State v. Carpenter
| Decision Date | 02 May 1917 |
| Docket Number | 435. |
| Parties | STATE v. CARPENTER ET AL. |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Appeal from Superior Court, Gaston County; Justice, Judge.
R. L Carpenter and another were convicted of receiving more than one quart of spirituous liquor, and they appeal. No error.
The count upon which the conviction was asked was as follows:
"And the jurors for the state, upon their oath, present that R L. Carpenter and Thomas Propst, late of Gaston county unlawfully and willfully did at and in Gaston county, on the 1st day of June, 1916, receive more than one quart of spirituous and intoxicating liquors, namely, did receive one gallon of whisky, contrary to the form of the statute in such cases made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state."
Public Laws of 1915, c. 97, § 2, is as follows:
"That it shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation at any one time, or in any one package to receive at a point within the state of North Carolina for his or her use or for the use of any person, firm or corporation, or for any other purpose, any spirituous or vinous liquors or intoxicating bitters in a quantity greater than one quart or any malt liquors in a quantity greater than five gallons."
S. J. Durham, of Gastonia, for appellants.
Attorney General, J. S. Manning, and Assistant Attorney General R. H. Sykes, for the State.
The verdict is well supported by the evidence, even the defendants' own testimony. They admitted that they had bought a glass jug containing one gallon of whisky, and also four quarts in separate bottles, from a man who was driving an automobile about three miles from Cherryville, in Gaston county, and that it was delivered to and received by them. They put it in their buggy, and it was found in their possession by the officers, who were searching for them, having received information that they had the liquor. The defendants contend, though:
"That the context of the act indicates that receiving as an aid to the unlawful transportation of liquor is the evil which the Legislature intended to prohibit."
But the first section of the chapter provides that:
It shall be unlawful for any one to "transport, carry or deliver, in any manner or by any means whatsoever, for hire or otherwise, in any one package or at any one time from a point within or without this state, to any [other] person, firm or corporation in this state, any spirituous liquors * * * in a quantity greater than one quart * * * and it shall be unlawful for any spirituous * * * liquors * * * so shipped, transported, carried or delivered in any one package to be contained in more than one receptacle." (Italics ours.)
It will be observed, in reading the statute, that in section 2 there is no reference to section 1, and it is contended, therefore, that it creates a separate and distinct offense, but, whether this be true or not, the receiving of liquor, under the circumstances stated in the indictment and detailed in the proof, would be an aid to the unlawful transportation, carriage, or delivery of the liquor. We do not perceive how the statute can be unconstitutional and void, even if the receipt of the liquor is "incidental to a purchase of it." There the sale was an unlawful one, as it was in this instance. The case falls within the plain and unmistakable terms of the statute. It is not necessary that the receipt should have been from one who had transported, carried, or delivered the liquor in interstate commerce, because the statute clearly embraces a carriage and delivery when they are acts done wholly within the state. It would seem that the person in the automobile, from whom the defendants purchased the liquor, was an itinerant dealer, acting in open violation of the law. While this does not play any very important part in the determination of the case as to its legal aspects, it discloses an evil against which the Legislature was evidently providing.
We have often held that a statute, even one of a criminal nature, when ambiguous, should receive a reasonable construction, so as to ascertain the intention of its framers, and to suppress the mischief against which it is directed. When the meaning is plain, as in this case, there is no room for construction. We merely interpret it as it is written and clearly expressed. The court recently said in Caminetti v. U. S., 37 S.Ct. 193:
"It is elementary that the meaning of a statute must, in the first instance, be sought in the language in which the act is framed, and if that is plain, and if the law is within the constitutional authority of the lawmaking body which passed it, the sole function of the courts is to enforce it according to its terms" (citing numerous cases).
And again:
There is no ambiguity in the terms of this act. If the proof had shown that defendants had merely bought and received the four quarts, each quart in a separate bottle, for themselves and others, the result might have been different (State v. Little, 171 N.C. 805, 88 S.E. 723), though this question is not before us.
It is here charged substantially that defendants received one package containing more than one quart, and at one time. It was not necessary that both of the latter elements should have coexisted, as it was sufficient that they received more than one quart at one time, or in one package, for themselves, as there are two offenses created by section 2, one for receiving more than one quart at one time, or at one delivery, and the other for receiving more than one quart in one package, as the language is virtually the same as that in the first section, which has been held to create two offenses as to transporting, carrying or delivering liquor. State v. Little, supra.
There was an objection to the form of the bill, but we think, as against a motion to arrest the judgment, it is sufficiently definite to inform the defendants of the charge preferred against them. By fair and reasonable intendment, it charged a receipt of more than one quart of liquor in one package; that is, one solid gallon of liquor, not four quarts, or eight pints. We have held that, in order to sustain a motion in arrest of judgment, after verdict, for defects in the indictment, it must appear that the bill is so defective that a judgment cannot be pronounced upon a verdict thereunder. State v. Moses, 13 N.C. 452; State v. Smith, 63 N.C. 234; State v. Francis, 157 N.C. 612, 72 S.E. 1041; State v. Barnes, 122 N.C. 1031, 29 S.E. 381; State v. Ratliff, 170 N.C. 707, 86 S.E. 997. The act of 1811, c. 809 (Revisal, § 3254), provides:
"Every criminal proceeding by warrant, indictment, information, or impeachment, shall be sufficient in form for all intents and purposes, if it express the charge against the defendant in a plain, intelligible, and explicit manner; and the same shall not be quashed, nor the judgment thereon stayed, by reason of any informality or refinement, if in the bill or proceeding,...
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