Goodwin Tile & Brick Co. v. DeVries

• Decision Date: 07 March 1944
• Docket Number: 46440.
• Citation: 13 N.W.2d 310,234 Iowa 566
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: GOODWIN TILE & BRICK CO. et al. v. DeVRIES et al.

13 N.W.2d 310

234 Iowa 566

GOODWIN TILE & BRICK CO. et al. v. DeVRIES et al.

No. 46440.

Supreme Court of Iowa

March 7, 1944

H E. deReus, of Knoxville, for appellants.

Klein & Klein, of Pella, Johnson & Johnson, of Knoxville L. S. Forrest, of Des Moines, and G. G. Gaass, of Pella, for appellees.

OLIVER Justice.

Kuyper Builders Material Company filed the mechanic's lien, and thereafter, assigned the same to Goodwin Tile and Brick Company. Both companies joined as plaintiffs in the foreclosure suit. Marion DeVries and wife, as owners of the property, the principal contractor and various lien claimants were defendants. Trial resulted in judgment against the principal contractor for $989.49, plus interest, and decree denying establishment and foreclosure of the mechanic's lien against the real estate. Plaintiffs have appealed complaining of the refusal of the court to establish the mechanic's lien against the real estate. For convenience, Kuyper Builders Material Company will be referred to as appellant, and Marion DeVries as appellee.

Paul DeWit was a building contractor, at Pella, Iowa. Appellant agreed to furnish him the lumber, brick, tile, etc., for his various contracts, at prevailing prices, and to give him a 10% cash discount when he paid his bill. Appellant kept separate accounts for each job. About November 1, 1940, DeWit contracted to build a house for appellee. The agreed price for labor and materials was $4,110. The house was to be ready for occupancy February 15, 1941, and all work completed a month later.

February 7, 1941, DeWit assigned the contract to a bank as collateral security for a loan of $3,000. Before completing the loan, the bankers called at appellant's office, told Mr. Kuyper of the assignment, and inquired about appellant's bill against DeWit for materials for appellee's house. The bankers testified Mr. Kuyper looked at appellant's records and stated the bill was $1,400; that they asked him if appellant would be satisfied with a payment of $1,200, and he said, "That was all right." Mr. Kuyper testified he did not remember what figures he gave the bankers but that he quoted the figures shown in the books. The books show the bill was then about $1,850. On February 8, the bank paid appellant $1,200 for DeWit.

Appellee occupied the house about February 16. He testified that about February 18, and before he paid anything on the contract he went to appellant's lumber yard and asked Mr. Kuyper how DeWit "was standing with my lumber bill because I wanted to make a payment"; that Mr. Kuyper said about $200 or $250; that appellee then said, "If that is all, I suppose it will be all right to make the (a) payment", and Mr. Kuyper said, "It was all right." Appellant's books show the account was $795.86, on February 18.

Mr. Kuyper testified he didn't have any recollection of the conversation testified to by appellee. The trial court accepted appellee's version of the conversation. This finding is entitled to substantial weight. We have considered the record accordingly and are satisfied the finding is correct.

On February 19, appellee paid the bank the $3,000 assigned to it, and, at DeWit's order, paid $800 to appellee's father-in-law for a debt owed the latter by DeWit. Appellee testified he made these payments on the contract in reliance upon his conversation with Mr. Kuyper.

The house was not finished on February 16, when appellee moved into it. Appellant's itemized statement shows charges for materials on 19 separate days between February 18, and April 8. About April 15, DeWit absconded, leaving the contract uncompleted. Thereafter, appellee furnished the labor and some materials to finish siding the house, construct sidewalks, paint the house, etc. $310 of the contract price was unpaid. The value of the materials and labor furnished by appellee to complete the contract equalled or exceeded this amount.

Appellee contends appellant is estopped to claim a mechanic's lien against the property by its conduct in the foregoing matters. The doctrine of equitable estoppel is a familiar one. It is applied to prevent fraud and injustice and exists wherever a party cannot in good conscience gainsay his own acts or assertions. Hainer v. Iowa Legion of Honor, 78 Iowa 245, 43 N.W. 185. The fraud may be either actual or constructive. Anfenson v. Banks, 180 Iowa 1066, 163 N.W. 608, L.R.A.1918D, 482. A fraudulent intention is not essential. It is enough if a fraudulent effect would follow allowing a party to set up a claim inconsistent with his former declarations or conduct. Helwig v. Fogelsong, 166 Iowa 715, 148 N.W. 990; Browning v. Kannow, 202 Iowa 465, 210 N.W. 596.

The essential elements of equitable estoppel, or estoppel in pais,...