Rose v. Figgie Intern., 90-1381
| Citation | 919 F.2d 739 |
| Decision Date | 07 December 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-1381,90-1381 |
| Parties | Unpublished Disposition NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Dorothy ROSE, Plaintiff Counter Defendant-Appellant, v. FIGGIE INTERNATIONAL, Scott Aviation, a division of Figgie International, Tyrone Wallace, Defendants Counter Plaintiffs-Appellees. |
| Court | United States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (6th Circuit) |
Before BOYCE F. MARTIN, Jr. and NATHANIEL R. JONES, Circuit Judges, and ENGEL, Senior Circuit Judge.
Dorothy Rose seeks to try before a jury her claim against her former employer, Scott Aviation, a division of Figgie International Inc. and her former boss, Tyrone Wallace. We agree with the district court that there is no genuine issue of a material fact to support Rose's sexual harassment claim.
Scott Aviation, a division of Figgie International Inc., operates a manufacturing facility in South Haven, Michigan. Dorothy Rose first became employed at Scott in 1973. Tyrone Wallace became Rose's supervisor in 1978. In 1981, Wallace was promoted to the position of plant manager. This position made him responsible for promotional and wage increase decisions affecting Rose. While being supervised by Wallace, Rose was promoted three times, including promotions to Supervisor of Engineering Liaisons in 1984; Materials Supervisor in 1985; and Productions Manager in 1987. Throughout this period Rose received above average wage increases.
Rose claims that throughout the period she was supervised by Wallace she was subject to sexual harassment. Specifically, Rose alleges that Wallace made continuing sexual comments and propositions to her. Rose also alledges that Wallace touched her from time to time. This conduct culminated in an incident during a 1986 business trip to Lancaster, New York. During a post-dinner conversation, Wallace asked Rose if he could come into her hotel room and she responded that he could not. Rose contends that after this incident, her work conditions and relationship with Wallace deteriorated. However, it appears from the record that Rose did receive annual pay increases and was promoted to Productions Manager after the hotel room incident.
In November, 1987, Rose was promoted by Wallace to the position of Productions Manager. On February 5, 1988, Rose asked to be returned to her previous position as the Materials Supervisor. This request was predicated on Rose's dissatisfaction with her pay rate at the new position. Rose was permitted to return to her previous position as the Materials Supervisor. In her deposition, Rose indicated that Wallace did not make any sexual advances or remarks towards her after she was promoted out of the Materials Supervisor position in November, 1987. On September 26, 1988, Rose resigned from her position at Scott.
Thereafter, Rose filed this action alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1981 and Sec. 1983, sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000 et seq. She also alleged a number of a number of pendent state law claims. Rose later voluntarily dismissed her Sec. 1981 claim. The district court determined that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the two remaining federal claims. The district court also dismissed the pendent state claims because there were no remaining federal claims to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Rose now appeals the decision of the district court granting the defendants' motion for summary judgment.
This Court applies a de novo standard of review when reviewing a grant of summary judgment. EEOC v. University of Detroit, 904 F.2d 331, 334 (6th Cir.1990). A motion for summary judgment should be granted only if, based upon the record as a whole and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1130 (6th Cir.1986). "[T]his standard provides that the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-248 (1986) (emphasis in original). Once the moving party has presented evidence sufficient to support a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party is not entitled to trial merely on the basis of allegations; significant probative evidence must be presented to support the complaint. Id. at 348-249; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 476 U.S. 317, 324 (1986); Gregg v. Allen-Bradley Co., 801 F.2d 859, 861 (6th Cir.1986).
Rose argues on appeal that summary judgment was inappropriate because she established a prima facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment. Quid pro quo sexual harassment is characterized as an employer's sexually discriminatory behavior which compels an employee to elect between acceding to sexual demands and forfeiting job benefits, continued employment or promotion, or otherwise suffering tangible job detriments. Highlander v. K.F.C. Nat. Management Co., 805 F.2d 644, 648 (6th Cir.1986); Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 908 (11th Cir.1982). Rose alleges that Wallace both delayed and denied her promotions due to her rejection his of sexual advances. Rose further asserts that it was common knowledge at Scott that if one...
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