Patane v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., Inc.
| Decision Date | 04 February 2022 |
| Docket Number | 3:17-cv-1381 (JAM) |
| Citation | 583 F.Supp.3d 341 |
| Parties | Mark PATANE et al., Plaintiffs, v. NESTLÉ WATERS NORTH AMERICA, INC., Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Alexander H. Schmidt, Pro Hac Vice, Colts Neck, NJ, Amanda K. Bonn, Pro Hac Vice, Jesse-Justin Cuevas, Bryan J.E. Caforio, Oleg Elkhunovich, Pro Hac Vice, Steven G. Sklaver, Pro Hac Vice, Susman Godfrey L.L.P., Los Angeles, CA, Craig A. Raabe, Mark P. Kindall, Christopher M. Barrett, Robert A. Izard, Jr., Izard, Kindall & Raabe, LLP, West Hartford, CT, Steven N. Williams, Pro Hac Vice, Joseph Saveri Law Firm, San Francisco, CA, Y. Gloria Park, Pro Hac Vice, Max Isaac Straus, Susman Godfrey L.L.P., New York, NY, V. Chai Oliver Prentice, Tycko and Zavareeei LLP, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiffs Mark J. Patane, Julie Harding, Heather Harrigan, Stephen S. Shapiro, Catherine Porter, Tina Moretti, Bridget Kopet, Jennifer S. Cole, Benjamin A. Fletcher, Diane Bogdan.
Craig A. Ollenschleger, Pro Hac Vice, Orloff Lowenbach Stifelman & Siegel, Roseland, NJ, Jeffrey M. Garrod, Orloff Lowenbach Stifelman & Siegel, PA, Morristown, NJ, Thomas B. Mayhew, Pro Hac Vice, Ashley E. Roybal, Farella, Braun & Martel LLP, San Francisco, CA, Jonathan B. Tropp, Day Pitney LLP, New Haven, CT, for Defendant.
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The plaintiffs are purchasers of Poland Spring water. They have sued defendant Nestlé Waters North America alleging claims for fraud, breach of contract, and unfair trade practices with respect to Nestlé’s marketing of Poland Spring water as genuine "spring water."1
Nestlé now moves for partial summary judgment on statute of limitations grounds, seeking to curb the time period for which the plaintiffs may seek damages. I will grant the motion as to the plaintiffs’ claim under the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act but will deny the motion as to the plaintiffs’ other causes of action, either because there remains a genuine issue of fact whether the limitations period should be equitably tolled for reasons of fraudulent concealment or because Nestlé has failed to properly identify the controlling statute of limitations.
The plaintiffs allege that they paid extra for Poland Spring water because Nestlé has long marketed it as "100% Natural Spring Water." But they believe that Poland Spring water is not really "spring water" as that term is defined by federal and state law.2
On August 15, 2017, they filed this lawsuit against Nestlé. They seek to represent a class of customers from numerous States who bought Poland Spring water since November 2003.3 They bring claims for common law fraud, breach of contract, and violation of the general consumer protection statutes of seven different States. See generally Patane v. Nestlé Waters N. Am., Inc. , 478 F. Supp. 3d 318, 326–27 (D. Conn. 2020).4
Nestlé has moved for partial summary judgment. It seeks to enforce the statutes of limitations for each of the plaintiffs’ claims in order to limit the applicable time period for this action.
The principles governing my review of a motion for summary judgment are well established. Summary judgment may be granted only if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). I must view the facts in the light most favorable to the party who opposes the motion for summary judgment and then decide if those facts would be enough—if eventually proven at trial—to allow a reasonable jury to decide the case in favor of the opposing party. My role at summary judgment is not to judge the credibility of witnesses or to resolve close contested issues but solely to decide if there are enough facts that remain in dispute to warrant a trial. See generally Tolan v. Cotton , 572 U.S. 650, 656–57, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 188 L.Ed.2d 895 (2014) (per curiam ); Benzemann v. Houslanger & Assocs., PLLC , 924 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2019).5
In a diversity case like this one, I must assess the timeliness of the plaintiffs’ claims using the same principles that a Connecticut state court would apply. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York , 326 U.S. 99, 108–112, 65 S.Ct. 1464, 89 L.Ed. 2079 (1945). But that does not necessarily mean that I must apply the Connecticut statute of limitations. Instead, I will look to Connecticut's choice-of-law rules to determine which State's timeliness rules govern each claim. See Thea v. Kleinhandler , 807 F.3d 492, 497 (2d Cir. 2015).
Absent a controlling decision from a State's highest court on a question of state law, a federal court's role is to carefully predict how the state court would rule on the issue presented. See Haar v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. , 918 F.3d 231, 233 (2d Cir. 2019). In so doing, a federal court should give proper regard to the relevant rulings of the State's lower courts and may also consider decisions from other jurisdictions on the same or analogous issues. See In re Thelen LLP , 736 F.3d 213, 219 (2d Cir. 2013).
Common law fraud (Count One)
I will deny summary judgment on the plaintiffs’ common law fraud claim. The parties agree that the timeliness of this claim is governed by Connecticut law. In Connecticut, "[n]o action founded upon a tort shall be brought but within three years from the date of the act or omission complained of." Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577 ; see Kidder v. Read , 150 Conn.App. 720, 93 A.3d 599, 603 (2014) (). Because the plaintiffs sued on August 15, 2017, they normally could recover only for fraudulent acts since August 15, 2014.
To reach back to 2003, however, the plaintiffs rely on another Connecticut statute, § 52-595. Under this section, if a defendant "fraudulently conceals from [the plaintiff] the existence of [a] cause of ... action, [the] cause of action shall be deemed to accrue ... at the time when the [plaintiff] first discovers its existence." According to the plaintiffs, Nestlé has long tried to deter lawsuits like this one by hiding the origin of its water. Because of these efforts, the plaintiffs say, they did not learn about the false advertising until 2015 or later.6 So they think that the three-year clock did not start running until at least 2015, and thus that when they sued in 2017, their claims were timely.
I conclude that there is a genuine dispute over whether Nestlé fraudulently concealed the origin of its water. For example, the plaintiffs offer evidence that Nestlé has maintained artificial ponds and tried to pass them off as natural springs. The plaintiffs even attach a picture of what they say is the rusty pipe that Nestlé has put in one of the fake springs to make it seem like water is bubbling up from the ground.7 If a jury believed this evidence, it could reasonably find that Nestlé built the fake springs to mislead third parties about the origin of its water, and thus to delay being sued.
Nestlé argues that because the plaintiffs ultimately pieced together their claims based on public records, it must not have concealed anything. I do not agree. To conceal is to hide, not necessarily to hide forever. If a party could not claim fraudulent concealment unless a claim was hidden so well that it was never discovered, the doctrine would not be of any use. In the plaintiffs’ telling, there were two ways they could have discovered the false advertising. First, they could have simply noticed that the company operated no springs. Or, they could have spent years poring over maps, aerial photos, property records, and geology reports.8 By building the fake springs, the plaintiffs say, Nestlé forced them to resort to the second method, keeping the plaintiffs’ claims hidden much longer. If a jury believes this, I see no reason why Nestlé’s acts would not count as concealment.
Nestlé’s authorities do not say otherwise. Those cases hold only that a defendant could not have concealed information that is plain from the face of an easy-to-access document. See Johnson v. State Jud. Dep't , 2012 WL 3176431, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2012) (); Epperson v. Ent. Express, Inc. , 338 F. Supp. 2d 328, 345–46 (D. Conn. 2004) (), aff'd, 159 Fed. App'x 249, 252 (2d Cir. 2005). They do not hold that publicly available information can never be concealed, no matter how deeply buried.
Next, Nestlé argues that because this controversy has been in the news since 2003, the plaintiffs have been on "inquiry notice" of their claims for years.9 See Vill. Mortg. Co. v. Veneziano , 175 Conn.App. 59, 167 A.3d 430, 442 (2017) (). But the plaintiffs say that they did not suspect that the water was mislabeled until at least 2015.10 And Nestlé points to no evidence that they knew about the controversy before then. So there is at least a genuine dispute over when the plaintiffs knew or should have known about their claims. Nestlé is therefore not entitled to summary judgment for the statute of limitations on its fraud claim.
Breach of contract (Count Two)
The plaintiffs sue for breach of contract under the Uniform Commercial Code. Nestlé argues that because this claim has been brought only by named plaintiffs from New York and New Jersey, I should analyze it under only those State's timeliness rules. The plaintiffs reply that I should consider the law of all States in their class definition.
I need not take sides on this argument. Nestlé is not entitled to summary judgment even under New Jersey and New York law. The parties agree that...
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