Majewski v. Bridgeport BOE, No. CV03-0406893 (CT 1/20/2005)
| Decision Date | 20 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. CV03-0406893,CV03-0406893 |
| Parties | Ellen Majewski v. Bridgeport Board of Education et al. |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
Pursuant to Practice Book §10-39, the defendants have filed a motion to strike the plaintiff's complaint, which sounds in three counts. The First Count alleges a hostile work environment due to sexual harassment in violation of Statutes §46a-60(8)(A)(B) and (C) is brought against the Bridgeport Board of Education. The Second Count, also brought against the Board of Education alleges retaliation pursuant to General Statutes §46a-60(4). The Third Count alleges intentional infliction of emotional distress is brought against the defendants Darlene Tickey and the Bridgeport Board of Education. The genesis of the plaintiff's action rests with a charge of discrimination filed by the plaintiff with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities on November 14, 2002. The plaintiff's charge of discrimination passed the Commission's "Merit Assessment Review." The plaintiff subsequently obtained a "Release of Jurisdiction" on or about August 5, 2003. In releasing jurisdiction, the Commission found that the Complaint Affidavit had been pending with the Commission for at least 210 days. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed the present action by way of a complaint dated October 1, 2003, bearing a return date of October 21, 2003.
In moving to strike the three counts of the plaintiff's complaint, the defendants argue that in the First Count the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts that her submission to sexual advances or conduct were made explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of the plaintiff's employment. The defendants also argue that the plaintiff has failed to allege sufficient facts to support a causal connection between sexual advances or conduct and any subsequent adverse employment action that affected a term or condition of employment. Next, regarding the First Count the defendants argue that the plaintiff's claim of hostile work environment is legally insufficient because all of the allegations are untimely pursuant to General Statutes §46a-82(e). Lastly, the defendants argue that in the First Count the defendants have failed to allege sufficient facts to establish a severe or pervasive hostile work environment.
Regarding the Second Count which alleges retaliation, the defendants claim that the plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted in that the Second Count does not allege any protected activity; does not allege any adverse employment actions; and fails to state a causal connection between any protected activity and any timely filed retaliatory adverse employment actions.
Finally, regarding the Third Count alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, the defendants argue that the alleged conduct by the defendants does not rise to the level of extreme or outrageous behavior required to sustain an action for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
A summary of the complaint reveals that the plaintiff has been a teacher in the Bridgeport public school system since 1987. Several years later she was assigned to the Maplewood Annex Elementary School. In the spring of 2000, the defendant Board of Education named the defendant Tickey to serve as the Principal. Tickey was plaintiff's direct supervisor. During October 2000 Tickey hugged and kissed the plaintiff on the cheek "seemingly" in appreciation for the plaintiff's writing two technology grants for the school on short notice. Later in October 2000, Tickey inquired into the sexual orientation of the plaintiff, who informed Tickey that she was a homosexual. Tickey allegedly revealed to the plaintiff that she had bisexual tendencies and related a sexual fantasy. Tickey then suggested that she and the plaintiff meet socially after working hours. Several days later the plaintiff advised Tickey that a social meeting would be inappropriate and that the plaintiff had no further interest in a personal relationship or personal discussions with Tickey.
The plaintiff's complaint alleges that as a result of her rebuffing Tickey, she was subjected to a series of adverse employment actions including being removed as the "teacher in charge" of the school as of January 1, 2001; being forced to resign as the Union Representative for the school in March 2001; being called a "pompous arrogant bitch" in May 2001; and attempts being made to change her grade late in the 2001 school year with the change becoming effective with the 2001-2002 school year. The plaintiff complained to her employee's Union regarding this grade change, prompting Tickey to advise the plaintiff that "she (Tickey) would never forgive her (plaintiff) for calling in the Union."
The complaint further alleges that Tickey made an additional advance toward the plaintiff during the spring of 2001, insofar as Tickey requested that the plaintiff accompany her to Philadelphia for professional meetings related to a reading program being considered by the Board of Education. The plaintiff refused this invitation and Tickey informed the plaintiff that if the plaintiff refused, "the Board will say no to you."
The plaintiff further alleges that after returning for the 2001-2002 school academic year, in late August 2001, Tickey also subjected the plaintiff to a series of adverse employment actions including the removal of the plaintiff as a member of the "Student Assessment Team," and removing the plaintiff as a mentor.
The complaint further alleges that Tickey hugged and kissed the plaintiff in September 2001, to congratulate the plaintiff for receiving her Administrative Certificate, and that on September 11, 2001, Tickey told the plaintiff that she liked the plaintiff, even if the plaintiff did not feel the same way about Tickey.
Thereafter, in December 2001, Tickey allegedly berated the plaintiff at a faculty meeting and later, in January 2002, convened a disciplinary meeting with the Assistant Superintendent of the Board during which Tickey falsely accused the plaintiff of acting inappropriately during the December faculty meeting. Subsequent to this, in February and March 2002, Tickey began depriving the plaintiff of her classroom aide and subjected the plaintiff to special rules regarding the scheduling of classroom birthday parties and the removal of classroom decorations.
The complaint further alleges that in May 2002, the plaintiff approached Tickey to get her signature on a form required for the plaintiff to apply for a Summer School position, and Tickey refused to sign the form. Tickey additionally refused to provide the plaintiff with a letter of reference, in late May 2002, which was required for a separate administrative position which was open that same summer. Lastly, the complaint alleges that, due to abuse, the plaintiff transferred to another school for the 2002-2003 school year.
The law regarding the court's review of a motion to strike is well established. "The purpose of a motion to strike is to contest the legal sufficiency of the allegations of any complaint . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., 196 Conn. 91, 108, 491 A.2d 368 (1985). A motion to strike shall be granted if "the plaintiff's complaint [does not] sufficiently [state] a cognizable cause of action as a matter of law." Mora v. Aetna Life and Casualty Ins. Co., 13 Conn.App. 208, 211, 535 A.2d 390 (1988).
A motion to strike "admits all facts well pleaded; it does not admit legal conclusions or the truth or accuracy of opinions stated in the pleadings" (emphasis omitted). Id. "A motion to strike is properly granted where a plaintiff's complaint alleges legal conclusions unsupported by facts." Id. "In ruling on a motion to strike, the court is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint." Gordon v. Bridgeport Housing Authority, 208 Conn. 161, 170, 544 A.2d 1185 (1988). A motion to strike "is to be tested by the allegations of the pleading demurred to, which cannot be enlarged by the assumption of any fact not therein alleged." (Internal quotation marks and citations omitted.) Alarm Applications Co. v. Simsbury Volunteer Fire Co., 179 Conn. 541-50, 427 A.2d 822 (1980).
Upon deciding a motion to strike, the trial court must construe the "plaintiff's complaint in [a] manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency." Bouchard v. People's Bank, 219 Conn. 465, 471, 594 A.2d 1 (1991). "The allegations of the pleading involved are entitled to the same favorable construction a trier would be required to give in admitting evidence under them and if the facts provable under its allegations would support a defense or a cause of action, the motion to strike must fail." Mingachos v. CBS, Inc., supra. 196 Conn. 108-09. However, if the plaintiff has alleged mere conclusions of law unsupported by the requisite facts, the motion to strike should be granted. Cavallo v. Derby Savings Bank, 188 Conn. 281, 285, 449 A.2d 986 (1982).
General Statutes §46a-82(e)1 requires that any discrimination complaint must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory act. If an individual fails to comply with this mandatory time requirement, the complaint may be dismissed . . . Williams v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, 257 Conn. 258, 284, 777 A.2d 645 (2001). National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113, 112 S.Ct. 2061 (2002). Furthermore, "discrete acts that fall within the statutory time period do make...
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