Nolen v. South Bend Public Transp. Corp.

• Decision Date: 07 April 2000
• Docket Number: No. 3:99CV142 AS.,3:99CV142 AS.
• Citation: 99 F.Supp.2d 953
• Parties: Michael S. NOLEN, Plaintiff, v. SOUTH BEND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION and Ryder/Ate, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Indiana

99 F.Supp.2d 953

Michael S. NOLEN, Plaintiff, v. SOUTH BEND PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION CORPORATION and Ryder/Ate, Inc., Defendants.

No. 3:99CV142 AS.

United States District Court, N.D. Indiana, South Bend Division.

April 7, 2000.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Georgia C. Luks-McFarland, South Bend, IN, John C. Hamilton, Hamilton Law Firm, South Bend, IN, for Michael S. Nolen, plaintiff.

Timothy W Woods, Jones Obenchain Ford Pankow, Lewis & Woods, South Bend, IN, for South Bend Public Transportation Corporation, defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

SHARP, District Judge.

This cause is before the Court on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. The parties have fully briefed the issues and the Court heard oral argument on March 17, 2000.

JURISDICTION

The case is brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et. seq. Jurisdiction is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff, Michael Nolen (Nolen) was employed by defendant South Bend Public Transportation Corporation (Transpo) from October 21, 1972 until April 22, 1997. Defendant Ryder/ATE, Inc. (Ryder) is a Delaware corporation that contracts management services to transportation companies throughout the country. Ryder contracted with Transpo and sometime in 1993 provided employee Mary McLain as an Assistant General Manager. At the time McLain began working with Transpo, Nolen was the Director of Operations and reported to the General Manager. For more than twenty years he had always received satisfactory performance reviews and had no negative records in his personnel file.

The facts of this case are somewhat difficult to sort out. The parties disagree as to certain dates and occurrences. In addition, much of the allegedly harassing behavior is based on inference and innuendo. However, for summary judgment purposes the Court construes the facts in a light most favorable to Nolen. Nolen alleges that beginning in 1995, McLain began making sexual comments and propositioning him.¹ He ignored her advances. At the end of 1995, she and the General Manager gave Nolen an excellent performance evaluation. According to Nolen, McLain then requested to directly supervise Nolen's department. The request was granted some time in 1996. Once Nolen had to report directly to her, McLain allegedly began a campaign to either get him to have a relationship with her or to get him out of the company.

In February or March of 1996, McLain and Nolen were to attend a training seminar in Wisconsin. Nolen did not want to go and asked McLain if a young female employee could take his place. The record indicates that McLain may have thought Nolen wanted to go with the young women. Nolen alleges that McLain became angry and jealous. After this incident McLain increased Nolen's assignments, nit-picked, and allegedly showed favoritism to males who supposedly accepted her "propositions." In August of 1996, McLain became the General Director. After her promotion, she began creating a paper trail, writing notes and documenting frequent complaints about Nolen. In October, 1996, without McLain's knowledge, Nolen requested his personnel file and looked through its contents. This was the last time he was allowed to see his file until it was subpoenaed in 1998.²

In December, 1996, McLain accused Nolen of falsifying time sheets for part-time employees.³ Nolen denied the accusation and the personnel specialist responsible for payroll vouched for him. (See Cook Aff.) In spite of this, McLain asserts the falsification of payroll as one of the legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for dismissing Nolen. In January 1997, Nolen received his first negative evaluation and a "six-month improvement plan" from McLain. Nolen complained to Ryder on January 28, 1997, and had a follow-up call on February 7.⁴ In late February, McLain told Nolen he had not yet met any of his improvement goals. In early March, 1997, someone circulated copies of newspaper articles about the Missouri transportation department where McLain previously worked. The articles were very critical of McLain. She accused Nolen of distributing the articles and trying to create dissension. Several employees testified that Nolen did not distribute those articles. (Anderlik Aff.; Hackney Aff.; Williams Aff.) On March 7 and March 13, 1997, McLain and Nolen both met with Transpo board members.⁵ There is nothing in the record to indicate that any action was taken or that notes were kept. McLain next accused Nolen of violating a time-off policy she had recently changed.⁶ At some point Nolen left on his scheduled vacation. McLain claims she found "several violations of company policy" while Nolen was away, however, she never elaborates further. Shortly after Nolen returned from vacation he was fired. McLain contends she had further reason to believe that Nolen falsified payroll, violated company policies and purposely incited dissension among the workers therefore his discharge was for cause. Nolen claims those reasons are a pretext for sex discrimination. Nolen filed charges with the E.E.O.C. alleging sex/gender harassment, hostile environment and retaliation. He claims he suffered severe mental distress.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a motion for summary judgment shall be granted "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R.Civ.P. 56(c); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Bragg v. Navistar Int'l Trans. Corp., 164 F.3d 373 (7th Cir. 1998); Leisen v. City of Shelbyville, 968 F.Supp. 409 (S.D.Ind.1997), aff'd 153 F.3d 805 (7th Cir.1998).

The initial burden is on the moving party to demonstrate, "with or without supporting affidavits," the absence of a genuine issue of material fact and that judgment as a matter of law should be granted in the moving party's favor. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56); Larimer v. Dayton Hudson Corp., 137 F.3d 497 (7th Cir.1998), reh'g denied. A question of material fact is a question which will be outcome determinative of an issue in the case. The Supreme Court has instructed that the facts material in a specific case shall be determined by the substantive law controlling the given case or issue. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Once the moving party has met the initial burden, the opposing party must "go beyond the pleadings" and "designate `specific facts shows that there is a genuine [material] issue for trial.'" Id. The nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, Weicherding v. Riegel, 160 F.3d 1139 (7th Cir.1998); Waldridge v. American Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920-21 (7th Cir.1994), nor may that party rely upon conclusory allegations in affidavits. Smith v. Shawnee Library Sys., 60 F.3d 317, 320 (7th Cir.1995). This general standard is applied with added rigor in employment discrimination cases, where intent is inevitably the central issue. De-Luca v. Winer Indus., Inc., 53 F.3d 793 (7th Cir.1995); McCoy v. WGN Continental Broadcasting Co., 957 F.2d 368 (7th Cir.1992); Tomasello v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 8 F.Supp.2d 1090 (N.D.Ill.1998). Accordingly, "affidavits and depositions must be carefully scrutinized for circumstantial proof which, if believed, would show discrimination." Collier v. Budd Co., 66 F.3d 886, 892 (7th Cir.1995); Courtney v. Biosound, Inc., 42 F.3d 414, 418 (7th Cir. 1994).

On a motion for summary judgment, the entire record is considered with all reasonable inferences drawn in favor of the nonmovant and all factual disputes resolved in his favor. Schneiker v. Fortis Insurance Co., 200 F.3d 1055 (7th Cir.2000); Baron v. City of Highland Park, 195 F.3d 333, 337-38 (7th Cir.1999). The burden of establishing a lack of any genuine issue of material fact rests on the movant. Wollin v. Gondert, 192 F.3d 616, 621-22 (7th Cir. 1999); Essex v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 111 F.3d 1304, 1308 (7th Cir.1997). The nonmovant, however, must make a showing sufficient to establish any essential element for which he will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265; Shank v. William R. Hague, Inc., 192 F.3d 675, 681 (7th Cir.1999); Wintz v. Northrop Corp., 110 F.3d 508, 512 (7th Cir.1997). Applying the above standard, this Court addresses defendant's motion.

II. PROPER DEFENDANTS

Nolen filed his suit against both Transpo and Ryder. He asserts that Ryder is subject to liability because it was McLain's employer. Alternatively, Nolen asserts that Ryder is liable as his co-employer.

A. The E.E.O.C. Charges

Ryder claims that it cannot be named as a defendant because it was not named in Nolen's E.E.O.C. filing. Ordinarily, a party not named in an E.E.O.C. charge may not be sued under Title VII. However, given the Civil Rights Act's purposes, charges are to be construed with utmost liberality and parties sufficiently named or alluded to in the factual statement are to be joined. Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers', Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 905 (7th Cir.1981). The purpose of this exception is to prevent frustration of the goals of Title VII by not requiring procedural exactness. Id. at 906. It is noted that Congress could not have intended that "a person filing E.E.O.C. charges should accurately ascertain, at the risk of later facing dismissal, at the time the charges were made, every separate entity which may have violated Title VII." Id. at 906; see Jenkins v. Blue Cross, 538 F.2d 164 (7th Cir.1976), cert. denied 429 U.S. 986, 97 S.Ct. 506, 50 L.Ed.2d 598.

In Eggleston, the Seventh Circuit adopted an exception to the general rule that a party must be named in an E.E.O.C. charge in order to be sued...