State v. Santos

• Citation: 273 Mont. 125,902 P.2d 510
• Decision Date: 24 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 94-210,94-210
• Parties: STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jose Delos SANTOS, II, Defendant and Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Montana

Page 510

902 P.2d 510

273 Mont. 125

STATE of Montana, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Jose Delos SANTOS, II, Defendant and Appellant.

No. 94-210.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs July 28, 1995.

Decided Aug. 24, 1995.

Thomas J. Sheehy, Big Sandy, Lawrence A. LaFountain, Great Falls, for appellant.

Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General; John P. Connor, Jr., and Michael S. Wellenstein, Assistant Attorneys General, Helena, Dave Rice, Hill County Attorney, Havre, for respondent.

TURNAGE, Chief Justice.

A jury in the District Court for the Twelfth Judicial District, Hill County, found Jose Delos Santos, II, guilty of felony theft and two counts of deliberate homicide. Santos appeals. We affirm.

The issues are:

1. Did the District Court err in finding Santos competent to stand trial?

2. Did the court err by admitting expert testimony elicited by the prosecution in violation of § 46-14-213(2), MCA?

3. Did the court err in refusing to allow the defense to play at trial certain videotapes of Santos?

4. Was Santos deprived of a constitutional right to an insanity defense by the court's refusal to give three jury instructions offered by the defense?

On the morning of March 4, 1993, the bodies of Walter and Thelma Gebhardt were found in their home just west of Havre, Montana. They had each been hit repeatedly in the head with a blunt object while they slept. They were sixty-one and sixty-seven years old, respectively. A bloodstained claw hammer was found in their living room, and their 1984 El Camino was missing.

Several adult children of the Gebhardts had visited their parents the night before they were killed. Based upon their statements, local law enforcement authorities began looking for Jose Delos Santos, II.

Santos had been staying at the Gebhardts' home for several weeks. He had arrived in Havre by freight train, inadequately dressed for the winter weather, and knocked on the Gebhardts' door. Although he was a complete stranger to them, the Gebhardts took him into their home. Santos was not at the Gebhardts' home when their bodies were found, although he had been there the night before.

On March 5, 1994, Santos was apprehended outside Virgelle, Montana, in the Gebhardts' El Camino. While he was being booked at the Chouteau County Jail, Santos said that he had changed the license plates on the El Camino and that he had killed the Gebhardts.

Santos subsequently gave a statement describing the murders in detail. He told the officers that he killed Walter Gebhardt because Walter had put him on the spot by asking him to show a picture of his girlfriend to visiting Gebhardt family members. He explained that he killed Walter by hitting him in the head with the claw hammer, and that he then killed Thelma by striking her with the hammer and choking her. He described burning documents which identified the owner of the El Camino and a pair of Walter's pants in the Gebhardts' living room fireplace "to destroy the evidence." He described switching the rear license plate on the El Camino with one from another vehicle before leaving the Gebhardts' home after the murders. He took with him his high school equivalency certificate, his birth certificate, food, clothing, and a letter from his girlfriend.

Prior to trial, Santos moved to be declared incompetent to stand trial. For purposes of that motion, he was examined by a psychiatrist on behalf of the State and a psychologist on behalf of the defense. After hearing the testimony of both experts and reviewing the written report prepared by the State's psychiatrist, the court denied the motion.

The case was transferred to Cascade County for trial on a defense motion for change of venue. After a week-long trial at which the central issue was Santos's mental state, a jury found him guilty on all charges. Santos appeals.

Issue 1

Did the District Court err in finding Santos competent to stand trial?

The standard for a district court's decision on whether a criminal defendant is fit to proceed to trial is set forth at § 46-14-103, MCA:

A person who, as a result of mental disease or defect, is unable to understand the proceedings against the person or to assist in the person's own defense may not be tried, convicted, or sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as the incapacity endures.

The trial court must determine "whether [the defendant] has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding--and whether he has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him." State v. Austad (1982), 197 Mont. 70, 78, 641 P.2d 1373, 1378, citing Dusky v. United States (1960), 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 789, 4 L.Ed.2d 824, 825. This Court's standard of review is whether substantial evidence supports the district court's decision that the defendant was fit to proceed to trial. State v. Statczar (1987), 228 Mont. 446, 456, 743 P.2d 606, 613.

Santos's attack on the District Court's decision is based on the adequacy of the court's findings rather than on the sufficiency of the evidence. Under the above standard of appellate review, however, we must look to the sufficiency of the evidence.

The State's expert witness was Dr. William Stratford, a forensic psychiatrist. Before offering his opinion that Santos was competent to stand trial, Dr. Stratford conducted a thorough examination of Santos and submitted a detailed report on his competency. His examination included reviewing the sheriff's reports, a police report, autopsy reports, witness interviews and statements, Santos's interview with the arresting officers, and Santos's Seattle police department rap sheet. He also reviewed Santos's records from the Seattle Mental Health Institute and a summary of Santos's contacts with a Seattle drop-in center. Dr. Stratford spoke by phone with Santos's father. In addition, he conducted interviews with Santos over the course of two days and administered eighteen different tests to him.

Dr. Stratford reported that Santos was twenty-four years old and had been living as a "street person" in Seattle before he came to Montana. Dr. Stratford admitted that, to a lay person, Santos's record may look bizarre. He stated, however, that the record revealed no clear-cut history of mental illness.

Dr. Stratford stated in his report that Santos has some intrusive paranoid ideas but that "it is also likely that much of the time he has learned to bring these issues up for effect knowing that they do influence health care examiners in general," and "[h]e certainly is not above or incapable of lying about issues such as this and is motivated to go to a hospital and certainly not to a prison or jail." At the hearing, Dr. Stratford stated, "I think it's also important to indicate that I think Mr. Santos is capable of emphasizing points like that consciously to attempt to impress someone that he's very disturbed." He reported that Santos had obtained elevated results on a test he administered to detect malingering and deception.

Dr. Stratford concluded that Santos suffers from a schizotypal personality disorder as well as being chemically dependent. However, Santos did well on a test to determine his competency to relate to and cooperate with his attorney and to fully understand the nature and quality of the proceedings against him. Dr. Stratford concluded his report to the court by stating that he believed Santos was competent to stand trial.

Santos's expert witness, psychologist Fredrick Wise, did not submit a written report to the court. His testimony at the competency hearing conflicted with that of Dr. Stratford in that Dr. Wise found Santos unresponsive and unable to comprehend what was going on. He concluded that Santos suffered from schizophrenia and was not fit to proceed to trial. Santos contends that the court erred in ignoring Dr. Wise's testimony and in not attempting to reconcile or assess the positions of the two experts.

The testimony of one witness is sufficient to prove a fact. State v. Radi (1978), 176 Mont. 451, 462, 578 P.2d 1169, 1176. Additionally, the weight and credibility of witnesses are exclusively the province of the trier of fact. In the event of conflicting evidence, it is within the province of the trier of fact to determine which will prevail. State v. Flack (1993), 260 Mont. 181, 189, 860 P.2d 89, 94. In this instance, the trier of fact was the District Court.

Santos was able to discuss with Dr. Stratford his complete history, including the homicides. That ability cast doubt on Santos's claims that he was not able to converse with his counsel, cooperate with his counsel, respond to his counsel's questions, or recall facts. Santos was cooperative with Dr. Stratford, providing an array of information, including extensive information about the charged offenses. As the District Court noted at the competency hearing, there was no reason why Santos's counsel could not also get the same information.

Dr. Stratford's expert testimony and report clearly supported a finding that Santos was able to consult with and assist his counsel and that he had a rational as well as a factual understanding of the proceedings against him. We conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in finding that Santos was fit to proceed to trial. We therefore affirm the court's determination.

Santos also asserts that the court should have reassessed its competency determination because of evidence presented after the competency hearing. He cites Drope v. Missouri (1975), 420 U.S. 162, 181, 95 S.Ct. 896, 908, 43 L.Ed.2d 103, 119, concerning the court's continuing obligation to be on guard for changes in a defendant's competence throughout the trial.

Santos refers to a report by Dr. Jack Hornby, a psychiatrist who prescribed medication for him after the competency hearing. Santos claims Dr. Hornby stated he felt Santos was not competent to stand trial. That comment is not found in the...