Radford v. Radford
Decision Date | 17 June 2005 |
Docket Number | 2030960. |
Citation | 917 So.2d 155 |
Parties | Thomas J. RADFORD v. Jacqueline C. RADFORD. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Thomas J. Radford, appellant, pro se.
Submitted on appellant's brief only.
Thomas J. Radford, the husband, appeals from a judgment entered by the Jefferson Circuit Court dismissing, without prejudice, his complaint for a divorce from Jacqueline C. Radford, the wife.
In November 2003, the husband filed a complaint for a divorce in the Jefferson Circuit Court. The husband alleged the he and the wife were married in 1969, that the wife resided in Birmingham, that he resided in the Limestone Correctional Facility and was "serving a twenty five year term in the State's prison system," and that he had resided in Alabama for more than six months preceding the filing of the complaint. The husband also alleged that the parties had one adult child, that the parties owned no real property, and that the parties had already divided their personal property. Further, the husband alleged that there had been an irretrievable breakdown of the marriage and that there was no reasonable likelihood that the marriage could be preserved. He requested that the trial court enter a judgment divorcing the parties and that it grant such other relief as the court deemed equitable. Attached to the complaint was a sworn statement by the husband stating that the contents of his complaint were true and correct to the best of his knowledge.
An entry on the case action summary sheet indicates that the wife was served with process in January 2004. The wife never filed an appearance or a responsive pleading to the husband's complaint.
In March 2004, the husband filed a motion for a default judgment and a brief in support thereof, alleging that the wife had been served with the complaint, that she had failed to file an answer or otherwise defend against the husband's allegations, and that he was entitled to the entry of a default judgment under Rule 55, Ala. R. Civ. P.
In April 2004, the husband filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals. The husband requested that the Court of Criminal Appeals direct the circuit court judge to enter a default judgment against the wife and in favor of the husband. The Court of Criminal Appeals transferred the petition to this court; this court denied the husband's petition in May 2004.1
According to an entry on the case action summary sheet, the trial court set the husband's case to be reviewed at a "call docket" scheduled for May 30, 2004. The record does not reflect what occurred at the call docket on May 30, 2004.2 However, according to June 2004 entries on the case action summary sheet, the case was continued and reset for the trial court's call docket on July 2, 2004. The trial court also set the case for trial on August 30, 2004. In mid-June 2004, the husband filed a motion requesting that the trial court enter an order requiring him to be transferred to the court for purposes of presenting "testimony" at the July 2, 2004, call docket.3 The trial court immediately entered an order denying the husband's transfer motion.
On July 2, 2004, the trial court entered an order of dismissal that stated:
The husband appeals, contending that the trial court abused its discretion when it dismissed his complaint for lack of prosecution.4
After the trial court entered its judgment in this matter, and a few days before the husband filed his appellate brief, this court addressed whether dismissal is an appropriate sanction where an inmate fails to appear at a pretrial conference conducted pursuant to Rule 16, Ala. R. Civ. P. See Brown v. Brown, 896 So.2d 573 (Ala.Civ.App.2004) (plurality opinion). In Brown, this court reversed a trial court's dismissal of an inmate's complaint, stating:
Although Brown involved a dismissal that was, in effect, a dismissal with prejudice, we conclude that the rationale of Brown mandates reversal in the present case. Like the present case, Brown involved a dismissal based on an inmate's failure to attend a pretrial proceeding that generally does not include the presentation of evidence. See Brown, 896 So.2d at 575. Moreover, the proceeding at issue in Brown was a pretrial conference conducted pursuant to Rule 16, Ala. R. Civ. P. Id. at 574. Rule 16 at least puts a litigant on constructive notice of matters the trial court might consider at such a conference. The present case, however, involves an inmate's failure to attend a "call docket," a term not found in the Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, there is no indication in the record that the trial court expected the husband to introduce evidence of any nature at the call docket or that the husband was aware, or reasonably should have been aware, of what matters the trial court might have expected the husband to address at the call docket. In response to his receipt of notice of the call docket, the husband requested that he be allowed to attend that proceeding. The trial court denied that request. While the husband, as an inmate, did not have a right to attend a civil proceeding unrelated to his confinement, see, e.g., McConico v. Culliver, 872 So.2d 872 (Ala.Civ.App.2003), we perceive of nothing in this case other than the husband's filing of that request that he should have done, but did not do, that would justify a finding of failure to prosecute this action. Compare Feagin v. Stokes, 837 So.2d 857 (Ala.Civ.App.2002); see also McConico, 872 So.2d at 875.
Finally, we note that a plurality of this court observed in Brown:
896 So.2d at 574. If analysis of the nature employed by this court in Aguilar were applied in the present case, it would foreclose the result we reach in this case, and our decision therefore necessarily overrules Aguilar to that extent.5
Based on the compelling policy objective of affording litigants a trial on the merits whenever possible, we conclude that, under the circumstances presented, the trial court abused its discretion when it determined that the husband's conduct mandated dismissal of his action. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded for further proceedings.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
PITTMAN, J., concurs in the result, with writing, which THOMPSON, J., joins.
The main opinion correctly concludes that dismissal of the husband's action for want of prosecution based upon his failure to attend a call of a docket6 was an unwarranted sanction in this case. However, as I opined in Brown v. Brown, 896 So.2d 573 (Ala.Civ.App.2004), the efforts of an incarcerated plaintiff, such as the husband in this case and the plaintiff in Brown, to "appear" at scheduled pretrial conferences render Aguilar v. Spradlin, 408 So.2d 525 (Ala.Civ.App.1981), distinguishable. 896 So.2d at 576 (Pittman, J., concurring in the result). Nor do I agree that Aguilar must be overruled: while incarcerated civil litigants should arguably be afforded a modicum of indulgence with respect to matters customarily calling for personal appearance of litigants or counsel, our circuit courts, as a matter of sound policy, must retain the discretion to...
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