Henry W. Wellington &Amp; Others v. Edward H. Jackson

• Decision Date: 20 October 1876
• Citation: 121 Mass. 157
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
• Parties: Henry W. Wellington & others v. Edward H. Jackson

121 Mass. 157

Henry W. Wellington & others v. Edward H. Jackson

Supreme Court of Massachusetts

October 20, 1876

Plymouth. Contract against the maker of a promissory note. Answer, a denial that the defendant made the note.

After the commencement of the action, the defendant filed his petition in the court of bankruptcy and obtained his discharge, which was filed in the case. His assignee obtained leave to come in and defend, and the plaintiffs prosecuted the action for the purpose of obtaining judgment and execution against the property of the defendant attached in the action, and the assignee defended on behalf of the creditors. Trial in the Superior Court, before Putnam, J who allowed a bill of exceptions in substance as follows:

There was evidence tending to show that on May 1, 1875, and before the defendant went into bankruptcy, the note, having been protested for non-payment, was presented to him, and he examined it, and said it should be arranged the following Monday. The plaintiffs also offered in evidence copies of the proceedings in bankruptcy, from which it appeared that the note in suit was contained and described in the schedule of the creditors of Jackson, signed and sworn to by him. This evidence was objected to on the ground that it was not admissible as against the defendant's assignee; but the judge admitted it, and the defendant excepted.

The plaintiffs contended, among other things, that if the jury were not satisfied upon the evidence that the defendant actually signed the note, yet that, by his conduct in reference to it, he was estopped from denying his signature.

The presiding judge instructed the jury as follows: "If upon the whole evidence in the case, the jury shall be satisfied that the defendant, knowing that his signature was forged, by his words, acts or silence, gave the plaintiffs to understand that it was not forged, but was a genuine signature, intending thereby to cause the plaintiffs to rely on the note as his note, and the plaintiffs did so rely and act upon it, and were injured thereby, the defendant would be estopped to deny that his name was not a genuine signature and that it was not put there by him or by his authority."

The counsel for the assignee asked the judge to give these instructions: "1. Estoppels are not favored in law because they operate to shut out the truth, and to prevent parties from asserting or defending their rights, by proof of actual existing facts. 2. There must be shown a wilful intent to induce the party to act on the faith of the alleged statements or representations, in addition to the fact that such statements were acted upon."

The judge gave the second instruction, as comprised substantially in the instructions already given, but declined to give the first.

The judge...