Christie ex rel. Estate of Christie v. Scott

Decision Date09 January 2013
Docket NumberCase No. 2:10–cv–420.
Citation923 F.Supp.2d 1308
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
PartiesJoyce CHRISTIE, on behalf of the ESTATE OF Nicholas T. CHRISTIE, deceased, Plaintiff, v. Mike SCOTT, Lee County Sheriff; Prison Health Services, Inc., n/k/a PHS Correctional Healthcare; Deputy Daniel Falzone; Deputy Kurtis Calhoun; Deputy Dathan S. Pyle; Sergeant Armando Croker; Sergeant Mary DaRoss; Maria Canete, R.N.; Linda Sundo, L.P.N.; Natalia Saunders, R.N.; Joan Winnie, R.N.; Janice Stepnoski, L.C.S.W.; Karen Overbee; Christine Aten; Sergeant Robert Bramblet; and Tammy Hamilton, R.N.; Defendants.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

Nicholas A. Dicello, William Hawal, Spangenberg Shibley & Liber LLP, Cleveland, OH, Troy Alan Rafferty, Virginia Marie Buchanan, Levin, Papantonio, Thomas, Mitchell, Echsner & Proctor, PA, Pensacola, FL, Theodore Lawton Tripp, Jr., Hahn, Loeser & Parks, LLP, Ft. Myers, FL, for Plaintiff.

Summer M. Barranco, Richard A. Giuffreda, Purdy, Jolly, Giuffreda & Barranco, PA, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Gregg A. Toomey, Bunnell & Woulfe, PA, Ft. Myers, FL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

PAUL A. MAGNUSON, District Judge.

This matter is before the Court on three Motions for Summary Judgment. For the reasons that follow, the Motions are granted in part and denied in part.

BACKGROUND

In March 2009, Nick Christie drove from his home in Ohio to visit his brother in the Ft. Myers area. During his trip to Florida, he called his wife and she became concerned about his mental health. After he arrived in Florida, his wife contacted the Lee County Sheriff's Office and asked them to check on Christie, because she was worried about his mental condition. Sheriff's deputies ultimately arrested Christie for public intoxication, and he was held overnight at the Lee County Jail. When he was booked into the jail, Christie told staff that he had several serious health problems, including asthma, chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder (COPD), and diabetes. He informed jail staff of the medications he was taking and gave them the name of his physician and his pharmacy. There is some dispute about how complete the information Christie gave the Jail was, but there is no dispute that he gave them some information from which an investigation might have gleaned Christie's complete health history. ( See Saunders Dep. (Docket No. 202) at 70–78 (discussing contents of Christie's intake file from March 25, 2009, which included medications and the name of a pharmacy, in addition to an authorization Christie signed that would allow PHS to access Christie's medical history).) No one at the jail ever checked these sources for more information about Christie's health.

Although the state judge who held the arraignment asked for a mental health evaluation on Christie, no evaluation was done. Rather, Christie was released on March 26.

On the afternoon of March 27, Christie was once again arrested. He was at an Arby's attempting to give money to passers-by. During booking, he refused to answer questions about his medical condition or medications. No medical intake was done when he was first brought to the Jail, as PHS policy requires. Rather, the medical technician attempted to conduct an intake screening with Christie just after 2:00 am on March 28, twelve hours after his arrest. Christie refused to provide any medical information to the intake clerk at that time.

Christie was initially housed in a closed cell unit but on March 28 was moved to a more open unit of the Jail, Unit 3A, where detainees with mental health concerns were placed to allow for closer observation. ( See Saunders Dep. (Docket No. 202) at 38 (Q: “And mental health patients, including those who may be off their meds, would be housed on 3A at the downtown jail, correct?” A: “In 2009, yes.”).) He was apparently very loud and belligerent and was also confused—he repeatedly asked for his car keys so he could go home. There is little evidence, however, that he was physically violent with staff. 1

Despite this, Christie was sprayed more than 12 times with pepper spray, or oleoresin capsicum (OC), during his brief stay at the jail. He was also restrained in a restraint chair for more than five hours, was sprayed with OC while restrained, was not decontaminated after the pepper spraying, and was at times forced to wear a “spit mask” over his nose and mouth, including when he was strapped naked in a restraint chair and after being sprayed with pepper spray. He was not given any of his prescribed medication during this time, either. On March 29, Christie's health deterioratedand he was transported to the hospital. He died on March 31 at the age of 62. The coroner determined that the cause of death was homicide due to OC poisoning. Indeed, the emergency room physician who examined Christie at the hospital testified that Christie was “entirely covered” in pepper spray, and that the physician had to decontaminate himself during his treatment of Christie because of the amount of pepper spray. (Guffrey Dep. (Docket No. 194) at 8.)

Christie's widow brought this lawsuit, alleging violations of § 1983 for excessive force and deliberate indifference to Christie's serious medical and mental-health needs, and a variety of state-law torts. Her claims are brought against the three moving parties here: Prison Health Services, which was the contract provider for medical and mental-health services at the Jail, and PHS's medical-staff employees; Sheriff Mike Scott; and employees of the Sheriff who work in the Jail. Plaintiff recently amended her Complaint to assert punitive damages, and the operative Complaint is the Fifth Amended Complaint (Docket No. 248).

DISCUSSION

Summary judgment is proper only if there are no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The Court must view the evidence and the inferences that may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1187 (11th Cir.1999).

The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. O'Ferrell v. United States, 253 F.3d 1257, 1265 (11th Cir.2001). When opposing a motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must demonstrate the existence of specific facts in the record that create a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A party opposing a properly supported motion for summary judgment may not rest upon mere allegations or denials and must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

A. PHS2

Plaintiff brings claims against PHS and eight of PHS's employees at the Jail: Maria Canete, Linda Sundo, Natalia Saunders, Joan Winnie, Janice Stepnoski, Karen Overbee, Christine Aten, and Tammy Hamilton. Stepnoski is a social worker, and Aten was a medical technician, but the remaining PHS Defendants are licensed nurses, either RNs or LPNs. Plaintiff's claims against the PHS Defendants are: § 1983 deliberate indifference (count 2); § 1983 failure to train (count 3); § 1983 unconstitutional custom, policy, or practice (counts 4 and 5); medical negligence (count 7); and negligent hiring, retention, or supervision (count 11). PHS concedes that there are questions of fact on the negligence claims (medical negligence and negligent hiring, retention, or supervision), and thus the Court will not discuss those claims further.

Although PHS is not a municipal entity, [w]here a function which is traditionally the exclusive prerogative of the state (or here, the county) is performed by a private entity,’ that private entity, like a municipality, may be held liable under § 1983.” Fields v. Prison Health Servs., Inc., 2:09cv529, 2011 WL 3878373, at *7 (M.D.Fla. Sept. 2, 2011) (Steele, J.) (quoting Ancata v. Prison Health Servs., 769 F.2d 700, 703 (11th Cir.1985)).

Each individual PHS Defendant had different contacts with Christie during his time at the Jail. Defendants Joan Winnie and Linda Sundo were on duty on March 29, the day Christie was sprayed multiple times, placed in a restraint chair and sprayed while restrained, and then finally taken to the hospital. They each evaluated Christie after one or more applications of pepper spray. Their supervisor that day, and apparently the person who made the decision to send Christie to the hospital, is Defendant Maria Canete, who was the charge nurse on duty. Canete also called Defendant Janice Stepnoski, the Jail's social worker, to request a mental-health screening for Christie, but that call was not made until 6 pm on Saturday evening, and by the time Stepnoski came into the Jail on Sunday, Christie was in the throes of a medical emergency. (Stepnoski Dep. (Docket No. 205) at 62.) Christie was never screened for mental-health issues.

Defendant Christine Aten was the intake clerk who was unable to get any medical information from Christie after his second arrest. Defendant Karen Overbee is an assistant director of nursing at the Jail; as such, she was Canete's direct supervisor, but she had no direct contact with Christie during his time at the Jail. Overbee's involvement in the case appears to be that she allegedly told Aten, the intake clerk, that the medical intake screening information from Christie's first Jail stay was not accessible, even though that information was indeed accessible and should have been included in the second intake screening.

Defendant Natalia Saunders was also an assistant director of nursing at the time of Christie's stay at the Jail. She was covering another nurse's shift on the afternoon of March 27, when...

To continue reading

Request your trial
7 cases
  • Johnson v. Massey
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida
    • February 23, 2023
    ...Miami v. Sanders, 672 So.2d 46, 47 (Fla. 3d DCA 1996), the Defendants may be liable for assault and battery under Florida law.” Christie, 923 F.Supp.2d at 1329; see also v. Untch, 79 F.Supp.3d 1305, 1315 (S.D. Fla. 2015) (stating that a state law “battery claim for excessive force is analyz......
  • Harris v. Rambosk
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • November 5, 2019
    ...force and his state-law claim for assault and battery are analyzed under the same standard. See Christie ex rel. estate of Christie v. Scott, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2013)("[T]he crux of a state-law assault and battery claim against [] officers is whether a reasonable officer ......
  • Harris v. Rambosk
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida
    • November 5, 2019
    ...is governed by the objective reasonableness standard of a federal excessive force claim. See Christie ex rel. estate of Christie v. Scott, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1328 (M.D. Fla. 2013)("[T]he crux of a state-law assault and battery claim against [] officers is whether a reasonable officer wou......
  • Harris v. Am. Int'l Grp., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma
    • February 11, 2013
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • THE HORROR CHAMBER: UNQUALIFIED IMPUNITY IN PRISON.
    • United States
    • Notre Dame Law Review Vol. 93 No. 5, May 2018
    • May 1, 2018
    ...(containing graphic photographs of Darren Rainey's burned flesh). (126) Christie v. Scott, 923 F. Supp. 2d 1308, 1314 (M.D. Fla. 2013); see also Radley Balko, Death in the Devil's Chair: Florida Man's Pepper Spray Death Raises Questions About Jail Abuse, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2017), (127......
  • Part two: case summaries by major topic.
    • United States
    • Detention and Corrections Caselaw Quarterly No. 60, June 2014
    • June 1, 2014
    ...(Richmond City Jail Annex, Virginia) U.S. District Court MEDICAL CARE USE OF FORCE Christie ex rel. estate of Christie v. Scott, 923 F.Supp.2d 1308 (M.D.Fla. 2013). An estate brought a [section] 1983 action against a private prison health services provider and corrections officers following......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT