jr., with whom Pierce, Atwood, Scribner, Allen, Smith &amp Lancaster, Portland, Me., were on brief, for defendants, appellants.

Murrough H. O'Brien, Portland, Me., for plaintiff, appellee.

Before TORRUELLA and SELYA, Circuit Judges, and BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.

BOWNES, Senior Circuit Judge.

This is an interlocutory appeal from the district court's denial of defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity. The defendants, Portland, Maine, police officers, were sued under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 for allegedly violating the fourth amendment rights of the plaintiff by arresting him without probable cause. Because the officers have not shown that they are entitled to qualified immunity as a matter of law, we affirm.

As the district court's opinion makes clear, many of the facts in this case are in dispute so we only state what appears to be undisputed. At the request of plaintiff's former wife, Irene Ashjean, police officers went to Ronald Fonte's house on an island off the coast of Maine for the purpose of taking the couple's daughter, Adriene, from his custody and turning her over to Ashjean. The officers did not find Fonte and his daughter on the island, but, as they were leaving, noticed Fonte's boat approaching. They went out in their boat to intercept it. Both Fonte and his daughter were in the boat. The police advised Fonte why they were there and told him he should drive his boat to the island so they could talk to him. Fonte's boat arrived at the dock first and his daughter jumped out and ran to the house of a friend. Fonte waited for the police at the dock. After the police arrived, they arrested him and eventually charged him with obstruction of government administration. Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 17-A Sec. 751 (1983). The charge was dropped a few months later. Fonte then filed this suit under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 alleging false arrest.

Defendants moved for summary judgment for failure to state a claim and for judgment based on the affirmative defense of qualified immunity. The district court denied the qualified immunity motion but granted summary judgment on the ground that there was no civil rights violation. Fonte v. Collins, 713 F.Supp. 511 (D.Me.1989). Upon a motion to alter judgment, the district court vacated its ruling on the failure to state a claim under Sec. 1983. Fonte v. Collins, 718 F.Supp. 1 (D.Me.1989). The denial of summary judgment was not altered. This appeal of the qualified immunity ruling followed.

I.

We have jurisdiction to hear this appeal because "a district court's denial of a claim of qualified immunity, to the extent that it turns on an issue of law, is an appealable 'final decision' within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 notwithstanding the absence of a final decision." Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 2817, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985). The basic outlines of a qualified immunity defense are well known: "government officials performing discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 2738, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982). The contours of the right "must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 107 S.Ct. 3034, 3039, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). Our review

must examine the discovered facts regarding defendants' conduct relevant to the immunity claim and applying normal summary judgment principles, determine whether a genuine issue does or does not exist concerning qualified immunity.

Unwin v. Campbell, 863 F.2d 124, 132 (1st Cir.1988). Thus we must decide whether, given the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the police officers have established as a matter of law, that it was reasonable for them to believe that their conduct did not violate Fonte's constitutional rights. They have not done so. We affirm for the reasons stated in the district court's opinion and add a few observations.

II.

The officers assert that Fonte was properly arrested because he obstructed government administration by using "force, violence, intimidation or engag[ing] in [a] criminal act with the intent to interfere with a public servant performing or purporting to perform an official function" in violation of Me.Rev.Stat.Ann. tit. 17-A Sec. 751 (1983). There is no doubt that the officers were purporting to perform an official function. At this stage of the case, there is no evidence that force, violence or intimidation was used by Fonte. Thus the only question is whether a criminal act was committed with intent to interfere with public duties. The district court found that there was no evidence that any criminal act committed by the plaintiff was committed with the intent to interfere with the investigation. We concur in that finding. In addition we question whether, despite the police officers' legal authorization to take the child, it was reasonable for the police officers to believe that Fonte had committed a crime.

The criminal statute at issue states:

A person is guilty of criminal restraint ... if the parent of a child ... knowing he has no legal right to do so ... takes,...