United States v. Rodríguez-Canchani

• Decision Date: 12 October 2021
• Docket Number: Criminal No. 19-710 (FAB)
• Citation: 566 F.Supp.3d 129
• Parties: UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff, v. Claribel RODRÍGUEZ-CANCHANI [3], et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

566 F.Supp.3d 129

UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff,

v.Claribel RODRÍGUEZ-CANCHANI [3], et al., Defendants.

Criminal No. 19-710 (FAB)

United States District Court, D. Puerto Rico.

Signed October 12, 2021

Scott H. Anderson, AUSA, United States Attorneys Office, San Juan, PR, for Plaintiff.

Carlos J. Andreu-Collazo, Javier Micheo-Marcial, Maria Dominguez-Victoriano, Dominguez, Micheo, Ramos & Andreu Law LLC, Guaynabo, PR, for Defendant Abel Nazario-Quinones.

Jose A. Andreu-Fuentes, Andreu & Sagardia Law Office, Jose R. Olmo-Rodriguez, Olmo & Rodriguez Matias, San Juan, PR, for Defendant Edwin Torres-Gutierrez.

Raul S. Mariani-Franco, Mariani Franco Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendant Claribel Rodriguez-Canchani.

Anita Hill-Adames, Anita Hill Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendant Humberto Pagan-Sanchez.

Melanie Carrillo-Jimenez, Melanie Carrillo-Jimenez Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendant Kelvin Ortiz-Vegarra.

Alex Omar Rosa-Ambert, Sanchez, Gonzalez, Matos & Rosa, P.S.C., Carolina, PR, Edgar L. Sanchez-Mercado, Gabriela Jose Cintron-Colon, ESM Law Office, San Juan, PR, for Defendant Ramon Martes-Negron.

Joseph A. Boucher-Martinez, San Juan, PR, for Defendant Juan Rosario-Nunez.

Marie L. Cortes-Cortes, San Juan, PR, for Defendant Eric Rondon-Rodriguez.

OPINION AND ORDER

BESOSA, District Judge.

Defendant Claribel Rodríguez-Canchani ("Rodríguez") moves for severance. (Docket No. 164.) Defendant Ramón Martes-Negrón ("Martes") and Rodríguez also move to compel the disclosure of statements by indicted and unindicted coconspirators. (Docket Nos. 168 & 184.) For the reasons set forth below, the motions are DENIED .

I. Background

Defendant Abel Nazario-Quiñones is the former, four-term mayor of Yauco, Puerto Rico. (Docket No. 3 at p. 1.) He held this position from 2000 to 2016. Id. During his administration, Rodríguez served as the Director of Human Resources for the Municipality of Yauco. Id. at p. 2. Defendant Edwin Torres-Guitérrez ("Torres") is the former Special Assistant to the Mayor. Id. Nazario won a seat in the Puerto Rico Legislative Assembly as a Senator at Large in 2016. Id. at p. 1; see P.R. Const. Art. III § 3.

Nazario, Torres, and Rodríguez purportedly misappropriated government funds to pay "irregular employees" for "work on [Nazario's] senatorial campaign," and for assisting "party politicians whose support [he needed] to win the senatorial election." Id. at p. 3. These "ghost" employees allegedly received compensation "based on false or no documentation to support the payment of wages [e.g. fabricated attendance sheets]." Id. at p. 5. The ghost employees include defendants Martes, Humberto Pagán-Sánchez ("Pagán"), Kelvin Ortiz-Vegarra ("Ortiz"), Juan Rosario-Núñez ("Rosario"), and Eric Rondón-Rodríguez ("Rondón"). Id.¹

On November 1, 2019, a grand jury returned a one-count indictment charging Nazario, Torres, Rodríguez, and the ghost employees with theft of federal funds in violation of 18 U.S.C. section 666(a)(1)(A). (Docket No. 3.) Rodríguez requests severance "from Mr. Nazario's trial in the instant case." (Docket No. 164 at p. 9.) She also moves "for an order compelling the government to disclose any and all statements made by any alleged unindicted or indicted co-conspirator." (Docket No. 168.) Martes joined the motion. (Docket No. 184.)

II. The Motion for Severance

The motion for severance sets forth two arguments, both grounded on the threat of evidentiary "spillover." (Docket No. 164.) First, Rodríguez contends that severance is required to mitigate the disproportional allegations between Nazario and Rodríguez. Id. Second, she argues that the admission of Nazario's prior bad acts will confuse the jury. Id.

A. Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14

"As a rule, persons who are indicted together should be tried together." United States v. O'Bryant, 998 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1993).² Joint trials prevent inconsistent verdicts and conserve judicial resources. Id.; Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537, 113 S.Ct. 933, 122 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993) (noting that joint trials "promote efficiency and serve the interest of justice by avoiding the scandal and inequality of inconsistent verdicts."). This preference "is especially strong for coconspirators who are indicted together." United States v. Jett, 908 F.3d 252, 276 (7th Cir. 2018) ; see United States v. Colón-Miranda, 985 F. Supp. 36, 39 (D.P.R. 1997) (Fusté, J.).

The Court may, however, sever the trial of a defendant if "joinder [...] appears to prejudice" the United States or the defendant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 14(a). Severance is a preemptive measure, intended to reduce the "serious risk that a joint trial [will] compromise a specific trial right of one of the defendants, or prevent the jury from making a reliable judgment about guilt or innocence." Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933.

To prevail, Rodríguez "must prove prejudice so pervasive that a miscarriage of justice looms." Id. (quoting United States v. Pierro, 32 F.3d 611, 615 (1st Cir. 1994) ); United States v. Tejeda, 481 F.3d 44, 55 (1st Cir. 2007) ("Prejudice means more than just a better chance of acquittal at a separate trial.") (quotation omitted). The Rule 14 standard places a "heavy burden" on Rodríguez. United States v. Maravilla, 907 F.2d 216, 228 (1st Cir. 1990) ; United States v. Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, 480 F. Supp. 3d 380, 383 (D.P.R. 2020) ("A request for severance based on spillover prejudice requires a defendant to overcome a high threshold.") (Besosa, J.).

Courts possess "considerable latitude" regarding severance motions, and "will be overturned only if that wide discretion is plainly abused." United States v. O'Bryant, 998 F.2d 21, 25 (1st Cir. 1993) (citation omitted). "[L]ess drastic measures, such as limiting instructions, often will suffice to cure any risk of prejudice." Zafiro, 506 U.S. at 539, 113 S.Ct. 933 ; see United States v. Baltas, 236 F.3d 27, 34 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that a limiting instruction provides adequate safeguard against evidentiary spillover prejudice).

1. Spillover Evidence

In joint trials, the risk of " ‘spillover’ may arise where evidence that is not admissible or should not be considered against one defendant on his or her own is admitted against a codefendant." United States v. Cancel-Lorenzana, 28 F. Supp. 3d 138, 140 (D.P.R. 2014) (Besosa, J.); United States v. Gilbert, 92 F. Supp. 2d 1, 10 (D. Mass. 2000) ("Severance is appropriate when the evidence that would be presented at one trial would be inadmissible at a second trial.") (citing United States v. Diallo, 29 F.3d 23, 28 (1st Cir. 1994) ). Prejudice resulting from spillover evidence is a possible basis for severance pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 14(a) ("Rule 15"). See, e.g., United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (overturning the conviction of a defendant who had been tried jointly with three principal members of the Watergate conspiracy, all of whom played much more substantial roles in the crime over longer periods of time); United States v. Kelly, 349 F.2d 720, 759 (2nd Cir. 1965) (holding that the district court erred in failing to sever the trial of three co-defendants, only two of whom "must have stamped in the eyes of the jurors as unscrupulous swindlers of the first rank").

Spillover evidence also refers to the "threat" that defendants "charged with only a minor role" will be "assess[ed]" according to the "extensive" evidence against other defendants. United States v. De La Paz-Rentas, 613 F.3d 18, 23 (1st Cir. 2010). "Because of the natural tendency to infer guilt by association, a defendant may suffer by being joined with another allegedly ‘bad man.’ " King v. United States, 355 F.2d 700, 704 (1st Cir. 1966). Severance need not occur, however, "[e]ven where large amounts of testimony are irrelevant to one defendant, or where one defendant's involvement in an overall agreement is far less than the involvement of others." United States v. Boylan, 898 F.2d 230, 246 (1st Cir. 1990). A codefendant who is "unattractive to the jury" is generally not sufficient to warrant severance. 1A Charles Alan Wright et al. , Fed. Prac. & Proc. Crim. § 225 (5th ed. 2020); United States v. DeCologero, 530 F.3d 36, 53 (1st Cir. 2008) (holding that the "unsavoriness of one's codefendant (including past criminal conduct) is not enough, by itself, to mandate severance").

B. The Motion for Severance is Premature

According to the motion for severance, the "scant allegation and evidence as to Mrs. Rodríguez-Canchani is overshadowed by the evidence for Mr. Nazario." (Docket No. 164 at p. 5.) This argument is unavailing. The number of allegations in an indictment is irrelevant to the Rule 14 analysis. Indeed, the United States "need not recite all of its evidence in the indictment." United States v. Keleher, 505 F. Supp. 3d 41, 46 (D.P.R. 2020) (quoting United States v. Stepanets, 879 F.3d 367, 372 (1st Cir. 2018) ) (Besosa, J.).

Severance is appropriate when there is a stark disparity between the charges, quantity, and strength of the evidence among the defendants. See United States v. Sampol, 636 F.2d 621, 647 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that district court erred in failing to sever a three-defendant trial where two defendants, but not the third, were charged with the bombing murder of two victims because "[i]n cases when there is a gross disparity in the quantity and venality of the testimony against the respective joint defendants it is fair to inquire whether the jury can reasonably be expected to compartmentalize the evidence as it relates to separate defendants in the light of its volume and limited admissibility.") Only pervasive prejudice will sustain a motion for severance. United States v. Pierro, 32 F.3d 611, 615 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding that a co-defendant's "unsavory" testimony did not "prejudice appellant above and beyond the quantum of prejudice that typifies virtually any multi-defendant trial – and that sort of prejudice clearly does not justify a severance"); ...