Fairfield Lumber & Supply Co. v. Herman

• Decision Date: 15 July 1952
• Citation: 90 A.2d 884,139 Conn. 141
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: FAIRFIELD LUMBER & SUPPLY CO. et al. v. HERMAN. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 884

90 A.2d 884

139 Conn. 141

FAIRFIELD LUMBER & SUPPLY CO. et al. v. HERMAN.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 15, 1952.

Nelson Harris, New Haven, for appellants (plaintiffs Pagliuco et al.).

David R. Lessler, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, was Robert N. Hunziker, Bridgeport, for appellee (defendant).

Before BROWN, C. J., and JENNINGS, BALDWIN, INGLIS and O'SULLIVAN, JJ.

INGLIS, Associate Justice.

The question upon this appeal is whether the five plaintiffs, having been promised by the defendant that he would compensate them for labor and materials furnished by them in the erection of his dwelling house, may maintain a single action against him in the Superior Court when the amount in demand claimed by four of them, if treated individually, would be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas.

The allegations of the complaint may be summarized as follows: All the plaintiffs either furnished materials or rendered services or both for the defendant in the construction of his house. The general contractor was Julius A. Hubler, who became a bankrupt. In consideration of the plaintiffs' continuing upon the original contract and completing the house, the defendant promised the plaintiffs that he would pay them in full for the materials, work, labor and services furnished and rendered by them. Relying upon that promise, the plaintiffs performed, but the defendant has refused to pay them. The amount due the plaintiff Fairfield Lumber & Supply Company is $9866.50. There is due to the plaintiff Pagliuco, for painting, $2000; to the plaintiff Casale, for mason work, $1570; to the plaintiff Meno, for plumbing, $300; and to the plaintiff Perisky, for electrical work, $1160.71. Each of the plaintiffs also claims interest from June, 1950, but that item is not sufficient in amount to bring the total of the claim of any of the four plaintiffs last mentioned up to $2500. The ad damnum claimed damages for each of the plaintiffs separately.

The defendant moved to erase the causes of action of the plaintiffs Pagliuco, Casale, Meno and Perisky from the docket for want of jurisdiction. The motion was granted. Judgment was rendered dismissing the causes of action of these four individual plaintiffs, and from that judgment this appeal has been taken.

The case presents two questions of law: first, whether these plaintiffs may join in bringing a single action, and, second, what court, if any, has jurisdiction of the combined action. The first question finds its answer in § 7824 of the General Statutes, which reads in part as follows: 'All persons may be joined in one action as plaintiffs in whom any right of relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to exist either jointly or severally when, if such persons brought separate actions, any common question of law or fact would arise * * *.' That is to say, the plaintiffs were permitted to join in one action if their respective rights of relief arose out of the same transaction or series of transactions and if any common question of law or fact was involved.

'A motion to erase under our practice serves the same purpose as a demurrer. It admits all well-pleaded facts and invokes the existing record and must be decided upon that alone.' Reilly v. Antonio Pepe Co., 108 Conn. 436, 443, 143 A. 568, 571; Equitable Trust Co. v. Plume, 92 Conn. 649, 652, 103 A. 940. In passing upon a motion to erase, the allegations of the complaint should be given such construction as is most favorable to the plaintiffs. Rutt v. Roche, 138 Conn. 605, 609, 87 A.2d 805; Wildman v. Wildman, 72 Conn. 262, 270, 44 A. 224. Every presumption which favors the jurisdiction of the court should be indulged. Port Chester Electrical Construction Corporation v. Industrial Electrical Supply Co., 139 Conn. 16, 17, 89 A.2d 377.

It appears from the complaint in the present case that, although the obligation of the defendant to each of the plaintiffs was several, his promise to all of them was made at the same time. It was made as a consequence of the bankruptcy of the general contractor and to accomplish the completion of the work which the plaintiffs had agreed with the general contractor to do. This rearrangement of the plaintiffs' contracts for labor and materials was all one transaction. See Craft Refrigerating Machine Co. v. Quinnipiac Brewing Co., 63 Conn. 551, 560, 29 A. 76, 25 L.R.A. 856. The rights to relief of all the plaintiffs arose out of the same transaction. Moreover, their causes of action involved common questions of fact, i. e., what was said at the conference at which the defendant is alleged to have made the promise and what were the circumstances which led up to the making of it. It follows that, pursuant to § 7824, it was proper for the plaintiffs to join in one action provided any one court had jurisdiction of all their causes of action.

This brings us to the crucial question of the case: Does the Superior Court have jurisdiction of all the causes of action alleged in the complaint? Section 7740 of the General Statutes provides that, subject to the provisions of § 7579, which are not material to the present inquiry, the Court of Common Pleas shall have exclusive jurisdiction in all civil actions for legal relief 'wherein the matter in demand shall exceed one hundred dollars, but shall not exceed twenty-five hundred dollars'. The 'matter in demand' claimed by each of the four plaintiffs against whom the motion to erase was directed was obviously less than $2500. Atlantic Refining Co. v. Schoen, 118 Conn. 26, 28, 170 A. 478. Ordinarily, where several separate claims are joined in one suit the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the amount in demand on each claim separately. Friede v. Jennings, 121 Conn. 220, 230, 184 A. 369. This is true even though the total sum demanded on all the claims is in excess of the jurisdiction of the court which has jurisdiction of each claim separately. Johnson v. Cooke, 85 Conn. 679, 683, 84 A. 97. Before the enactment of the portion of § 7740 quoted in the next paragraph, it was held that the Superior Court had no jurisdiction of a count alleging a claim for an amount less than its minimum jurisdiction, although another count in the same action set forth a cause of action which was within its jurisdiction. Brennan v....