Columbus Gaslight & Coke Co. v. City of Columbus
Decision Date | 24 January 1893 |
Citation | 33 N.E. 292,50 Ohio St. 65 |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Parties | COLUMBUS GASLIGHT & COKE CO. v. CITY OF COLUMBUS. |
Error to circuit court, Franklin county.
Action by the Columbus Gaslight & Coke Company against the city of Columbus. Plaintiff had judgment which was reversed by the circuit court, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.
The other facts full appear in the following statement by SPEAR C. J.:
The plaintiff in error commenced the original action by the filing in the court of common pleas of its petition, as follows: To this pleading the city, by its solicitor, interposed a general demurrer, which, being overruled, the cause was tried, resulted in a judgment for plaintiff. The circuit court reversed the judgment, and ordered the cause remanded.
1. The power to grade and improve streets is conferred upon municipal authorities for the public benefit. It is a continuing power, and is not exhausted by the first exercise of it; nor can it, in the absence of statutory authority, be ceded nor bargained away; nor can one council, by its exercise, abridge the capacity of its successors to perform their duties in that behalf as the public interest may demand.
2. A gas company laying its pipes in the streets of a city, under a grant from the city, in conformity with an established grade, does so subject to the right of the city to change the grade of the street whenever the necessities of the public require it; and, in the absence of wantonness or negligence on the part of the city, the company cannot maintain an action for damages occasioned by the necessity of taking up and relaying its pipes in order to accommodate them to the new grade.
R. H. Platt, for plaintiff in error.
Paul Jones and Florizel Smith, for defendant in error.
SPEAR, C. J., (after stating the facts.)
The single question is as to the sufficiency of the petition. If that states a cause of action, the judgment of the circuit court should be reversed; if not, the opposite result follows. It will be noted that there is no direct allegation that the grant from the city gave the company the right to maintain its pipes at any particular place in the street, nor at any prescribed depth beneath the surface. Nor is it averred that the action of the city was in any way wanton, nor that the change of the grade of the street was unnecessary; and that presumption is that the city acted, in that behalf, lawfully, and without negligence. Nor is it pretended that the city has denied the company's right to maintain its pipes in Broad street. The dispute involves only the right to maintain them where first laid.
The company's claim is that, while the consent of the city must first be obtained, the city having the right to make reasonable regulations as to the terms and conditions on which the company may occupy, yet, when the city has given its consent, has made the grant, the right in the streets is in the nature of an easement, which then belongs to the company by force of the statute, and the city cannot interfere with that right, save upon condition of awarding compensation for...
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