State v. Staley
| Decision Date | 21 August 1996 |
| Parties | STATE of Oregon, Appellant, v. Kenneth STALEY, Respondent. C93-02-31280; CA A81943. |
| Court | Oregon Court of Appeals |
Janie M. Burcart, Assistant Attorney General, argued the cause for appellant. On the briefs were Theodore R. Kulongoski, Attorney General, Virginia L. Linder, Solicitor General, and Janet A. Klapstein, Assistant Attorney General.
Jesse Wm. Barton, Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief was Sally L. Avera, Public Defender.
Before WARREN, P.J., and LEESON and ARMSTRONG, JJ.
Defendant is charged with 13 counts of sexual abuse in the third degree allegedly committed against five minor victims. The state appeals from the trial court's pretrial order suppressing evidence; defendant cross-assigns error to the trial court's decision not to sever the cases for separate trials. We determine that defendant's cross-assignment is not properly before us and we reverse and remand on the state's appeal.
Defendant was a drama teacher and basketball coach at Marshall High School. The charges arose out of his conduct toward female students. In the spring of 1992, the principal of Marshall High, Karr-Morris, received complaints from female students about sexually harassing conduct by defendant toward them. Defendant was warned to avoid inappropriate contact with students. After receiving several more complaints, Karr-Morris contacted the Portland school police to investigate them. During December 1992, a Portland school police officer, Leedom, investigated the complaint.
Based on Leedom's investigation, the state charged defendant with 13 counts of sexual abuse in the third degree. 1 All of the charges involve conduct between defendant and his female students that is alleged to have occurred during school hours. The charges were as follows:
Count 1: that defendant subjected victim N to sexual contact by touching her buttocks;
Counts 2 and 3: that defendant subjected victim C to sexual contact by pressing his groin area against her;
Counts 4 and 5: that defendant subjected victim C to sexual contact by touching her breasts;
Counts 6, 7, 8 and 9: that defendant subjected victim K to sexual contact by touching her buttocks;
Counts 10, 11 and 12: that defendant subjected victim S to sexual contact by touching her buttocks;
Count 13: that defendant subjected victim J to sexual contact by touching her buttocks.
Defendant initially moved to sever the charges and require the court to conduct five trials, one for each victim. Defendant argued that he would be unduly prejudiced by trying all the charges together, because the jury would be unable to keep the evidence related to each charge separate from the evidence related to the other charges. He argued that the charges alleged conduct that was "inflammatory and morally reprehensible" and that the jury would likely "cumulate the evidence to find guilt on all charges." The court denied the motion.
Subsequently, defendant filed a pretrial motion to exclude the following categories of evidence:
The trial court granted the motion, ordering that, in a joint trial, all of the challenged evidence would be inadmissible. At the hearing, the state summarized the court's oral holding by stating that "the [c]ourt is ruling that all of the evidence the [s]tate intends to provide other than the precise physical conduct that constitutes the crime is inadmissible." The court replied that "that is a spare statement of my analysis of what I'm obliged to do by the precedents."
On appeal, the state argues that the trial court's ruling excluding all evidence except the precise physical contact at issue is unduly restrictive and constitutes an abuse of discretion. Because the state told the trial court that it did not intend to offer any evidence about alleged misconduct toward people other than the five complaining witnesses in the case, we do not address whether that evidence would be admissible.
As we understand the trial court's ruling with respect to the other types of evidence listed above, it did not determine what evidence would be admissible if it conducted five separate trials, one for each complaining witness. The court stated that, if separate trials were conducted, the state could use "whatever evidence the jurisprudence seems to suggest is admissible as to each one of [the victims.]" The court was concerned, however, about the cumulative effect of the evidence if it were all offered in one trial. Consequently, the court ruled that, if the state chose to proceed with the joined charges, only evidence relating to the precise physical conduct charged as offenses would be admissible. 2
The trial court erred in limiting before trial the evidence that the state could use to show defendant's intent. There are three types of evidence that the state wants to have admitted at trial and that defendant wants to exclude: (1) evidence of uncharged misconduct by defendant toward the victims in this case, (2) testimony by the principal or others about allegations of uncharged misconduct by defendant against the victims and (3) evidence about stories that defendant asked the victims to read.
To determine whether the challenged evidence is admissible at trial, there are two questions the court must answer. First, is the evidence relevant to an issue in the case? OEC 401; OEC 402. If the evidence is relevant, the court then must determine whether its probative value is outweighed by unfair prejudice to the accused. OEC 403. Defendant's motion in limine sought to exclude broad categories of evidence that may or may not be relevant. The same evidence, if it is relevant, may or may not be unduly prejudicial. Without a factual context, neither the trial court nor we can make that determination. Until the issues to be tried are known, which may not occur in this case until after the state has put on its case, it is not possible to determine whether the evidence at issue is relevant or, if relevant, how probative it will be.
Once it becomes clear whether the evidence is relevant, the court...
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