Barrett v. M&B Med. Billing

• Decision Date: 22 November 2022
• Docket Number: 1442 WDA 2021,J-S20003-22
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court
• Parties: ANGELA MARIE BARRETT Appellant v. M&B MEDICAL BILLING, INC. AND SANDRA CASEY

2022 PA Super 200

ANGELA MARIE BARRETT Appellant v. M&B MEDICAL BILLING, INC. AND SANDRA CASEY

No. 1442 WDA 2021

No. J-S20003-22

Superior Court of Pennsylvania

November 22, 2022

Appeal from the Judgment Entered January 18, 2022 In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Civil Division at No(s): No GD-17-005863

BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., MURRAY, J., and KING, J.

OPINION

NICHOLS, J.

Appellant Angela Marie Barrett appeals from the judgment awarding her $1,000 in damages. Appellant argues that the trial court erred by allowing co-Appellee Sandra Casey (Casey), who is not an attorney, to represent co-Appellee M&B Medical Billing, Inc. (M&B) at trial and to present evidence that was not relevant to damages. Appellant also claims that the trial court's damages award is against the weight of the evidence. We affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for a new trial as to damages.

The trial court summarized the factual and procedural history as follows:

Appellant . . . filed a complaint against her former employers, [M&B and Casey]. The complaint alleges that Appellees committed defamation [per se], intentional infliction of emotional distress, [tortious] interference with contractual relationships and demanded both compensatory and punitive damages. [Appellant] claimed that she had been employed as a medical coder for Appellees until December of 2015. After several of her paychecks were late, she tendered her resignation on December 26, 2015.

[Appellant's] claim is that . . . [a] prospective employer, UPMC, sent a request for information to Appellees concerning [Appellant's] former employment with them, in order to determine whether [Appellant] would be a suitable and prospective employee of UPMC.

Appellees returned UPMC's requested response, which included a statement that [Appellant] took proprietary client information with her, and disclosed that [information. Also, Appellee stated that] contrary to [Appellant's] representations to UPMC, [Appellant's] position with [Appellees] was merely as a data analyst clerk and not a medical coder.

Thus, [Appellees] filed an answer and new matter and counterclaim, denying [Appellant's] allegations and noting that [Appellant] violated her employment contract by her use of proprietary information, when she contacted Appellee[s'] clients, to solicit them for letters of recommendation for her job search. Appellees informed UPMC and answered that [Appellant] was not employed as a medical coder by the [Appellees], as her complaint represented.

. . . Counsel for Appellee[s later] withdrew from representing [Appellees] and [after that withdrawal, Appellees] failed to respond to [Appellant's] discovery [requests]. The Honorable Robert J. Colville awarded [Appellant] $1,000.00, for sanctions and granted a default verdict in favor of [Appellant on April 29, 2019]. Thus, Appellees were prevented from putting on a defense at the time of this damages only trial.

Trial Ct. Op., 2/24/22, at 1-2 (unpaginated) (formatting altered).

The trial court held a non-jury trial limited to damages only on November 3, 2021. Casey appeared for trial and stated that she was representing both herself and M&B. N.T. Trial at 3. Appellant's counsel objected to Casey's representation of M&B because a corporation must be represented by counsel. Id. at 3-4. The trial court replied: "We'll just start the [trial] and see where we go."^[1] Id. at 4. At no point during the trial did the trial court instruct Casey that she could only represent herself and not the corporation. During the trial, Casey cross-examined Appellant and testified on her own behalf as part of Appellees' case. Id. at 25-63, 65-68.

That same day, the trial court entered a verdict in favor of Appellant in the amount of $1,000. Appellant filed a timely post-trial motion^[2] on November 10, 2021, requesting that the trial court reassess the damages or, in the alternative, award Appellant a new trial. In her post-trial motion, Appellant argued, among other things, that the trial court erred in allowing Casey to represent M&B because a corporation may appear in court only through counsel. On November 18, 2021, the trial court denied Appellant's post-trial motion.

Appellant filed a notice of appeal on December 2, 2021.^[3] Appellant subsequently filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement and the trial court issued an opinion addressing Appellant's claims that it erred by considering evidence related to liability at a trial limited to damages, reducing Appellant's damages against M&B, and that its damages award was against the weight of the evidence. See Trial Ct. Op. at 3-5 (unpaginated).

Appellant raises the following issues for our review, which we restate as follows:

1. Whether the trial court erred by allowing co-Appellee Sandra Casey, acting pro se, to represent the interests of co-Appellee M&B, at trial?

2. Whether the trial court erred by allowing co-Appellee Sandra Casey to introduce liability evidence at the trial limited to damages?

3. Whether the trial court erred by reducing damages against co-Appellee M&B when it was not represented by counsel at trial?

4. Whether the trial court's damages award was against the weight of properly admitted evidence?

Appellant's Brief at 5 (formatting altered).

In her first issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in allowing co-Appellee Casey, who is not a licensed attorney, to represent co-Appellee M&B at trial. Id. at 11-12. Appellant contends that Pennsylvania law prohibits an officer of a corporation, who is not licensed to practice law, from representing that corporation in legal proceedings. Id. at 11-12 (citing, inter alia, Walacavage v. Excell 2000, Inc., 480 A.2d 281, 284-85 (Pa. Super. 1984)).

In reviewing Appellant's claim, we are guided by the following principles:

Our appellate role in cases arising from non-jury trial verdicts is to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence in the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law. However, where the issue concerns a question of law, our scope of review is plenary.

The trial court's conclusions of law on appeal originating from a non-jury trial are not binding on an appellate court because it is the appellate court's duty to determine if the trial court correctly applied the law to the facts of the case.

Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Bach, 159 A.3d 16, 19 (Pa. Super. 2017) (Bach) (citation omitted).

The following standard of review applies to our review of the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial:

We will reverse a trial court's decision to deny a motion for a new trial only if the trial court abused its discretion. We must review the court's alleged mistake and determine whether the court erred and, if so, whether the error resulted in prejudice necessitating a new trial. If the alleged mistake concerned an error of law, we will scrutinize for legal error. Once we determine whether an error occurred, we must then determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in ruling on the request for a new trial.

Carlini v. Glenn O. Hawbaker, Inc., 219 A.3d 629, 643 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).

Section 2501 of the Judicial Code guarantees an individual's right to self-representation in civil matters. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 2501(a) (stating that "[i]n all civil matters before any tribunal every litigant shall have a right to be heard, by himself and his counsel, or by either of them"); see also In re Lawrence Cty. Tax Claim Bureau, 998 A.2d 675, 680 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (discussing the right to self-representation).^[4] However, it well settled that, with certain exceptions, non-attorneys may not represent other parties before Pennsylvania courts. See, e.g., Dauphin Cty. Bar Ass'n v. Mazzacaro, 351 A.2d 229, 233-35 (Pa. 1976) (holding that a public adjuster may not represent accident victims in settlement negotiations against alleged tort-feasors or their insurers). Further, the unauthorized practice of law is prohibited and criminalized in Pennsylvania. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 2524(a).

Additionally, the Courts of this Commonwealth have held that artificial entities, such as corporations, may only appear in court through counsel. See, e.g., Skotnicki v. Ins. Dep't, 146 A.3d 271, 284 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (explaining that "corporations may not act pro se in court, and that non-attorneys may not represent them, regardless of the individual's status as the corporation's officer, director, shareholder[] or employee" (citations and footnote omitted)); Walacavage, 480 A.2d at 283-85 (holding that a corporation may not appear in court and be represented by a corporate officer and shareholder who is not an attorney); accord Norman for Est. of Shearlds v. Temple Univ. Health Sys., 208 A.3d 1115, 1121 (Pa. Super. 2019) (concluding that a non-attorney administrator of an estate could not represent the estate pro se), appeal denied, 223 A.3d 668 (Pa. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S.Ct. 301 (2020).

Our Supreme Court recently held that a plaintiff who is not an attorney may litigate a wrongful death action pro se in their individual capacity, but that same pro se plaintiff may not represent the estate of the decedent as its administrator. Bisher v. Lehigh Valley Health Network, 265 A.3d 383 (Pa. 2021). Additionally, in other jurisdictions, courts have held that while a corporate officer who has been sued in his or her...