U.S. v. Moore
Decision Date | 26 July 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 95-3341,95-3341 |
Citation | 91 F.3d 96 |
Parties | UNITED STATES of America, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Lamar M. MOORE, Defendant-Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
Montie R. Deer, Assistant United States Attorney (Jackie N. Williams, United States Attorney, with him on the brief), Wichita, Kansas, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Kurt P. Kerns, The Law Offices of Leslie F. Hulnick, P.A., Wichita, Kansas, for Defendant-Appellee.
Before ANDERSON, BALDOCK, and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
The United States appeals from the district court's order suppressing evidence obtained during a search of the residence of defendant-appellee Lamar M. Moore. The central issue in this appeal is whether the government met its burden of demonstrating that state law enforcement officers were excused from the "knock and announce" requirement explicitly incorporated into our Fourth Amendment "reasonableness" inquiry by Wilson v. Arkansas, --- U.S. ----, ----, 115 S.Ct. 1914, 1916, 131 L.Ed.2d 976 (1995). We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
Mr. Moore was indicted on one count of possession with intent to distribute approximately eleven grams of crack cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), and one count of carrying and using a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Prior to trial, he moved to suppress all evidence obtained in the execution of a search warrant for his Wichita, Kansas residence.
United States v. Maden, 64 F.3d 1505, 1508 (10th Cir.1995) (citation omitted). "The reasonableness of a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment is a question of law we review de novo." United States v. McCarty, 82 F.3d 943, 947 (10th Cir.1996).
The following facts are either uncontested or are presented, as required by our cases, in the light most favorable to Mr. Moore. On December 29, 1994, members of the Wichita Police Department executed a search warrant for Mr. Moore's residence. One officer opened the screen door and then stepped aside as another officer announced their presence and indicated that they had a search warrant. "[N]early simultaneous[ly]" with their announcements, the officers forced open the door with a steel battering ram. Rec. vol. I, doc. 28 at 1 (Order of Suppression). The time that elapsed between announcement and battering was no more than three seconds. Id.
State law enforcement officers are prohibited by the Fourth Amendment from conducting "unreasonable searches and seizures." Although the federal "knock and announce" statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109, does not directly apply to state actors, we use § 3109 as a guide in conducting the "reasonableness" inquiry dictated by the Fourth Amendment. United States v. Smith, 63 F.3d 956, 962 (10th Cir.1995), cert. granted and judgment vacated on other grounds, --- U.S. ----, 116 S.Ct. 900, 133 L.Ed.2d 834 (1996). The Fourth Amendment, reflecting the long common law tradition protecting the sanctity of the home, includes a general presumption that police officers executing a search warrant for a residence must announce their presence and authority before entering. Wilson, --- U.S. at ----, 115 S.Ct. at 1918 ( ). If the occupants do not admit the officers within a reasonable period of time, the officers may be deemed to be constructively refused admittance, and they may then enter by force. United States v. Knapp, 1 F.3d 1026, 1031 (10th Cir.1993) (). Here, however, the district court found that the forced entry was "virtually instantaneous" and correctly concluded that this precluded any claim that the officers were constructively refused admittance. Rec. vol. I, doc. 28 at 1-2. At most, the officers waited three seconds: significantly less time than in prior cases in which constructive refusal has been found. Compare United States v. Lucht, 18 F.3d 541, 550-51 (8th Cir.) (waiting three to five seconds before entering was not long enough to find constructive refusal to admit), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 115 S.Ct. 363, 130 L.Ed.2d 316 (1994); United States v. Marts, 986 F.2d 1216, 1218 (8th Cir.1993) ( ); and United States v. Rodriguez, 663 F.Supp. 585, 587-88 (D.D.C.1987) ( ) with Smith, 63 F.3d at 962 ( ) and Knapp, 1 F.3d at 1030-31 ( ).
The government argues, as an exception to the "knock and announce" rule, that there were "exigent circumstances" which justified immediate entry, citing the averment in the application for the search warrant by Officer Mitchell that a confidential informant had "stated that the black male that sold the crack cocaine and another black male in the premises were armed with an unknown type of firearm." Rec. vol. III, Ex. 2 at 2 (Application for Search Warrant). Officers may indeed be excused from the usual "knock and announce" rule if exigent circumstances attended the search. However, this exception applies only when "the law enforcement officers in question held an objectively reasonable belief that an emergency situation existed." United States v. Maden, 64 F.3d 1505, 1509 (10th Cir.1995)....
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