Trevino-Barton v. Pittsburgh Nat. Bank
| Decision Date | 28 November 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 90-3109,A,TREVINO-BARTO,90-3109 |
| Citation | 919 F.2d 874 |
| Parties | 56 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 291, 55 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 40,407, 59 USLW 2362, 18 Fed.R.Serv.3d 118 Sylviappellant, v. PITTSBURGH NATIONAL BANK d/b/a PNC Investment Company/PNB. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
Mark J. Homyak (argued), Hess, Reich, Georgiades, Wile & Homyak, P.C., Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellant.
Laura A. Candris (argued), Eckert Seamans Cherin & Mellott, Pittsburgh, Pa., for appellee.
Before STAPLETON, COWEN and WEIS, Circuit Judges.
Sylvia Ann Trevino-Barton ("Trevino") complained to both the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission ("EEOC") and the Pennsylvania Human Rights Commission ("PHRC") about sex discrimination on the part of her employer, Pittsburgh National Bank. Proper filing of a complaint with the EEOC is a jurisdictional prerequisite to bringing a Title VII claim in federal court. Although Trevino's filing with the EEOC would otherwise be valid, the bank argues--and the district court held--that Trevino's earlier filing of a letter with the PHRC deprived the EEOC, and the federal courts, of jurisdiction. Such a result is not required by the statute's language and directly thwarts Congress' intent to make Title VII broadly enforceable. Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's judgment on Trevino's Title VII claim. 1
On June 22, 1987, Trevino filed a letter with the PHRC, alleging that her employer had discriminated against her on the basis of her sex. The letter stated explicitly that Trevino wished to receive a right-to-sue letter as quickly as possible and was writing to the PHRC only because she believed that was a necessary step to bringing her claim to the EEOC. A copy of her letter was sent to the EEOC.
This case was filed on July 1, 1987 alleging violations of the Federal Equal Pay Act of 1963, as amended, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 206(d) ("EPA"), and pendent state law claims. As originally filed, the complaint alleged no claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. Sec. 2000e, et seq., ("Title VII").
When the EEOC received its copy of Trevino's letter to the PHRC, its investigator mailed her counsel a draft of a formal charge. The requisite interview with the EEOC investigator was held and a formal, signed charge on an EEOC form was lodged with the EEOC. This charge alleged sexual discrimination and illegal retaliation for protected activity, both under Title VII.
The PHRC and the EEOC have a worksharing agreement in which they divide responsibility for the initial processing of complaints. Under the terms of that agreement each agency waives its right to initially review claims that are first filed with the other agency. The agencies communicate with each other, however, and under the agreement an agency may request the right to initially process any case that it feels is of special interest to it.
On July 10, 1987, the EEOC transmitted Trevino's EEOC charge to the PHRC with a covering form letter. The form letter provided the following information:
SUBJECT: CHARGE TRANSMITTAL PNC Investment Corp
Sylvia Ann v. Pittsburgh National Bank
TrevinoBarton
-------------------- -------------------------------
(Charging Party) (Respondent)
Transmitted herewith is a charge of employment discrimination initially
received by the
x EEOC__________P.H.R.C. on 07/06/87
(Name of FEPA) (Date of Receipt)
x Pursuant to the worksharing agreement, this charge is to be initially
processed by the EEOC.
Pursuant to the worksharing agreement, this charge is to be initially
processed by the FEPA.
The worksharing agreement does not determine which agency is to initially
process the charge.
The EEOC thus advised the PHRC that the EEOC regarded Trevino's claim as having been initially received by it and that the EEOC would initially process the claim. The PHRC never responded to this notice and on July 20, 1987, the EEOC issued a right to sue letter. Trevino amended her complaint on July 23, 1987 to include the alleged violations of Title VII.
After Trevino received her EEOC right-to-sue letter and amended her complaint to include the Title VII claims, the PHRC sent her two letters--on July 28, 1987 and August 3, 1987--asking for further information regarding her claim. The July 28th letter advised as follows:
IF YOU WISH TO HAVE THE PHRC, in addition to EEOC, PROCESS YOUR CHARGE, YOU MUST CONTACT A PENNSYLVANIA HUMAN RELATIONS COMMISSION OFFICE WITHIN THIRTY DAYS FROM THE RECEIPT OF THIS LETTER.
If you do not contact the PHRC within 30 days, your complaint will not be processed by the PHRC and you will lose your rights to relief under Pennsylvania law. Failure to contact the PHRC will not affect your Federal rights.
Trevino never responded to these letters.
On November 9, 1989, the district court adopted a magistrate's report and recommendation and entered summary judgment in favor of the bank on Trevino's Title VII and Equal Pay Act salary claims. The court declined, however, to enter summary judgment on the Equal Pay Act incentive compensation claim. On February 15, 1989, however, the parties stipulated to a dismissal without prejudice of Trevino's claim for incentive compensation. The district court approved the stipulation on February 21, 1990.
On February 27, 1990, Trevino filed a notice of appeal from "the Order dismissing Plaintiff's claims under the Equal Pay Act entered in this action on the 21st day of February 1990." The bank promptly filed a motion to dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction.
The bank's motion to dismiss alleges two obstacles to this court's jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291 to review final judgments of the district courts. First, the bank claims that because Trevino failed to designate in her notice of appeal that she was appealing the district court's dismissal of her Title VII claims, that dismissal is not properly before this court. Second, the bank claims that, because the February 21, 1990 order referenced in the notice of appeal was a stipulated dismissal without prejudice, that order is not a final adverse judgment and is thus not appealable.
Trevino's notice of appeal referred only to the February 21, 1990 order dismissing Trevino's incentive compensation claim under the Equal Pay Act. The bank claims that this is insufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction to review the district court's earlier order granting summary judgment to the bank on Trevino's other claims.
Even if we were to find that the notice of appeal was itself insufficient, we are not without jurisdiction to review the summary judgment order eliminating Trevino's Title VII claim. The Civil Appeal Information sheet was filed within the thirty day time limit for filing notices of appeal, Fed.R.App.P. 4, and could serve as the "functional equivalent" of an appropriately specific notice of appeal because it accurately described the issues being appealed. As the Supreme Court restated in Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 108 S.Ct. 2405, 101 L.Ed.2d 285 (1988):
the requirements of the rules of procedure should be liberally construed and [ ] "mere technicalities" should not stand in the way of consideration of a case on its merits. Thus, if a litigant files papers in a fashion that is technically at variance with the letter of a procedural rule, a court may nonetheless find that the litigant's action is the functional equivalent of what the rule requires.
108 S.Ct. at 2408-09 (citations omitted). 2
This court has previously found that other documents can supply deficiencies in the notice of appeal if they are timely filed. For example, we found that a consent order could serve as a "functional equivalent" when "[it] was filed within the time for filing an appeal ... [and] served to notify the court and the opposing parties of [appellants'] intention to appeal." Dura Sys. Inc. v. Rothbury Inv. Ltd., 886 F.2d 551, 555 (3d Cir.1989), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct. 844, 107 L.Ed.2d 838 (1990). In circumstances similar to this case, we have concluded that because "the [civil appeal information sheet and attorney appearance form] do, when considered along with the original notice of appeal, satisfy the requirements of Rule 3(c), we believe Dura Systems requires us to deny [the] motion to dismiss." Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., 912 F.2d 663, 666 (3d Cir.1990). Accordingly, we have jurisdiction over the order eliminating Trevino's Title VII claim. 3
This court has recognized that "[s]ettled policy in the federal courts discourages piecemeal appeals and, so, generally recourse may be had to appellate tribunals only when final orders are the subject of review." Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d 950, 951 (3d Cir.1976). As a result,
[g]enerally, an order which dismisses a complaint without prejudice is neither final nor appealable because the deficiency may be corrected by the plaintiff without affecting the cause of action. Only if the plaintiff cannot amend or declares his intention to stand on his complaint does the order become final and appealable.
Id. at 951-52. Making an exception in cases where the plaintiff either is barred from reasserting or has abandoned the remaining claim does not compromise the policy underlying the final judgment rule: if plaintiff cannot or will not bring a second action, there is no risk of multiple litigation.
Trevino's response to the bank's motion to dismiss this appeal states that she abandons her Equal Pay Act incentive compensation claim. 4 This provides adequate assurance against piecemeal litigation. Fassett v. Delta Kappa Epsilon, 807 F.2d 1150, 1157 ...
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