Boley v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.

• Decision Date: 10 June 2010
• Docket Number: No. 2009-0542.,2009-0542.
• Citation: 929 N.E.2d 448,125 Ohio St.3d 510,2010 Ohio 2550
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court
• Parties: BOLEY, Exr., et al., Appellants,v.GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, Appellee, et al.

125 Ohio St.3d 510

929 N.E.2d 448

2010 Ohio 2550

BOLEY, Exr., et al., Appellants,v.GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, Appellee, et al.

No. 2009-0542.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted Dec. 15, 2009.

Decided June 10, 2010.

Syllabus of the Court

A premises owner is not liable in tort for claims arising from asbestos exposure originating from asbestos on the owner's property unless the exposure occurred at the owner's property.

Bevan & Associates, L.P.A., Inc., Thomas W. Bevan, Patrick M. Walsh, and John D. Mismas, Northfield, for appellants.

Vorys, Sater, Seymour & Pease, L.L.P., Richard D. Schuster, Nina I. Webb-Lawton, Matthew M. Daiker, and Michael J. Hendershot, Columbus, for appellee.

Brzytwa, Quick & McCrystal, L.L.C., James L. McCrystal Jr., and Matthew L. Snyder, Cleveland, urging affirmance for amicus curiae Ohio Association of Civil Trial Attorneys.

Calfee, Halter & Griswold, L.L.P., Thomas I. Michals, Matthew M. Mendoza, and Laura C. McBride, Cleveland, urging affirmance for amici curiae Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company, Ohio Edison Company, and Toledo Edison Company.

Shook, Hardy & Bacon, L.L.P., Victor E. Schwartz, and Mark A. Behrens, Washington, D.C., urging affirmance for amici curiae Ohio Chamber of Commerce, American Insurance Association, Coalition for Litigation Justice, Inc., NFIB Small Business Legal Center, Chamber of Commerce of the United States of America, American Tort Reform Association, National Association of Mutual Insurance Companies, American Petroleum Institute, and American Chemistry Council.

O'DONNELL, J.

{¶ 1} Cheryl Boley, executor of the estate of Mary Adams, and Mary's husband, Clayton Adams, appeal from a decision of the Eighth District Court of Appeals that affirmed summary judgment in favor of Clayton's former employer, Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, in connection with their claims for negligence, strict liability, breach of express and implied warranties, loss of consortium, statutory products liability, fraudulent concealment and representation, wrongful death, and punitive damages allegedly arising from Mary's exposure to asbestos when she laundered Clayton's work clothes in their home. The issue presented for consideration in this appeal is whether R.C. 2307.941(A) bars all tort liability against a premises owner for asbestos exposure originating from asbestos on the owner's property if the exposure occurred away from the owner's property or whether R.C. 2307.941(A) is inapplicable in such instances, thus permitting recovery against a premises owner.

{¶ 2} Upon review, we conclude that pursuant to R.C. 2307.941(A), a premises owner is not liable in tort for claims arising from asbestos exposure originating from asbestos on the owner's property unless the exposure occurred at the owner's property. Accordingly, the decision of the appellate court is affirmed.

Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 3} Goodyear employed Clayton Adams as a pipefitter from 1973 to 1983 at its St. Marys, Ohio facility. His employment caused him to work with asbestos-containing materials, and he brought asbestos dust home on his clothing. Mary Adams allegedly breathed in the dust when she shook out his work clothes prior to laundering them.

{¶ 4} In March 2007, Andrea Arrossi, M.D., diagnosed Mary with malignant mesothelioma. Following this diagnosis, Clayton and Mary filed suit against more than 200 defendants, including Goodyear, alleging that asbestos exposure caused Mary's condition and resulted from Goodyear's negligence in allowing asbestos to be carried off its property. Mary died of mesothelioma in July 2007. Thereafter, the trial court substituted the executor of Mary's estate, Cheryl Boley, as a party to this case.

{¶ 5} Goodyear then moved for summary judgment in accordance with R.C. 2307.941(A)(1), which provides that premises owners are “not liable for any injury to any individual resulting from asbestos exposure unless that individual's alleged exposure occurred while the individual was at the premises owner's property.” Appellants opposed the motion, arguing that R.C. 2307.941(A) applies only to premises-liability claims and therefore subdivision (A)(1) should not prevent their negligence claim. After review, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of Goodyear.

{¶ 6} The court of appeals affirmed, holding that R.C. 2307.941(A)(1) precluded liability with respect to the alleged claims because Mary's exposure to asbestos did not occur at Goodyear's property. See Adams v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Cuyahoga App. No. 91404, 2009-Ohio-491, 2009 WL 280398, ¶ 18, 24.

{¶ 7} Clayton and Cheryl Boley appealed to this court, and we agreed to address the following proposition of law:

{¶ 8} “Revised Code Section 2307.941(A) does not apply to ‘take home exposure’ asbestos cases against a family member's employer who exposed the employee to asbestos and that family member brought asbestos home on their clothing causing other family members to become exposed to asbestos, and develop an asbestos related disease.”

{¶ 9} On appeal, Clayton and Boley contend that R.C. 2307.941(A), which provides that subdivisions (A)(1), (2), and (3) are applicable only to tort actions for asbestos claims against a premises owner for “exposure to asbestos on the premises owner's property” (emphasis added), does not apply to their claims, because Mary's “exposure to asbestos” occurred at her home rather than on Goodyear's property. Therefore, they assert that R.C. 2307.941(A)(1) does not bar Goodyear's liability, and they urge that a contrary interpretation would violate their rights to due process.

{¶ 10} In response, Goodyear maintains that the phrase “on the premises owner's property” in R.C. 2307.941(A) modifies “asbestos” rather than “exposure,” and therefore, subdivision (A) applies to all claims for exposure to “asbestos on the premises owner's property” without regard to where the exposure occurred. Goodyear further argues that because the claim seeks liability for Mary's exposure to asbestos originating from its property, R.C. 2307.941(A)(1) expressly precludes liability. Moreover, Goodyear also contends that the interpretation of R.C. 2307.941(A) offered by Boley and Clayton would render subdivision (A)(1) meaningless, because the event that would preclude liability pursuant to subdivision (A)(1)-exposure somewhere other than the premises owner's property-would also render division (A) inapplicable. Goodyear argues that pursuant to this interpretation, subdivision (A)(1) would never apply to bar claims when the exposure to asbestos occurred away from the premises owner's property. Consequently, Goodyear asks this court to hold that R.C. 2307.941(A) applies to all tort actions filed against it for asbestos exposure originating from asbestos on its property, without any limitation to where the exposure occurred, and as such, subdivision (A)(1) precludes all claims for asbestos exposure occurring away from its property as a matter of law.

{¶ 11} Accordingly, we are called upon to consider whether R.C. 2307.941(A) applies to all claims by individuals seeking to recover from premises owners for asbestos exposure originating from asbestos on the owner's property, thereby prohibiting liability for exposure that did not occur at the owner's property.

R.C. 2307.941

{¶ 12} The General Assembly enacted R.C. 2307.941 as part of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292, 150 Ohio Laws, Part III, 3970, which revised state law governing asbestos litigation in response to a legislative finding that “[t]he current asbestos personal injury litigation system is unfair and inefficient, imposing a severe burden on litigants and taxpayers alike.” Section 3(A)(2) of Am.Sub.H.B. No. 292, id. at 3988.

{¶ 13} R.C. 2307.941 provides:

{¶ 14} “(A) The following apply to all tort actions for asbestos claims brought against a premises owner to recover damages or other relief for exposure to asbestos on the premises owner's property:

{¶ 15} “(1) A premises owner is not liable for any injury to any individual resulting from asbestos exposure unless that individual's alleged exposure occurred while the individual was at the premises owner's property.

{¶ 16} “(2) If exposure to asbestos is alleged to have occurred before January 1, 1972, it is presumed that a premises owner knew that this state had adopted safe levels of exposure for asbestos and that products containing asbestos were used on its property only at levels below those safe levels of exposure. * * *

{¶ 17} “(3)(a) A premises owner is presumed to be not liable for any injury to any invitee who was engaged to work with, install, or remove asbestos products on the premises owner's property if the invitee's employer held itself out as qualified to perform the work. * * *

{¶ 18} “(b) A premises owner that hired a contractor before January 1, 1972, to perform the type of work at the premises owner's property that the contractor was qualified to perform cannot be liable for any injury to any individual resulting from asbestos exposure caused by any of the contractor's employees or agents on the premises owner's property * * *.

{¶ 19} “(c) If exposure to asbestos is alleged to have occurred on or after January 1, 1972, a premises owner is not liable for any injury to any individual resulting from that exposure caused by a contractor's employee or agent on the premises owner's property * * *.”

{¶ 20} As we explained in State v. Buehler, 113 Ohio St.3d 114, 2007-Ohio-1246, 863 N.E.2d 124, “in cases of statutory construction, ‘our paramount concern is the legislative intent in enacting the statute.’ ” Id. at ¶ 29, quoting State ex rel. Steele v. Morrissey, 103 Ohio St.3d 355, 2004-Ohio-4960, 815 N.E.2d 1107, ¶ 21. To determine intent, we look to the language of the statute and the purpose that is to be accomplished by the statute, see Rice v. CertainTeed Corp. (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 417, 419, 704 N.E.2d 1217, and “when its meaning is clear and unambiguous,” we apply the statute “as written.” Cheap...